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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Resettlement policies and laws in South Asian countries at present focus primarily on 
compensation payment for property acquired for a public purpose. This book assesses the adequacy of 
conventional compensation and resettlement assistance programs such as cash-for-land, land-for-land 
compensation, limited and temporary employment opportunities at project construction sites, better 
housing in urban development projects, and income and livelihood restoration and improvement 
assistance programs. It also examines affected persons’ perspectives, how they perceive their 
displacement, and what strategies they use to respond to displacement with or without assistance from 
project sponsors and authorities. This knowledge will help policy makers, project sponsors, and project 
executive agencies to improve resettlement planning and implementation programs and, at least to some 
extent, will assist in reforming resettlement policies and land laws. Such reforms, this book argues, 
should consider (i) the adequacy of current resettlement policy frameworks to deal with complex, 
widespread, and ambiguous experiences of affected persons of development interventions; (ii) the almost 
inevitable impoverishment of project-affected persons from the pre-displacement phase to post-
resettlement phase; (iii) limited state commitment to broadening such policy frameworks into national 
laws; and (iv) widespread weak institutional capacity to implement the laws. 
During the past 60 years, various interpretations of the land acquisition acts have been attempted by 
policy makers, academics, development practitioners, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and national 
courts in South Asia. Such interpretations have mostly been people-centered and have intended to 
provide a better compensation package to the displaced, particularly to poor and vulnerable persons. Key 
issues that have been discussed and articulated include (i) the adequacy of consultation with affected 
persons and communities on land acquisition and compensation; (ii) the comparative costs of cash-for-
land and land-for-land compensation as acquisition modalities; (iii) the desirability and possibility of 
assisting physically displaced households to resettle at a project-sponsored resettlement site compared 
to providing sufficient cash compensation and incentives to help displaced households self-relocate; and 
(iv) how to avoid impoverishment of displaced persons and their households. These are also the key 
issues that this book considers, using in-depth fieldwork from several South Asian countries. 
The book comprises recent displacement and resettlement case studies conducted by several 
anthropologists and sociologists in South Asia. Each contributor wrote around the key theme of the book: 
Is resettlement a development opportunity for those displaced by a development intervention? In this 
book, resettlement carries a broader meaning to include physical and economic displacement, restricted 
access to public land such as forests and parks, relocation, income rehabilitation, and self-relocation. 
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A crucial issue that confronts development in South Asia is how to build a 
better life for people displaced by infrastructure development projects. 
 This book comprises recent displacement and resettlement case 
studies conducted by eight anthropologists in South Asia. Each contributor 
wrote around the key theme of the book: Is involuntary resettlement 
a development opportunity for those displaced by development 
interventions? In this book, ”resettlement” carries a broader meaning 
to include physical and economic displacement, restricted access to 
public land such as forests and parks, relocation, income rehabilitation, 
and self-relocation.
 The book demonstrates that despite significant progress in national 
policies, laws, and regulations, their application still requires more 
commitment, adequate resources, and better supervision. 
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Foreword
I nvoluntary displacement of persons occurs when a state agency acquires private property or limits access to public land. Such displacement affects not only the physically displaced, but also those who lost their livelihoods 
and the host population that eventually accommodates them. Loss of property 
and access to common land, community disintegration, and loss of income 
sources and livelihood are the common outcomes of involuntary displacement. 
Involuntary resettlement is a process that assists the displaced persons to 
replace their lost land, housing, and access to resources and services to 
restore and improve their socioeconomic and cultural conditions.
In the past 25 years, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has developed 
policies and methodologies to help its borrowers minimize displacement and 
restore sources of incomes and livelihoods of those affected by development 
projects. In 1990, the then President of ADB directed the staff to follow the 
World Bank’s Operations Directive 4.30 on Involuntary Resettlement in 
planning, implementing, and monitoring all projects. In June 1991, ADB issued 
guidelines for social analysis of development projects and for the formulation 
of involuntary resettlement plans and their implementation. ADB issued Staff 
Instructions on Certain Policy/Administrative Issues—Involuntary Resettlement 
in February 1994 emphasizing that staff should adhere to the principles and 
approaches in Operations Directive 4.30 to deal with involuntary resettlement 
in ADB operations until a formal adoption of a bank policy on involuntary 
resettlement. ADB’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy was approved in 1995 and 
became effective in 1996. The Safeguard Policy Update of 2009 incorporated 
the post-1995 involuntary resettlement policy developments and broadened 
the scope of involuntary resettlement policy to include the imposition of limits 
on access to public land such as forests and parks.
ADB’s involuntary resettlement policy shares several international best 
practices with the involuntary resettlement policies of several international and 
regional development agencies. Among these best practices are: (i) involuntary 
displacement should be avoided or minimized; (ii) where displacement of 
persons is inevitable in the context of a specific project, they will be compensated 
for their losses at full replacement cost; (iii) assistance should be given to 
displaced persons to move and support them during the transition period; and 
(iv) assistance should be provided to displaced persons to restore their former 
living standards, and improve their income-earning capacity and production 
levels. As the book points out, during the past several decades, developing 
member countries (DMCs) in South Asia have adopted these international best 
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practices on involuntary displacement and resettlement on their own initiative 
and with the help of international development agencies such as ADB.
A key challenge to both ADB and borrowers has been how to ensure that 
displaced persons recover from their physical and economic displacement. 
This book examines this key development issue in the South Asian context 
using several case studies from India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The enactment 
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 replacing the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894 in India shows the willingness of DMCs to embrace good practices 
and to apply them, enabling displaced persons to regain their livelihoods 
and benefit from development processes. In South Asia, however, the level 
of incorporation of involuntary resettlement good practices varies widely. 
In the past decade, ADB’s South Asia Department has worked with several 
DMCs to improve or formulate national involuntary resettlement policies, 
laws, and regulations with varying levels of success. The application of such 
policies, laws, and regulations has also been improved especially at the 
project level, benefiting the displaced persons. As the book points out, more 
commitment, legal reforms, and adequate resources are needed to ensure that 
involuntary resettlement becomes a development opportunity for all project- 
affected persons.
I thank the contributors to this important and timely book for presenting their 
analyses of the outcomes of diverse project experiences and for providing 
insights into how development processes might better accommodate 
development needs and aspirations of displaced persons and their 
communities. Each chapter has identified risks and vulnerabilities that are 
generated by displacement, specific actions needed to avoid or at least 
minimize them, and how to create opportunities for the displaced to improve 
their socioeconomic conditions. I would like to thank Jayantha Perera, the 
editor of the book, for recognizing the critical need for a volume on resettlement 
practices in South Asia and for leading several resettlement specialists who 
have in-depth field experience in South Asia in writing this book.
This important knowledge product of ADB’s South Asia Department will provide 
insights into resettlement planning, implementation, and monitoring which 
are useful to policy makers, development practitioners, and researchers on 
social development.
Juan Miranda 
Director General, South Asia Department 
Asian Development Bank
Acknowledgments
I t was a truly fulfilling experience having worked with the contributors to this book. Each of them fully cooperated by meeting deadlines and responding quickly to numerous queries. This team effort contributed to transform 
diverse ideas and experiences in the field of displacement and resettlement 
into a coherent discourse on development experience in South Asia.
Juan Miranda, Director General of the South Asia Department of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), encouraged the creation of this project, supported 
its implementation, and generously wrote a foreword for the book. Sekhar 
Bonu, Director of Regional Cooperation Division of the South Asia Department 
(SARC), was instrumental in getting this book project through its various 
stages. Gambhir Bhatta, SARC Principal Knowledge Management Specialist, 
facilitated the financial and administrative aspects of the project.
April Gallega of ADB’s Department of External Relations coordinated the 
production of the book with great care, kindness, and efficiency. Madhumita 
Gupta, Principal Social Development Specialist of ADB’s East Asia Department, 
and K. Karunathilake, Professor of Sociology at the University of Kelaniya 
in Sri Lanka, peer reviewed the book’s manuscript and provided insightful 
comments. Caroline Ahmad edited the manuscript with diligence and high 
professionalism. Sherin Qadir expertly designed the cover page of the book. 
Kae Sugawara copyedited the book, and Enid Zafran prepared the index. 
Ma. Theresa Arago did the proofreading and pageproof checking. Rehan 
Abeyratne, Shyamala Abeyratne, Hans Carlsson, Carmela M. Locsin, Joyce 
Munsayac, and Rokeya Sabur also lent their invaluable assistance during 
various stages of this project.
To them all, I extend a hand filled with gratitude.
Jayantha Perera 
Editor
 vii
Abbreviations
AAOV – average annual gross output value
ADB – Asian Development Bank
BMRC – Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation
BPL – below poverty line
CEB – Ceylon Electricity Board
CRP – Compliance Review Panel
DFI – development finance institution
EIA – environmental impact assessment
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IRP – income restoration program
IRR – impoverishment risks and reconstruction (model)
JBIC – Japan Bank for International Cooperation
LARC – land acquisition and resettlement committee
LTTE – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MOEF – Ministry of Environment and Forests
MOU – memorandum of understanding
MUTP – Mumbai Urban Transport Project
NBA – Narmada Bachao Andolan
NGO – nongovernment organization
NHAI – National Highways Authority of India
NIRP – National Involuntary Resettlement Policy
PAF – project-affected family
PRC – People’s Republic of China
R&R – resettlement and rehabilitation
R&RP – Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy
RIP – resettlement implementation plan
SEEDS – Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services
SEZ – special economic zone
SIA – social impact assessment
SMEC – Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation
STDP – Southern Transport Development Project
viii Abbreviations
THDC – Tehri Hydro Development Corporation
THDP – Tehri Hydroelectric Development Project
TISS – Tata Institute of Social Sciences
UKHP – Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project
VDC – village development committee
WSH – West Seti Hydro
Weights and Measures
ha – hectare
km – kilometer
MW – megawatt
 ix
Contributors
Tulsi C. Bisht, MA, PhD, is a social development specialist in the East Asia 
Department of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was a research fellow 
of Victoria University in Melbourne. He has contributed several research papers 
to international social science journals.
Biswanath Debnath, MA, PhD, is a senior social development specialist 
(safeguards) in the South Asia Department at ADB. He is a member of the 
International Network on Displacement and Resettlement. He was the 
technical editor and contributor to the Post-Graduate Diploma Programme in 
Participatory Management of Displacement, Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
at Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi, sponsored by the 
World Bank.
Amarasena Gamaathige, MA, PhD, is the external monitoring expert of a large 
infrastructure development project in Sri Lanka. He was the social sector/
resettlement specialist at the Sri Lanka Resident Mission of ADB. He held 
senior positions at several agencies including the Open University of Sri Lanka, 
International Water Management Institute, National Development Bank, the 
Mahaweli Authority, and the Marga Institute in Sri Lanka. His professional 
interests include agrarian research, university-level teaching, and project 
administration and monitoring.
Razaak M. Ghani, MA, PhD, is a senior social development specialist at the 
World Bank Colombo Office where he leads the social development portfolio 
for urban and rural development, health, education, social protection, and 
community-centered development. His key areas of interest are internal 
displacement, urban resettlement, human security, and forced migration. 
He was a senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology of the Peradeniya 
University, Sri Lanka. He has been a consultant for ADB, the International 
Fund for Agriculture Development, and several other international 
development agencies.
Dolores Koenig, PhD, is professor of anthropology at the American University 
in Washington, DC, in the United States. She has written extensively about 
rural and agricultural development and involuntary resettlement in West Africa, 
including the effects of resettlement on those forced to move by the Manantali 
Dam, part of the Senegal River Basin Development Plan. She has also published 
work on social changes following increased migration and cotton cultivation. 
Her interests focus on the effects of development-caused forced resettlement 
x Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
in the growing cities of Africa and India. She has published several articles 
on the challenges of urban resettlement and the responses of those affected. 
She has also written Development and Economic Anthropology for the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Encyclopedia of 
Life Support Systems.
Chiara Mariotti, PhD, has conducted research on involuntary resettlement at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, and 
has been a lecturer at the University of Bath, United Kingdom. Currently, she 
is working for the Chronic Poverty Advisory Network, hosted at the Overseas 
Development Institute in London.
Hari Mohan Mathur, PhD, is a visiting professor at the Council for Social 
Development in New Delhi, India. As a member of the Indian Administrative 
Service, he held senior positions including the chief secretary to the Government 
of Rajasthan. He was the vice-chancellor of the University of Rajasthan. He has 
worked for the United Nations, the World Bank, and ADB as a staff member 
and consultant. His work has been published in international journals, and he 
has authored and edited several books on anthropology, development, and 
resettlement, including Administering Development in the Third World; The 
Human Dimension of Development: Perspectives from Anthropology; Managing 
Projects that Involve Resettlement; Development Projects and Impoverishment 
Risks (coedited with David Madson); Managing Resettlement in India; Can 
Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? (coedited with Michael Cernea); India 
Social Development Report 2008: Development and Displacement; Resettling 
Displaced People: Policy and Practice in India; and Resettlement in India. His 
latest book is Displacement and Resettlement in India: the Human Cost of 
Development.
Jayantha Perera, MA, LLM, PhD, is a development anthropologist and a fellow 
of the Royal Anthropological Institute in London. He was the principal safeguard 
specialist in the South Asia Department at ADB in Manila. His key areas of 
interest are involuntary resettlement, indigenous people, environmental law and 
practice, irrigation water management, and agrarian change. He has taught 
at several universities, including the University of Peradeniya and University of 
Colombo in Sri Lanka and at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom. He 
was the deputy director of the Agrarian Research and Training Institute and senior 
research fellow of the Centre for Policy Studies in Sri Lanka. He has authored 
several books, including New Dimensions of Social Stratification in Rural 
Sri Lanka; Conflict and Change: A Portrait of a Sri Lankan Village; An Introduction 
to Sociology; Classical Sociologists: Their Theories and Methods; and Irrigation 
Development and Agrarian Change. He edited Land and Cultural Survival: The 
Communal Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Asia and Transnational Culture 
and Expert Knowledge: Responses from a Rural Community in Sri Lanka. 
 1
1. Introduction
by Jayantha Perera
An act to ensure a humane, participative, informed and 
transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, 
development of essential infrastructural facilities and 
urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the 
land and other affected families and provide just and fair 
compensation to the affected families whose land has been 
acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such 
acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affected 
persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement, and for ensuring 
that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be 
that affected persons become partners in development leading 
to an improvement in their post-acquisition social and economic 
status and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
(Government of India 2013,1) (emphasis added).
T he Land Acquisition Act, 1894 of British India still directs and controls the acquisition of private land for a public purpose in South Asia. Its origins go back to the 1824 Regulation I of the Bengal Code, approved 
by the colonial authorities to enable the acquisition of land at fair value for 
roads, canals, or other public purposes and to secure land for the purpose 
of salt manufacture (Gupta 2012). It sets the legal framework and detailed 
procedures, and is backed by a large volume of case law. 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka adopted the key legal principles and 
processes of the Land Acquisition Act in enacting their own land acquisition 
and compensation laws. Through its close association with India, Nepal, 
although not part of the former British Empire, also adopted the principles and 
procedures of the act as its own land acquisition and compensation legislation. 
Although compensation packages and opportunities for negotiation on 
compensation and resettlement assistance available for those affected by 
land acquisition vary from country to country within South Asia, several key 
common principles have remained intact. First, the state may claim the right of 
“eminent domain.” This means the state can acquire any private property for 
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a public purpose regardless of whether the property owner is willing to sell or 
not. Second, only titled landowners receive compensation for private property 
lost to a public purpose. Tenants, squatters, encroachers, leaseholders, and 
other categories of land users will not be a party to compensation negotiations 
and settlement, although they could receive different types of assistance to 
recover their losses. Third, the state can acquire land without prior notice if 
such acquisition is deemed necessary for the security of the country or to deal 
with an emergency such as flooding. In such instances, 48 hours’ notice is 
considered sufficient, and the determination and payment of compensation 
for the acquired private land will take place after the land is vested in the state. 
Fourth, cash compensation for acquired property is calculated based on the 
market value of the property, which is the sum considered sufficient to buy 
new property or to restore sources of income and livelihoods affected by 
such acquisition. 
Development of Involuntary  
Resettlement Policies
International development agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and the World Bank, have participated in the resettlement debate, and 
have helped to articulate key issues in partnership with borrower countries. 
Their participation in such debates has been encouraged by the rapid growth 
of international law, especially international environmental law and human rights 
law, starting with the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment in 1972. 
The public debates on societal processes that lead to sustainable development 
gathered momentum with the publication of the Brundtland Commission Report 
in 1987. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 
and the draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment 
of 1994 played key roles in these debates. One key outcome of the debates 
is the realization that a society becomes sustainable when it is based on the 
volition of individual human beings, not on the results of “an enforceable legal 
prescription” (Zoeteman 2012, 4). 
Since the 1980s, international development agencies have developed their 
own policies on involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and environment 
to identify, prevent, minimize, and mitigate the social and environmental 
harm of the development interventions they support. Such policies were 
labeled “safeguard” or “do-no-harm” policies. ADB, for example, approved 
a set of staff instructions on involuntary resettlement in 1994. In 1995, ADB 
formulated its Involuntary Resettlement Policy (ADB 1995). In 2009, it updated 
the Involuntary Resettlement Policy, Indigenous Peoples Policy (ADB 1998), 
and Environment Policy (ADB 2002) and combined them into one Safeguard 
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Policy Statement (ADB 2009). The African Development Bank as well as several 
bilateral development agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency and the Australian Agency for International Development followed suit. 
In supporting infrastructure development projects, international development 
agencies recognize and accept the inevitability of displacement of some 
households and communities, although the key principle of involuntary 
resettlement policies is to “avoid involuntary resettlement wherever possible” 
(ADB 2009, 17). The involuntary resettlement policy of the World Bank 
elaborates this principle fully: “Involuntary resettlement may cause severe 
long-term hardship, impoverishment, and environmental damage unless 
appropriate measures are carefully planned and carried out.” Therefore, the 
overall objectives of its policy on involuntary resettlement are:
i. Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible, or minimized, 
exploring all viable alternative project designs.
ii. Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should 
be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, 
providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons displaced 
by the project to share in project benefits. Displaced persons should be 
meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in 
planning and implementing resettlement programs.
iii. Displaced persons should be assisted in their efforts to improve their 
livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them, in real terms, 
to pre-displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning 
of project implementation, whichever is higher (World Bank 2001; 2013, 
Section 2).
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group issued 
its revised and updated Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition 
and Involuntary Resettlement in 2012. This is the most recent and most 
comprehensive safeguard policy framework for involuntary resettlement. The 
IFC emphasizes that the government of a country has a central role “in the 
land acquisition and resettlement process, including the determination of 
compensation, and is therefore an important third party in many situations.” 
At the same time, it suggests that “to help avoid expropriation and eliminate 
the need to use governmental authority to enforce relocation, clients are 
encouraged to use negotiated settlements meeting the requirements of this 
Performance Standard, even if they have the legal means to acquire land 
without the seller’s consent.” 
Hence, international development agencies have progressively developed 
a comprehensive involuntary resettlement policy framework that is friendly 
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toward project-affected persons and communities as it aims to avoid their 
impoverishment, hopelessness, and disarticulation. However, as discussed in 
several chapters of this book, this resettlement framework focuses more on the 
procedures and processes of how to help persons that are already displaced 
than on the need to widen their scope to include the processes of displacement 
starting at the planning phase, followed by post-project resettlement support 
and services. Dwivedi (2002) called the current dominant approach to 
involuntary resettlement a “reformist-managerial” approach to development. It 
takes mainstream development as given, and displacement as an unfortunate 
phase that some people have to undergo to achieve development benefits for 
all. Thus, displacement together with resettlement is a social equalizing process 
that makes the world a better place to live in; in other words, a development 
opportunity for all, especially for those who have lost their property, livelihood, 
and social networks to a development intervention.
The tendency is to normalize displacement as a consequence 
of development that has happened in the past and will happen 
in the future. The concern of this [approach] is to minimize the 
adverse outcomes of displacement. As a result resettlement 
becomes the main problem area… Since resettlement is the 
focus, its inadequacies and failures become main areas of 
concern. The search is for effective ways of designing and 
handling resettlement for which appropriate legal, managerial 
and policy frameworks are sought (Dwivedi 2002, 720). 
Competing Involuntary  
Resettlement Frameworks 
During the past 40 years, South Asian countries formulated comprehensive 
domestic environmental policies and enacted environmental laws. Such 
policies and laws took environment protection and sustainability as their primary 
objectives reflecting the heightened focus of the international community 
on international law and especially on international environmental law. As a 
result, domestic environmental policies and laws included land acquisition 
and resettlement of project-affected households as issues pertaining to 
environmental sustainability. Sri Lanka’s National Environmental Act, 1980 
and India’s Environment (Protection) Act of 1986 are two examples of this all-
inclusive legal framework in which involuntary resettlement is treated as an 
environmental issue, based on the close relationship between the environment 
and human society. 
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The inclusion of involuntary resettlement in the general field of environment 
has positive and negative outcomes. In most South Asian countries, land 
acquisition and compensation occupy the center stage of development 
projects. Relocation, income restoration, and rehabilitation of project-affected 
persons are not specifically addressed by domestic legal systems, but are 
generally included in environmental impact assessments. Because of this, 
persons affected by development interventions can seek recourse in a court 
of law if they are not consulted before their displacement or if the project fails 
to provide them with sufficient resettlement assistance. This is the positive 
aspect of incorporating involuntary resettlement in the environmental legal 
framework. The negative aspect of such incorporation is that it limits the scope 
of involuntary resettlement to the do-no-harm principle without stressing the 
importance of restoring and improving income and livelihood of affected 
persons. Development interventions are not only expected to do no harm to the 
environment, but also to ensure that the affected persons of such development 
interventions have opportunities to improve their life chances, or at the very 
least to restore them. 
Partly in response to improvements in local good governance based on rapidly 
developing international law and international humanitarian law, and partly in 
response to the assistance received from international development agencies 
to improve local capacity in involuntary resettlement safeguards, South Asian 
countries during the past 40 years have also shown interest in improving and 
updating their land laws, land acquisition regulations, and compensation and 
relocation methodologies. Despite genuine attempts that reflect countries’ 
commitment to develop humane and fair land and resettlement laws, South 
Asia as a whole has failed so far to revise and update its land acquisition laws. 
Chief among difficulties encountered are resistance from landholders and 
politicians, bureaucratic apathy, and the complex legal procedures involved in 
such revisions and updates. As a result, instead of reforming land acquisition 
laws, which would substantially change the core principles of land acquisition, 
compensation, relocation, and rehabilitation, governments find it much easier 
to introduce involuntary resettlement policies, regulations, guidelines, and 
frameworks to recognize some rights or entitlements that development-induced 
displacement and resettlement processes are likely to affect. This approach 
enables them to achieve some equivalence with international best practices in 
involuntary resettlement. 
The involuntary resettlement policies of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and 
Sri Lanka are more or less compatible with those of international development 
agencies, particularly ADB and the World Bank. In order to obtain development 
assistance from an international development agency, a borrower has to agree 
to follow the international best practices enshrined in the agency’s involuntary 
resettlement policy in addition to following its own involuntary resettlement 
policy and laws. Each country has also received technical assistance either 
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from ADB or the World Bank to formulate its own involuntary resettlement 
policy and improve local capacity to implement it. These national involuntary 
resettlement policies reflect the general principles and procedures of the 
involuntary resettlement policy of the international development agency which 
supported the formulation of the national involuntary resettlement policy. The 
National Involuntary Resettlement Policy of Sri Lanka (2001), for example, was 
formulated by adopting the principles of the Involuntary Resettlement Policy 
of ADB. A country that has adopted involuntary resettlement policy principles 
and procedures of an international development agency in formulating its own 
involuntary resettlement policy tends to apply it only to development projects 
or programs funded by the agency. Locally funded projects and programs 
usually follow only the local laws and regulations pertaining to involuntary 
resettlement. The presence of two involuntary resettlement frameworks could 
create competing safeguard approaches to land acquisition, compensation, 
and rehabilitation of affected persons.
Scope of Involuntary Resettlement 
Safeguard Policies
The involuntary resettlement safeguard policies of international development 
agencies and their counterpart policies in South Asian countries focus mainly 
on how to minimize or mitigate traumatic experiences of physical and economic 
displacement. They also aspire to convert displacement into a development 
opportunity for those who are displaced. National legal frameworks for land 
acquisition, compensation, and rehabilitation, on the other hand, deal with 
households’ displacement trauma through limited cash compensation and 
rehabilitation assistance. Although there has been substantive improvement 
in land acquisition, compensation, and rehabilitation policies and land laws 
in recent years in South Asia, converting the deep and prolonged trauma of 
physical and economic displacement into a development opportunity is an 
aspiration that has not yet been achieved. The findings of in-depth fieldwork 
associated with each case study of this book reaffirm this conclusion. This will 
be the case until involuntary resettlement policies are updated and converted 
into involuntary resettlement laws, and adequate local capacity is developed to 
implement them in each country. In this regard, India is ahead of other South 
Asian countries. Its comprehensive Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Bill was passed by the Parliament in 2013 after many years of 
debate and consultation (Government of India 2013).
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Objectives of the Book
Resettlement policies and laws in South Asian countries at present focus 
primarily on compensation payment for property acquired for a public 
purpose. This book assesses the adequacy of conventional compensation 
and resettlement assistance programs such as cash-for-land, land-for-land 
compensation, limited and temporary employment opportunities at project 
construction sites, better housing in urban development projects, and 
income and livelihood restoration and improvement assistance programs. 
It also examines affected persons’ perspectives, how they perceive their 
displacement, and what strategies they use to respond to displacement with 
or without assistance from project sponsors and authorities. This knowledge 
will help policy makers, project sponsors, and project executive agencies to 
improve resettlement planning and implementation programs and, at least 
to some extent, will assist in reforming resettlement policies and land laws. 
Such reforms, this book argues, should consider (i) the adequacy of current 
resettlement policy frameworks to deal with complex, widespread, and 
ambiguous experiences of affected persons of development interventions; 
(ii) the almost inevitable impoverishment of project-affected persons from 
the pre-displacement phase to post-resettlement phase; (iii) limited state 
commitment to broadening such policy frameworks into national laws; and 
(iv) widespread weak institutional capacity to implement the laws. 
During the past 60 years, various interpretations of the land acquisition acts 
have been attempted by policy makers, academics, development practitioners, 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and national courts in South Asia. 
Such interpretations have mostly been people-centered and have intended 
to provide a better compensation package to the displaced, particularly 
to poor and vulnerable persons. Key issues that have been discussed and 
articulated include (i) the adequacy of consultation with affected persons and 
communities on land acquisition and compensation; (ii) the comparative costs 
of cash-for-land and land-for-land compensation as acquisition modalities; 
(iii) the desirability and possibility of assisting physically displaced households 
to resettle at a project-sponsored resettlement site compared to providing 
sufficient cash compensation and incentives to help displaced households 
self-relocate; and (iv) how to avoid impoverishment of displaced persons and 
their households. These are also the key issues that this book considers, using 
in-depth fieldwork from several South Asian countries. 
The book comprises recent displacement and resettlement case studies 
conducted by several anthropologists and sociologists in South Asia. 
Each contributor wrote around the key theme of the book: Is resettlement a 
development opportunity for those displaced by a development intervention? 
In this book, resettlement carries a broader meaning to include physical and 
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economic displacement, restricted access to public land such as forests and 
parks, relocation, income rehabilitation, and self-relocation. 
Structure of the Book
The book is structured broadly into three parts. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 examine 
the current scope of involuntary resettlement policies, laws, and regulations in 
South Asia to identify the areas that are not sufficiently addressed in domestic 
resettlement policies and laws, and also in the safeguard policies of international 
development agencies. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 examine compensation packages 
of large infrastructure projects and their adequacy in restoring and improving 
the sources of income and livelihoods of affected persons and households. 
Chapters 9 and 10 apply a comparative perspective to involuntary resettlement. 
Chapter 9 discusses the value of the “social preparation phase” of a project 
that allows project-affected persons to negotiate compensation for their 
lost property at its replacement cost, and also to participate in resettlement 
planning. It examines these key aspects of involuntary resettlement in a 
regional perspective. Chapter 10 compares India’s experiences in involuntary 
resettlement with those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), mainly 
in the areas of resettlement policy and laws, relocation experience, income 
restoration programs, and local capacity to implement resettlement programs. 
The chapter highlights several common good practices which would ensure 
income restoration and improvement among project-affected persons.
1. Scope of Involuntary Resettlement Frameworks
Chapter 2 highlights an area ignored by involuntary resettlement policies, laws, 
and best practices. Using the displacement and resettlement experience of a 
large dam project in India, the contributor argues that the resources available 
to resettlers of a project are not limited to compensation and resettlement 
assistance. They can also capitalize on the informal structures, networks, and 
social practices in their communities that play an important role in day-to-day life 
as well as in meeting contingencies including displacement and resettlement. 
Current resettlement and rehabilitation policies, laws, and regulations do not 
recognize these untapped resources, and the contributor argues that this is a 
major drawback in resettlement and rehabilitation planning that at least partly 
explains why resettlement programs often fail to restore the life chances of 
displaced persons in the post-displacement phase. The contributor points out 
that such informal assets should be identified during pre-displacement social 
surveys and included in resettlement planning and implementation so that 
resettlers can participate in the resettlement process and lessen the magnitude 
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of stress, trauma, marginalization, and hopelessness associated with physical 
displacement and resettlement. 
Chapter 3 highlights, in the context of Indian forest policies, laws, and regulations, 
the importance of paying equal attention to the outcomes for affected persons of 
the acquisition of property for a public purpose and the imposition of restrictions 
on land use or access to forests, designated parks, and protected areas. While 
policies, laws, and regulations have evolved over the past 150 years, the need 
for comprehensive action programs to minimize adverse impacts of restrictions 
on forestland use or access to forests has only recently received the attention 
of governments and international development agencies. The contributor 
argues that the state’s determination to treat forests as state property, and 
to restrict the access of communities who claim customary rights over forest 
produce, directly and adversely affects forest dwellers and forest-dependent 
communities. These communities treat state usurpation of their customary 
rights as an encroachment into their social, economic, and sacred space. The 
physical, economic, and cultural displacement of peoples by state-sponsored 
processes often affects vulnerable communities such as tribal peoples who 
depend on forest and commons to earn their living and maintain their identities 
as social groups distinct from others. Recently, NGOs and community-based 
organizations have played a key role in raising their concerns, while the 
Indian judiciary, through its landmark judgments on customary rights of tribal 
people and forest-dwelling communities, has progressively transformed their 
interests into rights. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006 and its regulations and guidelines, 
and their recent proactive interpretation by the Supreme Court are indicative of 
such progress. The contributor argues that improvements in the development 
policy framework cannot be fully achieved unless the scope of safeguard 
policies and national laws are further expanded to accommodate and address 
the complex and often politically oriented ground realities. 
Chapter 4 also contributes to widening the scope of resettlement planning 
and implementation. It discusses how people react to sudden forced eviction 
by non-state actors. They experience much greater trauma, vulnerability, 
and disarticulation than persons affected by state-sponsored development 
projects. They are evicted without warning and their movable and immovable 
properties are usurped by the aggressor. In such a situation, there is neither 
compensation nor rehabilitation assistance. In the absence of such support 
they tend to develop their own survival strategies. This chapter elaborates 
several such strategies developed by a group of displaced people  in northern 
Sri Lanka in response to their harsh social and physical environment at their 
resettlement sites. The contributor describes how most of them have overcome 
their initial impoverishment and hopelessness as resettlers and moved on to 
become entrepreneurs and economic catalysts in their host community by 
drawing on their past to reinvent their lives on the land where they found refuge. 
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Chapter 5 uses a case study of a proposed hydropower project in Nepal to 
show how resettlement planning alone without physical displacement can 
impoverish persons potentially affected by a development project, if planning 
is delayed or prolonged over several decades. In such projects, borrowers and 
lenders engage in formulating plan after plan over several years or decades 
without giving a firm commitment to implement them. The planning process 
itself can generate major adverse impacts on the people who live in the areas 
demarcated for a project. The contributor discusses such adverse impacts of 
resettlement planning in three specific situations. First is the trauma of pending 
displacement among potential project-affected households and their curtailed 
access to commons. Uncertainty about their future; lack of sufficient information 
about the project, time of displacement and relocation, and compensation 
packages; and disinformation campaigns run by various interest groups expose 
a large number of households in the project area to psychological, social, and 
economic hardships that progressively impoverish them. Second, identified 
host communities also experience anxiety, fear, and frustration because they 
too are worried about the possibility of losing their resources and access to 
common land as a result of the influx of resettlers. Prolonged resettlement 
planning exacerbates their anger and desire to thwart the resettlement 
programs. Third, local government authorities in the project area tend to act 
as if the project is being implemented. As a result, they often exclude areas 
identified for the project from their annual development and welfare investment 
plans and budgets on the grounds that these investments would be a waste 
of money because the areas are to become a reservoir. The key point of the 
chapter is the need to expand the scope of the theoretical and policy framework 
of involuntary resettlement to accommodate would-be displaced communities 
and would-be host communities as risk-ridden communities that have already 
entered the stream of impoverishment, marginalization, and hopelessness 
about the future.
2.  Adequacy of Compensation Packages to Restore  
Livelihoods Lost
Chapter 6 demonstrates with a rural case study from India that the successful 
performance of a resettlement program depends not only on the commitment of 
its management but also on structural factors such as the social class system of 
the affected population, the structure of landownership and agrarian relations, 
labor markets, and the ability of local governments to create employment 
opportunities for the resettlers. It also examines the strengths and weaknesses 
of cash-for-land and land-for-land compensation, and concludes that both 
modalities are unlikely to meet resettlement and rehabilitation objectives of 
preventing impoverishment and enabling the restoration of livelihoods that have 
been disrupted by displacement and relocation processes. However, between 
the two modalities, land-for-land compensation is put forward as the better 
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option. The contributor recommends that if cash compensation is paid, it must 
be paid at the replacement cost, calculated fairly and transparently, and paid 
promptly so that resettlers could invest the money meaningfully to generate 
income. She also recommends that every resettlement program should be 
combined with a comprehensive income restoration and improvement program 
to tackle the risks of landlessness and unemployment that are embedded in 
the displacement and relocation processes. 
Chapter 7 examines the progressive impoverishment of communities that are 
displaced in an urban setting. It focuses on the outcomes for displaced persons 
of urban development initiatives in Mumbai City, India, and concludes that those 
displaced by such development projects often become impoverished because 
the projects do not pay sufficient attention to the resettlers’ livelihoods. The 
contributor argues that in formulating urban livelihood programs, the project 
personnel should pay more attention to displaced persons’ access to skills 
and social networks than to their tangible assets such as land and buildings. 
Conventional prescriptions prioritize the restoration of tangible assets such 
as land, infrastructure, and housing. As a result, many urban resettlement 
programs provide housing but do not offer livelihood development programs 
suitable for urban resettlers. The contributor suggests that the livelihoods 
of urban resettlers could be restored and improved by partnering with and 
building on city programs that combat urban unemployment and encourage 
skills training, as well as on those that promote urban safety nets. Such an 
approach emphasizes the livelihood needs of the displaced, regardless of 
their land tenure status. It removes the need to check whether the displaced 
are squatters or encroachers; instead it highlights the fact that they are urban 
residents who are threatened by impoverishment, if relocated. 
Chapter 8 using field research findings of two infrastructure development 
project in Sri Lanka argues that the identification of eligible affected persons 
for income rehabilitation assistance is a major problem in any resettlement 
program. It demonstrates that unless socioeconomic surveys and censuses 
are carefully prepared and executed, it would be very difficult to develop 
scientific social databases of project-affected persons. If the pre-displacement 
survey data and information are not comprehensive and complete, any 
subsequent attempt at redesigning databases will bring more confusion, and 
complicate income restoration planning and implementation. In one project, 
the non-availability of comparable income data of affected persons for pre-
project and post-project phases made it difficult to compare them and to 
determine the differences. Moreover, the project personnel did not consider 
resource bases such as the unaffected land, private savings, employment 
skills, and social support networks of each affected household in the analysis 
of a household’s income level. In the other project, such difficulties were not 
noted as the scale of displacement was small and all the displaced households 
were resettled not far from their original settlements, enabling them to continue 
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their livelihood activities in addition to enjoying the temporary additional 
income sources generated by project construction. This suggests that there 
is no standard blueprint for restoring the incomes of project-affected persons, 
and each project must develop its own approach and methodologies for 
income restoration and improvement programs. In this regard, the contributor 
outlines key hurdles that any such program should be aware of and avoid. 
First, the implementation of income restoration programs may be delayed by 
weak institutional support and commitment and the lack of sufficient funds. 
Second, the definitions of poverty and eligibility criteria for assistance may be 
ambiguous. Third, income-generating activities may not match the diverse 
skills and interests of the affected persons. Fourth, complexities in measuring 
impoverishment risks, income changes, and livelihood improvements may 
thwart robust planning and implementation. The chapter recommends that 
the design and planning of income restoration and improvement should be 
preceded by a good understanding of socioeconomic conditions of affected 
persons and a well-designed consultation process and participatory evaluation 
of outcomes. The contributor also suggests that options available for income 
restoration and improvement should be evaluated in the context of dynamic 
local conditions and the findings of the consultation process, and based on an 
evaluation of the sustainability of economic opportunities. 
3. Social Preparation and Replacement Practices
Chapter 9 contributes to the long-standing debate among resettlement 
specialists and development planners on compensation and impoverishment 
from a comparative perspective. It emphasizes the importance of having 
a “social preparation” phase early in the project cycle to allow the affected 
persons and project authorities to discuss, negotiate, consult, and agree on fair 
and adequate compensation packages for the acquired property, which could 
be termed “replacement cost.” During this phase, the potentially displaced 
persons can learn about compensation and relocation packages, their future 
employment programs, and how well they would fit into such programs. The 
chapter outlines several methodologies for determining the replacement 
cost of lost property, and identifies the comparable and residual methods 
of valuation as the most appropriate ones. While the comparable method is 
appropriate for valuing land, the residual method is useful in valuing structures 
and land with structures. The chapter argues that social preparation should 
be followed by timely, full disbursement of cash compensation to affected 
persons. The contributor emphasizes that, unless the payment of compensation 
at replacement cost is accompanied by a well-planned and well-funded 
income and livelihood restoration program, there is a high probability that the 
affected persons may not be able at least to restore their pre-project income 
and livelihoods. 
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The final chapter examines how the PRC and India deal with the massive physical 
displacement arising from development interventions and their outcomes. 
It compares the resettlement policies, laws, and implementing strategies of 
both countries, and considers how well they remedy the impoverishment and 
marginalization arising from physical displacement and resettlement. In both 
countries, national resettlement policies play an important role not only in 
controlling impoverishment risks but also in improving resettlement outcomes. 
The resettlement experiences of the PRC and India indicate that sound 
resettlement practices generally lead to rapid household income restoration 
at resettlement sites. In the PRC, the resettlement authorities of several 
resettlement programs have wisely anticipated a rapid growth of the regional 
economy and selected resettlement sites where resettlers could benefit from 
such growth. Rapid economic growth and the strong commitment among 
project resettlement officials to implement the resettlement program have 
saved large numbers of resettlers from impoverishment and marginalization. 
In India, with the passage of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Policy of 2007 development projects pay more attention to income restoration 
and improvement among project-affected persons. With the increasing 
engagement of international development agencies such as ADB and the 
World Bank in infrastructure development projects, and the continuing pressure 
from civil society organizations to improve compensation and resettlement 
packages, rapid progress has been noted in the planning and implementation 
of income restoration and improvement programs associated with such large-
scale projects. 
References
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 1995. Involuntary Resettlement. Manila.
———. 1998. Policy on Indigenous Peoples. Manila.
———. 2002. Environment Policy of the Asian Development Bank. Manila.
———. 2009. Safeguard Policy Statement. Manila.
Dwivedi, R. 2002. Models and Methods in Development-Induced Displacement. 
Development and Change. 33 (4). pp. 709–732.
Government of India. 2013. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in 
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act. New Delhi.
14 Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
Gupta, P. 2012. The Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India. 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 49. pp. 445–489.
International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2012. Performance Standard 5—
Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement. In Update of IFC’s Policy and 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Access 
to Information Policy. Washington, DC. pp. 58–65.
World Bank. 2001 and 2013. OP 4.12, Involuntary Resettlement. Washington, 
DC.
Zoeteman, K. 2012. Sustainable Development Drivers: The Role of Leadership 
in Government, Business and NGO Performance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 15
2.  Negotiating Impoverishment 
Risks through Informal Social 
Structures and Practices
by Tulsi C. Bisht
Supported by pillows, he sits on his cot with one leg heavily 
plastered. A motorbike hit him about 10 days ago while trying to 
cross the road. He was afflicted by polio in his childhood and a 
limp allows him to walk only short distances. Now he is worried 
whether he will be able to walk at all. His house is still under 
construction. His wife, who can barely communicate in Hindi, 
uncomfortably oversees the construction work while he watches 
helplessly. Settling down in a plastic chair next to his cot, I feel 
nervous, uncomfortable, and guilt-ridden. I don’t want this interview, 
this conversation. But he wants to talk, wants to narrate his story. 
“You are the first person who has come in so many days,” he tells 
me. “I keep lying here but nobody visits me; they just pass by. 
Same villagers, same neighbours, but everyone is busy with his 
or her own life. No one has time for the others. In our old village it 
would have been different. There, probably 10 people might visit 
you in a day. As a result, even if you were suffering from pain you 
could ignore it. In the village, people would listen to your problems 
and suggest solutions, and eventually you would find an alternative 
and then the problem was solved. But here is no one to talk to, to 
discuss…” (Private communication with a resettler in 2007).
T his lamentation by a 40-year-old man who was displaced by the Tehri Hydroelectric Development Project (THDP) in India highlights the way physical displacement affects the everyday lives of displaced persons. 
It also shows the way the loss of community relations and informal social 
networks becomes problematic soon after physical relocation. When my 
fieldwork began among those displaced by the Tehri Dam, they had been at 
resettlement sites for 2–3 years. This early phase of resettlement is termed the 
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transitional stage by Scudder (1993) in his five-phase paradigm.1 During this 
stage, relocation of displaced persons begins, and they will have the daunting 
task of adapting to new realities. This process of adaptation and leaving the 
familiar behind is difficult and stressful as it becomes “multidimensional” with 
“physiological, psychological and sociocultural impacts” (Scudder 1993, 131).
This chapter points out that in resettlement planning and rehabilitation of 
displaced persons, very little attention is paid to the informal structures, 
networks, and social practices in communities that play an important role in 
day-to-day life as well as in meeting various contingencies. This is a major 
drawback in resettlement planning and rehabilitation and it explains, at least 
partially, why resettlement programs often fail to restore the life chances of the 
displaced persons. Forced displacement undermines the social and community 
structures and practices and creates a “dissonant culture” that renders the 
traditional institutions and practices ineffective (Downing and Downing-Garcia 
2009). As a result, people find themselves unable to respond to everyday life 
situations and contingencies. They try to resurrect their old social structures 
and practices in the new locations to help negotiate challenges encountered 
in the resettlement process (Scudder 1993). In this process, they need support 
and direction. 
This chapter will also emphasize the importance of identifying the informal 
networks and social practices of the displaced persons in their own social 
settings to understand the complexity of displacement. Such an understanding 
will help in formulating effective resettlement policies and programs for the 
benefit of displaced persons and helping them cope with their new challenges 
once they are resettled.
The Setting 
The THDP is located at the confluence of Bhagirathi and Bhilganga rivers in the 
Himalayan Region of the State of Uttarakhand. The idea of constructing a dam 
across the confluence was first mooted in 1949. Electric power generation, 
irrigation, and drinking water supply are the main objectives of the dam. The final 
dam site was selected in 1965. The Planning Commission of India approved 
the project in 1972, and construction works at the dam began in 1978. The 
last of the three tunnels of the dam was shut in October 2005, symbolizing the 
completion of the construction process.
1 The five stages are the planning stage, recruitment stage, transitional stage, economic 
development and community formation stage, and handing over and incorporation stage. In 
his Future of the Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political Costs 
(2005), Scudder reduced the number of phases to four.
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The 260.5-meter-high rock-filled dam created a 45-square-kilometer reservoir. 
The electric power plant has an installed capacity of 1,000 megawatts. The dam 
was expected to bring 270,000 hectares of agricultural land under irrigation and 
to stabilize irrigation supplies to 604,000 hectares of cultivated land. It was also 
expected to supply 300 cubic meters per second of drinking water to Delhi 
City and another 200 cubic meters per second to towns and villages in Uttar 
Pradesh (Tehri Hydro Development Corporation [THDC] 1998). 
As no baseline survey was conducted before project implementation, there 
is no reliable data on the number of physically displaced persons and 
households. The Hanumantha Rao Committee, appointed in 1996 to examine 
the environmental and social impacts of the project, estimated that 125 villages 
were affected by the dam (Hanumantha Rao Committee, unpublished). Of 
these, 37 villages were fully affected and 88 villages were partially affected. 
A village was considered fully affected if more than 75% of its households 
were considered fully affected households. A household was defined as fully 
affected if it lost more than 50% of its land to the project. A household that lost 
less than 50% of its land to the project was considered partially affected. 
The Hanumantha Rao Committee estimated that 4,909 rural households were 
fully affected by the project, while 3,998 households were partially affected. 
In addition to these rural households, another 5,291 urban households in the 
Tehri town were also physically displaced by the dam. The estimates of the 
total displaced population differ. The Indian National Trust for Art and Culture 
estimated that 85,600 persons were physically displaced because of the 
project (Paranjpye 1988). 
The displaced households were resettled at 17 resettlement sites. The 
compensation package given to the affected households consisted of two 
options—land and cash. Those who opted for land-for-land compensation were 
resettled at widely dispersed resettlement sites. The project authorities attempted 
to resettle households of a displaced village community at a resettlement site 
as a group; but because of the individual household resettlement choices 
and a scarcity of suitable land for resettlement, it was not possible to keep all 
households of a displaced village together at a resettlement site. 
Resettlement Packages  
for Displaced Population
Under the land-for-land compensation method, each displaced household was 
allocated 2 acres of irrigated land in a rural area or 0.5 acres of land in an urban 
area. In a village, if the size of the acquired land was less than 2 acres, the owner 
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still received 2 acres of irrigated land as compensation. If the value of acquired 
land was more than the value of the allotted land, the affected owner received 
the difference in cash; and if it was less, the difference was not recovered. The 
same principal applied in urban areas. As the value of land in urban areas is 
high, the affected households that opted for the urban package of 0.5 acres of 
land did not have to pay the difference in value even if the value of the acquired 
land was much less than the value of the land allocated. Under the cash-for-
land compensation method, a landowner received statutory compensation and 
solatium (a payment to recognize the involuntariness of land acquisition—30% 
of the statutory compensation). A displaced household that opted for the cash-
for-land compensation method received a minimum cash compensation of 
Rs500,000 regardless of the value of the acquired land (THDC 1998). 
The value of buildings, trees, and home gardens on the acquired land was 
evaluated at the prescribed rates of the public works, forest, and horticultural 
departments. Such costs were supplemented by solatium. A special payment 
was also made for depreciation of buildings with a ceiling of Rs50,000. 
The minimum compensation for an acquired house was Rs100,000. In 
addition, the following resettlement assistance package was also provided to 
each displaced household:
•	 Allotment of a residential plot of 200 square meters to each household at 
nominal cost. 
•	 A cash grant of Rs5,200 for moving household materials.
•	 A cash grant of Rs4,960 for seeds and/or fertilizer. 
•	 An additional incentive grant of Rs15,000 to each displaced household that 
shifted from the acquired land within 6 months from the date of award of 
compensation or date of allotment of land. 
•	 Each eligible displaced household member (above 21 years), and each 
dependent parent received a payment equivalent to the value of 750 days 
of daily agricultural wage. A cash grant was also paid to each rural shop 
owner, ranging from Rs80,000 to Rs120,000. 
Each eligible landless agricultural worker received 2 acres of land in a rural area 
or 0.5 acres close to a city, or Rs500,000 on certification by a district magistrate. 
A grant to each additional adult household member was given equivalent to the 
value of 750 days of daily agricultural wage. 
In calculating the replacement cost of a demolished house, the authorities 
took into consideration the market value of such traditional houses. However, 
the replacement cost calculation went awry as some nonmarket factors that 
influenced total cost of building a house were not taken into consideration. 
For example, before their displacement, households relied largely on their 
environment to obtain construction materials such as stones, slates, and 
timber. As villagers generally depended on their collective labor to build houses, 
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the labor cost of such an endeavor was marginal. None of these factors were 
considered in calculating the replacement cost of traditional village houses. 
At relocation sites, resettled households did not have access to free stone, timber, 
clay, and slates; they had to buy bricks, steel, and cement from the market. The 
practice of collective labor sharing became ineffective at resettlement sites for 
two reasons. First, the resettlers did not have any experience or skills in working 
with new construction materials. One resettler aptly summarized this scenario:
This is my house under construction. You can see these men 
working here and I am just watching them. I am a traditional 
artisan. My expertise is house construction. In our original village, 
my forefathers constructed others’ houses. I myself constructed 
many houses in the village and in neighboring villages. But here 
my house is being constructed by hired workers and I am just 
watching them. The only task that I perform is to provide tea and 
snacks to workers. Because I am not trained in working with 
cement, bricks, and steel, I cannot join them in constructing  
the house. 
Second, the dispersal of displaced households at resettlement sites weakened 
traditional collective practices such as labor sharing. The loss of community 
identity and subsistence ethics further weakened such practices. As a result, 
a resettled household spent most of their cash compensation on house 
construction. Some of them did not have sufficient money to complete their 
houses and were compelled to sell a portion of the land they received as 
compensation to raise extra money to complete them.
Coping with Displacement 
Large-scale development projects result in massive population displacement 
and impoverishment. In India, 1 million–2 million persons are displaced annually 
as a direct consequence of development projects (Cernea 1990). Typically, 
only about 25% of them are rehabilitated (Fernandez and Chaterji 1995). This 
lack of concern about the welfare of affected populations is an outcome of an 
ideological justification that upholds the displacement and suffering of some 
people as a necessary condition to increase the welfare of the wider community 
(Robinson 2003). 
However, during the past 5 decades it has become clear that grand-scale 
infrastructure and development projects do not necessarily result in general 
good. The adverse impacts of such projects on the environment and population 
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are now well documented. Large-scale displacement of people and inadequate 
resettlement programs have resulted in the economic and sociocultural 
impoverishment of communities, which has left them psychologically 
traumatized (Mathur 2011). Tribal and rural communities constitute the majority 
of such affected populations. Living at the margins of the society, these groups 
often lack the voice and capacity to protect their interests, and are thus overrun 
by the march of development. 
In recent times, displaced communities have become more vocal, and in some 
cases have resisted forced displacement. In the case of the Tehri Dam, the 
affected people opposed the construction of the dam from the beginning of 
the project (Bisht, unpublished). They had a strong sense of attachment to their 
native villages and saw displacement not only as a process of uprooting but 
also as a threat to their survival. 
Following the government’s approval of the project, anti-dam protests 
gathered momentum in an organized form. The Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangharsh 
was formed under the leadership of Virendra Sakalni in 1978. A noted 
environmentalist, Sundarlal Bahuguna, led the anti-dam movement. The anti-
dam protests resulted in some political and judicial interventions including 
setting up environmental and social impact reviews by the Government of 
India, and review of project activities by the Supreme Court of India. As a result, 
the construction of the dam was delayed by many decades. This not only 
undermined the economic viability of the dam, but also caused the affected 
populations a lot of stress as they waited without knowing when they would be 
displaced and resettled. A resettler explained the outcome of such uncertainty: 
I remember hearing of the construction of a dam when I was 5 or 
6 years old. Our grandmother used to tell us that a dam would be 
built in our neighborhood and that we would have to move out 
of our villages when they are submerged by the reservoir. Now I 
am 46 years old. I moved out of my native village only recently, 
after waiting nearly 40 years. My grandmother died a long time 
ago, so did many other old people. And during these years we 
lived with a great uncertainty and fear of being displaced. We 
could not do much to improve our socioeconomic conditions 
or we did not want to invest in land. If a villager was living in a 
dilapidated house, he continued to live there without repairing it 
as he did not know when he would be asked to move out. 
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Informal Structures and Practices 
as Risk Management Mechanisms 
“Informal” is a generic term used to indicate the structures and practices that 
fall outside the established institutional domain of formalized rules and norms. 
Informal structures and practices have evolved and have their own rules and 
norms, as well as mechanisms to ensure their compliance. Although they are 
not enforced through formal sanctions, such informal domains are socially 
shared, internalized, and have become a part of the way of life of a community. 
Three broad types of informal structures and practices can be identified 
in a community: the “moral economy,” “exchange practices,” and “social 
capital.” They are mutually reinforcing and help persons in coping with various 
contingencies and traumas. 
1. Moral Economy
The concept of moral economy has a strong lineage. Karl Polanyi’s (1944) notion 
of “embedded economy” underlines that in traditional societies, economic 
behavior is not merely a rational pursuit, but is intermeshed with sociocultural 
factors. The manner in which Scott (1976) employed this concept to understand 
peasant politics in subsistence economies of Southeast Asia is relevant in this 
context. He points out that the notion of moral economy is not merely confined 
to the domain of economics, it also refers to the “study of peasant culture and 
religion” (1976, vii). The foundation stone of the moral economy according to 
Scott is a “subsistence ethic” that emerges as a “consequence of living so 
close to the margin” (1976, 2). Directed to deal with risks, especially the risk 
of falling below the subsistence level, peasant communities have developed 
technical and social arrangements, to iron out the “ripples that might drown a 
man” (1976, 3). These arrangements primarily consist of traditional knowledge 
and practices as well as “patterns of reciprocity, forced generosity, communal 
land, and work-sharing…” (1976, 3). Scott argues that the moral economy 
also defines the peasantry’s notions of economic justice and exploitation that 
determine whether a rebellion would eventuate within a particular peasant 
context. He points out that to avoid risks, peasants use various technical, 
social, and moral arrangements which are based on the “safety-first” principle. 
This strongly justifies redistributive effects of various arrangements in the 
moral economic framework as they “assure a minimum income to inhabitants” 
(1976, 5) of a village. Arjun Appadurai also highlights the notion of moral 
economy and points out that, although Amartya Sen’s concept of entitlement is 
important to comprehend famine, it is a very formalistic approach to understand 
entitlement, confining the notion within a legalistic framework. Appadurai notes 
that such an approach misses the “moral or cultural dimension, one that might 
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provide, in many societies, an alternative to the existing legal framework” 
(1984, 483).
The notion of moral economy has been critiqued on the ground that it 
romanticizes peasant communities, while hiding their exploitative character. 
Another criticism is that it treats peasants as incapable of taking rational 
decisions. Popkin (1979) attempts to demonstrate that Vietnamese peasants’ 
logic is not fully moralistic—it is also rational and driven by the principle of 
maximization, thereby questioning the presupposition of collective over 
individual as argued by Scott. 
The notion of moral economy remains useful in understanding the dynamics 
of peasant societies (Appadurai 1984). Arnold (2001) also points out that the 
moral economy is embedded in concrete, ongoing social relations even in 
a modern society. He uses the concept of “social goods” in place of moral 
economy and argues that social goods not only influence the identity and 
status of a community, but are also “intrinsically communal” in nature. Social 
goods are thus seen as producing sensibilities and special commitment to one 
another, bringing together associated people as a community (Arnold 2001). 
2. Exchange Practices 
Exchange forms an important part of the socioeconomic life of a community 
or person. Exchange practices are the binding glue of a community and its 
solidarity. Conceptualizing the exchange of gifts, Marcel Mauss (1954) pointed 
out that such exchange falls well beyond the realm of economic or utilitarian 
understanding of gift exchange. He argues that exchange is deeply embedded 
in social relations, and labels it a “system of total services” that underlines an 
enduring contract. Economic reciprocity is just one aspect of the exchange 
system that is not only related to economic matters, but is also a system that 
creates social and moral bonds. 
Reciprocity is an integral part of these exchange practices and is guided by 
the local cultural norms rather than by economic calculations. In his continuum 
model of reciprocity, Marshall Shalins (1972) presents a threefold typology of 
reciprocity based on the degree of concern for the self or for others. He outlines 
these three as generalized reciprocity, balanced reciprocity, and negative 
reciprocity. Generalized reciprocity is based on altruism, and expected return 
is neither immediate nor equivalent. Moreover, return is only seen as necessary 
if a condition in future so requires. Balanced reciprocity, on the other hand, is 
direct, requiring equivalent and immediate returns. It lacks the personal bonds 
that underline generalized reciprocity. Negative reciprocity involves opposed 
interests including such activities as gambling and theft. The continuum is 
determined according to social closeness and social distance. While reciprocal 
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relations with people that are socially close are based on the principle of 
generalized reciprocity. As one moves away from these close connections to 
strangers and socially distant contacts, the relationships could take the form of 
negative reciprocity. 
3. Social Capital
Social capital has both positive and negative connotations. For example, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) pointed out that social capital could be 
beneficial to those who share a social network; but for those outside the social 
network, it can produce inequality. Portes (1998) defines social capital as the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of their membership of a social 
network. Social capital in rural communities is embedded in social relations 
and in their functionality. The village-level social relations networks are a set of 
blended social relationships that deal with everyday life contingencies arising 
from the precariousness of their subsistence economy. 
Moral economy, exchange, and social capital mutually reinforce each other, 
developing an effective mechanism to deal with various risks and contingencies 
of everyday life in the community. The following section demonstrates the 
interrelatedness of these structures and practices and their efficacy as localized 
coping strategies.
Informal Structures and Practices in Villages 
before Displacement
The majority of households that were physically displaced by the THDP were 
Hindus, organized into caste groups. The three main castes were Brahmins 
(priests), Kshatiryas (worriers/cultivators), and Harijans (untouchables). Each 
caste was subdivided into jatis (sub-castes). The patrilineal and patrilocal joint 
family is the functional unit that managed property and land. A joint family acted 
both as an economic and a social unit. Members of a joint family normally 
shared a common chulha (hearth) and lived under one roof. Caste and joint 
family were the two key aspects of village social organization. 
The villagers’ primary economic activity before physical displacement 
was subsistence agriculture on small landholdings. As a result, they rarely 
produced an agricultural surplus. For many households, small landholdings 
meant that they could only produce food grain for a few months of the year. 
Animal husbandry was also an important component of the village economy. 
While buffalos and cows provided milk and other dairy products, oxen helped 
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in agricultural activities. The village forest was closely integrated with the 
community, and it provided timber, fuelwood and fodder, as well as edible 
roots and green leafy plants. Housing materials such as roof slate and stones 
were extracted locally. The rivers provided fish, which was their main source of 
protein, and water for household use and land irrigation. They also facilitated 
transporting of fuelwood logs during the monsoon season. However, the local 
subsistence economy did not provide an adequate household income and, as 
a result, many young men migrated to cities in search of work. Their remittances 
constituted a sizable portion of household income. The Harijan community 
did not own any irrigated land. As a result, their economic conditions were 
precarious. Dry land parcels that most of them cultivated did not provide 
sufficient subsistence for households. This precarious existence meant that 
villagers’ income often fell below the subsistence level. A culturally determined 
mechanism whereby the limited resources of the village community could be 
utilized to thwart such occurrences had been operating in village communities 
before their displacement. Based on a subsistence ethic, the village moral 
economy was an important part of this mechanism, which ensured the survival 
of all, albeit at a low economic and food security threshold. 
Village Moral Economy
Berreman pointed out that because of the mountainous topography, the cultivable 
areas that could attract settlements were scattered, resulting in the emergence 
of village settlement that had “an inward-looking, self-contained character…” 
(1963, 351). Physical boundaries of a village were cultural boundaries as well. 
The disha-bandhan (fastening of directions) was an important village ritual that 
consisted of erecting wooden poles around the village indicating its boundaries. 
The poles were supposed to dispel any external bad influence on the village. 
The village was a common marker of identity for its inhabitants. Outside the 
village, its inhabitants were known by the name of the village. People had a strong 
sense of affiliation with the village. Even though the caste system operated as a 
factional and stratifying system of social organization, interdependence among 
various castes ensured that the village existed as a cohesive unit. Village-level 
interdependence, therefore, resulted in a strong sense of community, and 
despite differences people had a strong sense of belonging to their village, 
often expressed as jaise bhee the hum ek gaon ke the (whatever way we were, 
despite of our differences, we were from one village). Furthermore, a village-
level kinship system operated to strengthen the interpersonal relationships, 
giving a sense of the village being an extended family. 
The village community demanded cooperation and loyalty from all residents 
and a shared sense of responsibility toward one another. Therefore, if a 
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household ran out of food, another household in the village would help out. 
A woman stated that: 
In our village not everyone had enough land. The poor people 
were often dependent on well-off households. Someone 
would come to our house and would say my grandchildren or 
children have not eaten. In such an instance, whatever I had in 
my house—rice, jhongra (coarse grain)—I would give them a 
portion so that they too could eat a meal. The person whom I 
helped might come at a later point to do some work voluntarily 
at my house or in my field. Moreover, it was not considered 
good if someone in the village went hungry when you stored 
food in your house. 
The usefulness of the moral economy was evident on occasions that required 
substantive expenditure and could expose the households to economic and 
moral servitude. For example, during a marriage ceremony in a household, 
all other village households contributed in one way or other. Every household 
would bring some rice so that the family organizing the marriage was not 
overburdened. The whole village used to cooperate in the event. A villager 
explained that:
In the village, if there was a marriage, it used to be everyone’s 
responsibility to see that the things happened properly. There 
was an attitude that if a marriage was taking place in someone’s 
house it would mean that the marriage is taking place in our own 
house. So everybody was involved in the ceremony. Our parents 
used to tell us that at least one person from the household had 
to work in the house where marriage was taking place. They 
used to tell us that if we did not do it, when there would be 
an occasion in our house, others would not cooperate either. 
We would do cleaning and decorating of the house, arranging 
necessary things such as cooking utensils, preparing dough, 
making pooris (deep fried bread) and welcoming the guests 
and even if required, carrying bride’s or groom’s palanquin.
The village acted as a moral community, as its inhabitants were conscious of 
their collective identity and responsibility. Gaon ki ijjat (the pride of the village) 
was an important consideration and was often invoked to meet the challenges 
that the individual or household would encounter. 
The moral economy of the village based on subsistence ethics was culturally 
reinforced as well. Certain cultural practices also had a redistributive aspect. 
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For example, the cultural practice of chaiti, which was celebrated during the 
first month (chaitra) of the Hindu calendar, had economic implications as well, 
as one man explained:
In our villages, during the month of chaitra, there used to be 
a scarcity of food because the crops would be readying for 
harvesting and the old stocks of food grains would be limited. 
During this month, members of Harijan community would 
come and visit upper caste houses. Men would beat drums 
and women would sing and dance and, in turn, they would be 
given food grains and cloths. Even if one did not have enough 
for oneself, it was necessary that we kept something aside for  
this purpose.
Thus, the moral economy was an integral part of the villagers’ pre-displacement 
life and helped them to respond to various challenges they encountered. It 
reinforced a multifacted community-based system of ethics and ensured that 
the village households were able to deal with various contingencies and risks 
that as individuals they would find difficult to manage. 
Informal Exchange System
The exchange of goods and services was a common everyday practice. It was 
the redistributive part of the subsistence economy and the basis for social 
bonding that reinforced community relationships. The everyday exchange 
practices were known as painchu and were based on the principle of reciprocity. 
They were not confined to economic activities, but emphasized communal 
and moral considerations as well. One villager illustrated this system with the 
following example:
In the village, if my household ran out of milk, I would go to 
the neighboring house and get a glass of milk. We did not pay 
any money or give anything else in exchange. Likewise, if my 
neighbor required something, he would come to my house. If I 
have what he wanted, I would give it to him. 
Such reciprocity and exchange not only indicated a cordial and good neighborly 
relationship, but was also seen as morally justified. Such exchanges could also 
take the form of a long-term arrangement: 
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The painchu system worked on a day-to-day or long-term basis. 
For example, if the cow or buffalo in my house has stopped giving 
milk, instead of buying milk we would make an arrangement 
with some other household that had enough milk to provide us 
for the time being. We would get an opportunity later to give 
them milk from our cattle. No money was exchanged. If I sold 
milk to a merchant or to another person when my neighbor did 
not have milk, it was not seen as a good practice.
The painchu system was also used in money transactions. Small amounts of 
money were exchanged as and when required without any formal agreement 
or charging of interest. The return of the loan could take different forms. If the 
borrower could not pay in cash, she could provide physical labor in the field of 
the lender in lieu of returning the loan, or provide milk or ghee (clarified butter) 
to the value of the money borrowed. As a villager explained:
In the village, sometimes people who were not well-off would 
come and ask for some small amount of money. We would know 
that they would either repay very late or won’t even be able to 
repay. But that was alright. They were from our village and when 
we require some assistance, they would come to help us.
Similar to the commodity exchange, another important system of exchange was 
the exchange of labor, known as padyalo. It was an integral part of agricultural 
practices, especially in paddy transplantation. While men prepared fields for 
transplantation, women collected the seedlings. Villagers worked collectively 
in each other’s fields, usually without expecting any payment for labor. The 
practice was also observed in other labor-intensive activities—women usually 
followed this system while transporting compost to the fields from cattle sheds. 
Collective labor exchange was also evident during other occasional labor-
intensive activities such as house construction. When a villager planned to 
construct a house, she would send an invitation to fellow villagers requesting 
their help in transporting building material such as timber, slate, and stone to 
the construction site. 
Social Relations as Social Capital 
Reciprocity and trust, together with shared values that emanate from the moral 
economy, generate social capital. Social capital is easy to generate in small 
village communities where there are no strangers: 
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In the village, we knew what is cooking in someone else’s 
kitchen…we knew whose cow had calves or who was unwell 
or who had received a money order from his son working in the 
army or in the city. We knew about which house had received 
guests and we knew who had entered our village. There was 
one path leading to our village and everyone’s eyes were on it.
This familiarity and intensive social network were complemented by reciprocity and 
trust. Reciprocity functions because villagers had faith in their fellow villagers on 
whom they depended for any emergency. They knew that others would come to 
their rescue if they were in trouble. The closely knitted network of relations acted as 
enforcing agency to ensure that reciprocity and trust were not breached:
There could be instances when someone broke the trust…
someone would borrow something but would not repay or 
reciprocate. In that case, he was only causing trouble to himself. 
Everyone would come to know about his misdeeds and people 
won’t help him in future.
Social Capital
The social capital generated by a network of relations within a village community 
was an important instrument in dealing with everyday life contingencies. An old 
resettler explained:
In the village, we did not lock our houses. We had a full sense 
of security and we were aware that within the village no one 
would take away our belongings. There might be an old woman 
looking after her grandchildren, but in fact she would be looking 
after the whole village. If some wild animal came to someone’s 
field or if someone’s cow or calf got loose or if someone had 
a visitor, she would just yell over that such and such thing had 
happened and people would attend to those things. 
Physical Displacement, and Informal 
Structures and Practices
Physical displacement affected village-level informal structures and practices 
adversely. As Downing and Downing-Garcia (2009) pointed out, displacement 
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destabilizes “routine culture” and results in a “dissonant culture” marked by a 
temporary reordering of space, time, relationships, norms, and psycho-social-
cultural constructs. Such a dissonance of culture is evident among the people 
displaced by the project and even among those who had been resettled together 
with their relatives and friends at a resettlement site. A resettler explained:
We in the village held meetings prior to our displacement. We 
were offered many locations to resettle. The elders advised us 
that we should resettle together as a group at a resettlement 
site. We took a collective decision to resettle at this location. 
But it is different from our original village community. Everyone 
is busy with his or her own life, and no one has time for other 
people. We thought that if we relocated as a group we could 
continue our traditional social practices. But soon we realized 
that it was impossible.
Dispersal of displaced households from a village across several resettlement 
sites destroyed the informal networks and subsistence ethics that they enjoyed 
in their original villages. The difficulty in finding sufficient amount of suitable land 
to resettle a whole village community at a new location and household choices 
about relocation played a role in the dispersal of villagers at resettlement sites. 
As a result, the resettlement sites became a mix of households from different 
affected villages:
In this basti (resettlement colony), resettlers are from different 
villages. We do not know where some of these villages were 
located prior to their displacement. In this basti, 10 different 
villages have been given land for resettlement. 
The undermining of the way of the life of the people has weakened the village 
moral economy. The collective identification with the village has been lost. As a 
result of the dispersal of village communities and the breakdown of the social 
networks and practices, the collective control of a village community over an 
individual has become difficult. The collective attitude has been replaced by 
competitive individualistic attitudes. A resettler explained:
At our resettlement colony, there is a kind of competitiveness—
if my neighbor has constructed a big house, I too will construct 
a similar one, even if I do not have the capacity do so…
An individual thinks that if he constructs a smaller house, he 
will be counted as nobody by others. So to ensure that I also 
get counted, I am obliged to construct a big house. All these 
vikritiyan (distortions) were born here. 
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Resettlement has also transformed exchange practices. Everyday life has 
become market dependent and this has impacted everyday life practices as 
well. Now, if a household runs out of milk, it has to go to a shop to buy it; it 
cannot borrow milk from a neighbor. 
At this resettlement site, a household received a 200-square-
meter plot to construct a house. There is hardly any space 
to keep a cow. Even if a household keeps a cow, from where 
can the cow owner get fodder? We do not have a village forest 
or grazing ground here. We need to go to the market to buy 
fodder. With all these difficulties, people think why take so much 
of trouble? Why not buy a packet of milk from a shop? So our 
past practices such as painchu have vanished and now we go 
directly to the market for everything we require.
These changes have led the generalized reciprocity of the past being replaced 
by a balanced reciprocity (Sahlins 1973) that demands immediacy and 
equivalence of exchange. It has resulted in the replacement of the altruistic 
attitude by a rational one, where the interacting parties now deal with one 
another as economic subjects. Unlike in the past, trust is now more a property 
of an individual rather than a collective or societal property. It is now measured 
by an individual’s capacity to reciprocate. And as displacement has adversely 
affected the capabilities of the displaced people, they are no longer certain 
about a borrower’s ability to reciprocate. A resettler explained: 
In the village, if you give money on a loan to someone, you know 
that even if the borrower does not have money to return in cash, 
he would do some work for you, or would give you some ghee 
or might bring a bundle of firewood. But here we do not have 
such resources, so if I go borrowing money, the same people 
who used to lend me in the past do not trust me to be able to 
return the favor. Moreover, we are becoming more and more 
dependent on the market; hence we require less and less help 
from each other.
Resettling in new and physically and culturally different landscapes has also 
impacted the pattern of settlement. Unlike in the past, when houses used to 
share a long courtyard, the new houses are surrounded by boundary wall and 
gates. The change is necessitated mainly by the security concerns and the 
prevailing house design in the new locations. The boundary wall and gate limit 
the social interaction of the villagers. A resettler lamented:
Negotiating Impoverishment Risks through Informal Social Structures and Practices 31
Here, our social interaction has become very limited, even if we 
come from the same village. In the village we would just walk into 
anyone’s house at any time. But here we first need to knock at 
the gate, and we wonder, what if they don’t open the gate?…I will 
feel insulted. So we don’t make the effort to visit one another’s 
house as frequently as we used to in the past. Now we go to 
someone’s house only if there is a need to go there…
Resettlement Process and the Role 
of Informal Structure
The resettlement process that follows forced and collective physical 
displacement is a complex phenomenon. Its impacts on the affected population, 
either in form of multidimensional stress (Scudder 1993) or impoverishment 
(Cernea 2000) are well documented. Similarly, the efficacy of land-for-land 
and cash-for-land compensation has also been scrutinized (Cernea and 
Kunbur 2002; Mathur and Cernea 2008). An important aspect that needs more 
investigation is the processes involved in resettlement. Downing and Downing-
Garcia (2009) provided an important window for this purpose. They pointed out 
that the transition from a dissonant culture to a routine culture takes place in a 
block-by-block or piecemeal manner. Sorensen (1996) also sees relocation as 
a dynamic process in which relocated people play an active role.
During the early phase of resettlement, persons displaced by the Tehri 
Hydroelectric Development Project (THDP) felt acutely the usefulness of 
informal structures, which formed an important aspect of their pre-displacement 
lives. In the absence of such structures and practices, they find themselves 
bereft of common practices that help them cope with difficulties and crises 
that they encounter during resettlement. As they build new cultural norms and 
values that will eventually orient them to deal with the new realities of life at 
the resettlement colonies, they attempt to resuscitate or at least to incorporate 
social practices that they had traditionally used to deal with life contingencies. 
The resettlers at several resettlement sites have been trying to rebuild 
communities by forming samitis (associations). Such samitis are marked 
by contractual, formal, and association-type relations that are different from 
their traditional reciprocal and mutual-help practices. But samitis help rebuild 
individual and household capabilities to cope with the resettlement process 
through a collective endeavor. The collective resources built through the 
formation of samitis will eventually be directed to meet the various exigencies 
that a household faces. For example, at a resettlement site, its association 
32 Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
bought large cooking pots and cutlery with contributions collected from the 
samiti members to use on occasions such as weddings. At another resettlement 
colony, by forming a samiti, the resettlers raised sufficient funds to operate a 
high school. As a collective, they have also been able to influence government 
agencies to channel funds through the samiti to the school. Such samitis give 
resettlers a political voice as well. As resettlers first they became members of 
panchayats (village councils) where they did not have any power. But later as 
members of samitis, some resettlers have become political pressure groups. 
Using their numerical dominance in the area, they could influence electoral 
results in their constituencies. As a result, major political parties note their 
presence and listen to their demands. 
Resettlers are also trying to resurrect some of their exchange practices, even 
though the exchange is now money-based rather than commodity-based. In 
cultivating land, for example, resettlers still give priority to renting each other’s 
agricultural implements and machines instead of renting from outsiders. 
Resettlers also feel that once they gain sufficient skills and knowledge in 
modern agricultural practices, they could restart their labor exchange practice 
of padyalo, as this would eventually lessen the monetary burden of farming. 
Ferdinand Tonnies’ (1963) distinction between gemeinschaft (association) 
and gesellschaft (community) types of relationship provides a theoretical 
framework to understand the dynamics of the resettlers’ samitis. Although they 
are formal organizations, they allow for community-type relationships. Thus, 
samitis comprise both gemeinschaft and gesellschaft relationships. Moreover, 
although formed as associations, their objective is to resurrect similar structures 
that had helped them deal with various contingencies in their pre-displacement 
life. These new structures at the resettlement sites, therefore, could be seen as 
attempts to develop a moral economy similar to that of the past, although the 
notion of the village moral economy is now replaced by the moral economy of 
the displaced. 
Conclusion
Informal social structures play an important role in dealing with risks and 
contingencies in villages. They are culturally informed practices derived from 
local knowledge, involvement, and participation. Such key social practices, 
which keep village communities together and give identity to a collection of 
persons or households as one group or association, are rarely taken into 
consideration in resettlement planning or in the implementation of relocation 
programs. Resettlement policies and plans still pay attention only to tangible 
assets such as land and trees, and in some rare cases, to common property 
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resources. Cultural and social institutions that are as important as economic 
considerations are kept out of the purview of resettlement policies and planning. 
The chapter has attempted to demonstrate that forced physical displacement 
involves not only a change of place, but also a change in the way of life, or 
a process of “disembedding” (Giddens 1990) of the people from their world. 
However, as resettlers, displaced populations at resettlement colonies 
do not restart their lives as people without a history or past. They refer 
back to their traditional culture and way of life that oriented them to deal 
with the contingencies in everyday life in the past. In dealing with the risks 
encountered in their post-displacement lives, they attempt to resuscitate their 
traditional social structures and practices in different forms to suit the new 
environment. Thus, by referring to their traditional frame of reference, they gain 
an opportunity to act as participants in the resettlement process, rather than 
remaining passive recipients of compensation and resettlement assistance. 
Recognition and inclusion of these traditional mechanisms in resettlement 
planning and implementation would make it easier for resettlers to participate 
in the resettlement process, which, in turn, would reduce the stress, trauma, 
and social displacement associated with physical displacement. 
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3.  Displacement through 
Limiting Access to Forests: 
A Socio-Legal Analysis 
by Jayantha Perera
D evelopment investments displace persons and communities in two key ways: by acquiring property including land, and by imposing restrictions on land use or access to forests, designated parks, and protected areas. 
The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standard 5 elaborates 
these two forms as follows:
Project-related land acquisition and restrictions on land use 
can have adverse impacts on communities and persons that 
use this land. Involuntary resettlement refers both to physical 
displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic 
displacement (loss of assets or access to assets that leads 
to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood) as a 
result of project-related land acquisition and/or restrictions on 
land use. Resettlement is considered involuntary when affected 
persons or communities do not have the right to refuse land 
acquisition or restrictions on land use that result in physical or 
economic displacement. (2012, 58)
The scope of this chapter is the second form of involuntary displacement—
restrictions on access and use of land that the state claims as its property. 
Forests, protected areas, and designated parks fall into this category of land. 
Its focus is on tribes that live in forests and their peripheries. They depend on 
forests to earn their livelihood, or part of it, and consider forests to be integral 
part of their social, economic, and sacred space. Forests thus play a key role 
in shaping their collective identity and culture, and in their survival (Rodriguez-
Pinero 2005). 
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The chapter first discusses how British colonial rule in India incrementally 
deprived tribal populations—especially forest-dwelling tribes—of their 
economic, social, and environmental interests and rights. The chapter then 
examines the actions taken by the government and judiciary in post-colonial 
India to rectify such harm, deprivation, and displacement of forest dwellers and 
other tribal peoples. It also assesses the adequacy of these actions to protect 
their cultural, economic, and environmental interests and rights.
The chapter makes a distinction between “interests” and “rights” of tribal 
people to highlight the emergence of procedural rights through judicial 
decisions on tribal peoples’ interests. Procedural rights are critically important 
in the conversion of interests into rights. Interests are not easily enforceable 
through legal proceedings, but they indicate the wider ascription of value 
or status to the interests and claims of a particular entity. Because of such 
ascriptions, lawmakers and institutions are encouraged to take account of 
those interests and confer on them some priority that they might not otherwise 
enjoy. Moreover, such ascriptions make them part of the context for interpreting 
legal rules. Therefore, the value of procedural rights is to be judged in the 
context of national legal systems. 
Forests under British Rule
The land the British rulers in India labeled and demarcated as forests had long 
been inhabited by local tribal communities, especially forest-dwelling tribes. 
The rulers took over forestland under the principle of eminent domain either 
to override or reject the claims, rights, and interests of forest dwellers and 
other fringe communities. They first used the concept of eminent domain in 
1824, when Regulation I of the Bengal Code was approved. The key purpose 
of Regulation I was to enable colonial authorities to acquire private land at 
fair value for “roads, canals, or other public purposes.” “Indian jurisprudence 
regarding eminent domain inevitably traces the concept back to its roots in 
Grotius and justifies its use based on the proposition that all land vests in the 
‘sovereign,’ which can reassert its rights over the land of its ‘subjects’ at any 
time” (Gupta 2012: 454).
The colonial government implemented its forest laws through its Forest 
Department, which was established in 1854 as a specialized state institution with 
authority over forest affairs. Access to forests was controlled through “territorial 
controls,” which demarcated a specific territory as forestland and claimed all 
its resources as state property under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department. 
Access to forestlands was allowed by issuing permits or by recognizing some 
customary rights as legal exemptions. In addition, the government created 
a few customary rights through a political process called “discovery” or 
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“recognition.” This process helped the state to appear generous in conceding 
access to forests. The discourse of customary rights thus contributed to the 
state’s constant efforts to maintain some balance between rule by consent and 
by coercion (Upadhyay and Upadhyay 2002).
The British interests in Indian forests grew rapidly from the 1850s with the 
construction of railroads that demanded immense quantities of sleepers 
for rail beds. At the same time, forests in India also became a rich source 
of timber for shipbuilding (Godgil and Guha 1993). Commercial demand for 
timber had accelerated forest felling, raising the value of forestland. The British 
colonial government enacted the Forest Act in 1864, which drastically curtailed 
the traditional claims of forest dwellers and nearby communities to forest 
produce such as food, fuel, building material, fibers, and medicinal plants, and 
regulated tree felling and unplanned cultivation in forests such as slash-and-
burn cultivation of crops. The act and its various amendments were reissued 
as the Forest Act of 1878. 
The Indian Forest Act of 1927 further consolidated forest-related laws, the 
transit of forest produce, and duty or taxes on timber sale. Under the act, the 
state can declare any land or wasteland as a “reserved forest” and acquire 
its proprietary rights or vest such rights in a third party. The act also created 
“protected forests” where the state can, by notification, reserve trees, close any 
portion of forest to the public, and prohibit removal of forest produce or clearing 
of forestland for cultivation. The act consolidated the government’s rights over 
forests, and subordinated the entitlements of tribal people to state’s right of 
eminent domain. The act and its regulations determined who could use timber 
in forests, collect forest produce, and cultivate forestland. Setting fire to forests, 
hunting, trespassing, quarrying, fishing, and setting traps for animals in forests 
were made criminal offenses under Section 26 of the act.
The legal categories of forests, such as reserved forest and protected forest, 
that are defined in the Indian Forest Act of 1927 give the impression that the act 
was environment-oriented and tribal-friendly. But both reserved and protected 
forest categories further diminished or curtailed the access of forest dwellers to 
forests, as the state began to control all transactions within forests. It restricted 
forest dwellers’ movements and, more importantly, deprived them of their 
age-old rights to collect forest produce on which their livelihoods depended. 
Reserved and protected forest could be labeled “political forests” because 
they were created by the state by legal codes to establish its full control over 
large tracts of land where some populations subsisted (Peluso and Vandegeest 
2001). As Scott (1998) pointed out, the exercise of specific types of power 
relationships between the state and the people, initiated through controls on 
forest and land resources, enabled the state to exclusively claim the resources 
contained within its territory.
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The Indian Forest Act of 1927 was geared to deal with specific claims from 
forest dwellers over reserved forests. Many of them claimed rights to land 
parcels that they had cultivated before the parcels became part of reserved 
forests. The forest settlement officer reviewed such claims and, if accepted, 
excluded the claimed piece of land from the forest area, made an agreement 
with the claimant on how to use the land, or initiated the process of acquiring 
the land parcel under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for a public purpose. 
Public purposes include maintenance of a reserved forest. A second type of 
claim was to pasture or to collect forest produce. If a claim was accepted, the 
officer determined the area within the forest where the claimant could graze 
his cattle or how much timber and other produce he or she could collect from 
the forest. The third type of claim related to slash-and-burn cultivation. For 
this claim, the officer prepared a statement explaining the nature of the claim, 
the officer’s personal observations and recommendations, and reference to 
local rules, if any, under which shifting cultivation of forestland was allowed, 
regulated, or prohibited. The officer then submitted the report to the district 
administration to determine whether shifting cultivation should be permitted. 
The act made clear that slash-and-burn cultivation is a privilege bestowed by the 
state. The traditional rights to forest resources were converted into privileges, 
concessions, or favors (Sarker and Das 2008). Such regimented control over 
forests and forest produce specifically disadvantaged forest dwellers and other 
tribal communities that depended on forests for their livelihood. Often, they 
could not produce documentary evidence to prove their claims. They neither 
had contacts with the state administration nor resources to file a case in a 
court. As the rights of forest dwellers gradually eroded, conflicts arose between 
the state agencies and forest dwellers. Disagreement between the state and 
forest dwellers over forest management priorities generated unsustainable 
patterns of forest exploitation that accelerated the degradation of India’s vast 
forest cover (Poffenberger and McGean 1996).
Independent India—Constitutional Protection 
for Tribal Communities
The environmental interests and rights of tribal peoples achieved prominence 
in the constitutional debates in the late 1940s. These debates revealed 
contrasting positions on the issues of tribal peoples and their future (Guha 
2007). Some parties wanted to let tribal peoples develop and maintain their 
own distinct identity; others wanted to assimilate them into mainstream 
society. However, the framers of the Indian Constitution wanted to maintain the 
distinction between mainstream society and tribal communities to provide tribal 
communities with special assistance in the framework of the fundamental rights 
and directive principles of the Constitution. The Constitution redesignated the 
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tribal areas and listed the tribes living in them. As a subset of this vast category, 
the Constitution identified several groups as “scheduled tribes” and the areas in 
which they live as “scheduled areas.”1 Most scheduled tribes live in remote rural 
areas, where basic amenities such as water and electricity supplies are absent 
and food security is erratic. The Constitutional Assembly designated some 
400 communities as scheduled tribes (Guha 2007). The fifth and sixth schedules 
of the Constitution listed all scheduled tribes in India and prescribed an 
elaborate indigenous system of executive, legislative, and judicial administration 
focusing on self-governance features such as village councils with specific 
powers and responsibilities. 
The sixth schedule also emphasized the importance of forest preservation and 
thus aimed to protect forests for the benefit of tribal peoples, especially forest 
dwellers. About 60% of the forest area of the country lies in 187 tribal districts, 
although the geographical area of these districts constitutes only one-third of 
India’s physical domain. Most tribal areas are known for their mineral resources. 
About 84% of India’s tribal population lives in or around forests (Government 
of India 2003). 
Section XVI of the Constitution promotes social justice by elaborating a series 
of affirmative-action schemes for disadvantaged groups. These “Special 
Provisions Relating to Certain Classes” include the reservation of seats 
in the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and in state legislative bodies for 
members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The section stipulates 
that a special officer for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes should be 
appointed by the President of India to “investigate all matters relating to the 
safeguards provided” for them, as well as periodic commissions to investigate 
the conditions of “backward classes” (groups considered to be socially and 
educationally disadvantaged). 
In 1952, 2 years after the Constitution of India was adopted, the government 
formulated a forest policy to streamline forest management and systematically 
codify local people’s rights to forests (Government of India 1952). The policy 
pointed out that over the years, forests in India had suffered serious depletion. 
This was attributed to ever-increasing demand for firewood, fodder, and timber, 
especially from forest dwellers, and to their failure to protect the forests. It 
was also attributed to the diversion of forestlands to nonforest uses, such 
as development projects, without ensuring compensatory forestation and 
adequate environmental safeguards.
Despite constitutional guarantees of preferential treatment and the recognition 
of forest dwellers’ plight by the Forest Policy of 1952, forest dwellers remained 
1 The term “scheduled tribe” refers to a specific indigenous peoples group whose vulnerability 
and marginalized status is acknowledged by the Constitution (Muda 2002).
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marginalized and poor, without much political support to change their life 
chances. Large-scale development projects, such as irrigation and highway 
projects, as well as mining projects, physically or economically displaced 
thousands of forest dwellers from the 1950s (Godgil and Guha 1993). Such 
impacts on forest dwellers, in particular, and on tribal peoples, in general, took 
place while India was trying to operationalize the Constitution-backed tribal 
peoples’ safeguards. Education and employment safeguards of tribal peoples 
have received some recognition in several states in India, but forest dwellers’ 
rights in forests were not explored in the legislature or judiciary until the 1980s. 
Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980
Widespread concerns regarding large-scale deforestation resulting in ecological 
imbalance and environmental degradation led to the enactment of the Forest 
(Conservation) Act in 1980. It aimed at balancing environmental interests and 
rights of tribal peoples with national development needs. The act prescribes 
that no state government or any other authority could, without the prior approval 
of the central government, make any order to “de-reserve” forestland,2 use any 
forestland for a nonforest purpose,3 lease out forest land to a private agency, or 
cut naturally grown trees on forestland. However, since the 1980s, the central 
government has undertaken massive infrastructure and mining projects as the 
key contributor to national development. In the process, it has approved more 
than 11,000 development projects that permitted de-reservation of large areas 
of forestland in different states under the act. 
A key aim of the act is to assimilate into mainstream society forest dwellers and 
other tribal peoples who depended on forests for their livelihood, so that forests 
can be released from them. The central government issued guidelines on 18 
September 1990 on how to change forest villages into revenue villages under 
the Forest (Conservation) Act. By 2005, about 384 forest villages covering about 
34,000 hectares of forestland had been converted into revenue villages in the 
states of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. About 85% of the populations of 
these forest villages are tribal peoples. Furthermore, the Forest (Conservation) 
Act can permit the use of forestland in respect of projects such as underground 
drinking water supply, electricity, and telephone lines in tribal areas. Guidelines 
issued in October 2003 under the Forest (Conservation) Act prescribe the 
setting aside of 5% of project costs to provide basic amenities and services 
such as education, health, employment, and sports facilities to forest dwellers 
who will be affected by projects.
2 “De-reserve” means removing the legal status of forest from a tract of land.
3 Nonforest purposes include clearing of any forestland to cultivate coffee, tea, spices, rubber, 
palms trees, horticultural crops, or medicinal plants. 
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The progressive expansion of the state’s rights over forests has added a political 
dimension to forest management. The state clarified who could use forests for 
their livelihood. In 2002, for example, the Director General of Forests issued 
guidelines on how to distinguish encroachers on forestland from those who are 
entitled to use it. Those who are entitled to use forests were classified as forest-
dwelling communities. But distinguishing forest dwellers from encroachers on 
forests is difficult. One key problem is the complexity of forest boundaries and 
the myriad categories of forests—reserve forests, protected forests, village 
forests, forest villages, panchayat forests, national parks, sanctuaries, closed 
areas, biosphere reserves, tiger reserves, elephant reserves, core areas, buffer 
zones, demarcated forests, and undemarcated forests. Another pitfall is the 
ambiguity in describing interests, rights, and privileges of various categories of 
communities in accessing forests. These difficulties are further complicated by 
forest bureaucracies’ belief that collection of forest products, grazing of cattle, 
or cultivation of land in forests by forest dwellers is the chief cause of forest 
degradation and mismanagement. The lack of clarity in the definitions of forest 
and forestland, and property has also contributed this complex scenario. 
...simplistic attempts to define forests or the lack of clarity in 
distinguishing “forests” from “forest land” or even understanding 
the complexity of the categories [of forests] have only added 
to the already complex forestry management attempts thus far. 
The notion of property rights and proprietary rights in forests, 
the nuances of rights vs. privileges as compared to “favours” 
and “concessions,” the benefit of “recorded rights” vs. “implicit 
usufruct rights” or traditional and customary rights which may 
not be recorded are the other important dimensions that are 
often ignored (Upadhyay 2003, 939). 
Corruption and officers’ negligence encourage illegal tree felling and 
encroachment on reserved and protected forests. Regularization of 
encroachment on forests often works against marginalized and illiterate forest 
dwellers, but frequently benefits rich, influential landholders and commercial 
interests. Moreover, portions of forests are leased out by the state to rehabilitate 
landless laborers as a key arrangement for distributing the population and 
eradicating rural poverty. As a result, many forest dwellers have become 
strangers in their own environment. As commercialization sets in, forests 
become a source of raw materials for forest-based industries (Godgil and 
Guha 1993). The state’s control over tree felling helped the interests of the few 
more than it served the cause of forest preservation. Privatization of common 
property resources works against the interests of tribal peoples, especially 
of forest dwellers, whose very existence depends on such resources. These 
changes have struck a blow to the multifaceted and symbiotic relationship 
between forests and forest dwellers. 
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To promote nation-building development programs, the central and state 
governments have given companies, industries, and international corporations 
large areas of forest to establish businesses and industries. They have 
progressively encroached on forest dwellers’ social, sacred, cultural, economic, 
and physical space. Forest dwellers see this encroachment as taking two forms: 
(i) national and state laws and regulations inhibiting or limiting their space and 
redefining their interests and rights over forests; and (ii) the state handing over 
large portions of forestland to corporations and companies to build dams and 
roads, excavate mines, and establish special economic zones. A well-known 
example of the awarding of land to a corporation is the mining agreement 
signed between the State of Orissa and Vedanta Alumina in 2004 to extract 
bauxite from the Niyamgiri Hills. The hills are home to the Dongraria Kondha 
tribe, which has depended on the forested hill slopes for their livelihood for 
centuries. Such inroads into ancestral land by external forces have generated 
a sense of hopelessness and vulnerability among forest dwellers (Shyam and 
Rosencranz 2002).
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional  
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act of 2006
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, ratified by India, added impetus to environmental protection 
and the safeguarding of forest dwellers’ rights, such as their right to ancestral 
territory and livelihood based on access to natural resources. As discussed, the 
government has introduced policies and laws that paved the way for recognition 
of the rights of tribal peoples, especially forest dwellers, to earn their livelihood 
from forests, and to protect their cultural identity associated with such land and 
livelihoods. An important landmark in this regard is the National Forest Policy 
issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests in 1988. The provision of 
fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce to rural and tribal peoples is one of its 
objectives. However, the policy did not recognize any distinct customary rights 
of forest dwellers. Forest dwellers had to wait another 18 years until 2006 to 
receive legal recognition to their customary rights:
…while customary rights of the Primitive Tribal Groups are 
not recognized in the National Forest Policy, 1988 they are an 
integral part of the [Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional 
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of] Forest Rights) Act, 2006. An 
Act passed by Parliament has greater sanctity than a Policy 
Statement. (Supreme Court of India, Judgment on Orissa Mining 
44 Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
Corporation vs. Ministry of Environment and Forest and others, 
Writ Petition (civil) No. 180 of 2011, delivered on 18 April 2013)
The government enacted the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act4 in 2006. This is a landmark in the 
government’s development perspectives on tribal peoples and their rights. Its 
passage after nearly 25 years of debate and consultation is a watershed in the 
prolonged struggle of forest dwellers in India for the recognition of their interests 
and rights. The preamble to the act states that it is “[A]n Act to recognize and 
vest the forest rights and occupation of forest land in forest dwelling Scheduled 
Tribes and other forest dwellers who have been residing in such forests for 
generations but whose rights could not be recorded; [and] to provide for a 
framework for recording the forest rights so vested and the nature of evidence 
required for such recognition and vesting in respect of forest land.”
The Forest Rights Act of 2006 recognizes forest dwellers’ customary rights 
to access forests and collect forest produce. Associated with these rights, 
their responsibilities are to use forests sustainably, conserve biodiversity, and 
sustain the ecological balance. The act corrected historic injustice but also 
vested in forest communities a primary role in sustaining forest ecosystems. 
Most importantly, it states that forest dwellers have rights that include the 
conservation of forests and biodiversity (section 5). 
The act prescribes that all future notification of “inviolate” conservation zones 
and curtailment of rights in protected areas shall require the “free, prior, 
informed consent” of tribal peoples who live on such land (section 4 [e]). It 
also emphasizes that all forestlands—irrespective of location and category—
which have traditionally been used by tribal communities would be henceforth 
treated as “community forest resources,” and forest dwellers can act decisively 
through their gram sabhas (village councils) in conserving such resources. 
The act effectively recognizes the rights of forest dwellers who, until the act was 
enacted, were considered encroachers on state land. The Forest Department 
had the power to expel them without paying appropriate compensation, and 
such expulsion had taken place mainly when forest dwellers did not have 
sufficient evidence to prove their right to ancestral land (Leelakrishnan 2002). 
Corrupt practices, bribery, and tribal vendettas often influenced such actions. 
Unfortunately, however, the act has not taken into account thousands of forest 
dwellers who face charges under different provisions of the Indian Forest 
Act, 1927, and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, for illegally felling trees, 
encroaching, and collecting minor produce. There is no provision in the Forest 
4 Popularly known as the Forest Rights Act, 2006.
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Rights Act of 2006 that would cancel or drop such charges against forest-
dwelling scheduled tribes.5 
Although the act seeks to make forest conservation stronger by giving 
powers to forest-dwelling communities to protect forests, such powers are in 
addition to, not instead of, the powers that the Forest Department and other 
government agencies possess, thereby creating room for a clash between 
these communities and the Forest Department. This can happen if forest 
dwellers disagree with the government’s decisions to transfer forestland to 
development projects. In this regard, the act stipulates that the government 
should obtain “the free informed consent” of affected forest dwellers and their 
village councils for such transactions (section 4 [2][e]). This was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court of India in its judgment on Orissa Mining Corporation vs. 
Ministry of Environment and Forest and Others in 2013.
Section 4 (2)(d) of the act stipulates that the displacement of tribal peoples can 
only happen after a resettlement or alternative package has been prepared 
in consultation with them. The package ensures that affected communities 
will have appropriate income sources. It will fulfill “the requirements of such 
affected individuals and communities given in the relevant laws and the policy 
of the Central Government.” Section 4 (2)(f) says that “no resettlement shall 
take place until facilities and land allocation at the resettlement location are 
complete as per the promised package.” This is a significant improvement in 
terms of land acquisition, compensation, and rehabilitation for project-affected 
forest dwellers. 
Despite the safeguards built into the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and 
the Forest Rights Act of 2006, the takeover of forests for development 
programs continues at an alarming rate (Table 3.1). Since the enactment of 
the Forest Rights Act, more than 200,000 hectares of forestland have been 
converted to nonforest purposes. During 1982–2012, only 6% of applications 
for conversion were rejected by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The 
main nonforest purposes include regularization of encroachments (30%), 
irrigation (14%), power (14%), and mining (12%). In addition, defense, public 
utilities, and highways took over forestland. The Forest Advisory Committee, 
appointed under the Forest Conservation Act of 1980, plays a role in the 
forest clearance process. 
5 By 2004, there were 257,226 such cases pending against 162,692 forest dwellers and other 
tribal peoples under sections 26, 33, and 41 of the Indian Forest Act of 1927 (Ghosh 2006). 
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Table 3.1 Conversion of Forest Areas 
into Nonforest Areas, 1982–2012
Period
Forest Area Converted
(hectares)
1982–1991 198,421
1992–1996  84,587
1997–2001  147,397
2002–2006  196,262
2007–2012  204,425
Total  831,092
Source: Economic and Political Weekly (2011). 
The committee is chaired by the Director General of Forests and has two officials 
from the Forest Department, one official from the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
three eminent experts in forestry and allied disciplines as nonofficial members. 
The regulations of the 2006 act were revised in 2009 to include experts in 
mining, civil engineering, and development economics as nonofficial members 
of the committee. In 2008, the Supreme Court directed the committee to include 
conservation biologists, environmental historians, and sociologists among its 
nonofficial members. “The presence of social scientists has become all the 
more important since forest clearances are likely to have a significant impact 
on forest-using communities under the Forest Rights Act 2006” (Economic and 
Political Weekly 2011, 16).
Tribal Rights and Judicial Activism
The judiciary has played an important role in making proactive and innovative 
interpretations of laws and regulations pertaining to tribal peoples and forest 
dwellers. While recognizing the importance of forests for maintaining ecological 
balance, which includes forest dwellers’ environmental interests and rights, 
the judiciary pays equal attention to the nation’s development requirements 
such as mining, road infrastructure, hydropower, and irrigation (Leelakrishnan 
2002). Therefore, the judiciary will not interfere with the executive’s decisions 
regarding national development programs, unless they blatantly harm forest 
dwellers’ livelihoods and cultural distinctiveness. Although some policies 
interfere with forest dwellers’ lives, livelihoods, and culture, the judiciary 
allows them to proceed if development agencies compensate affected forest 
dwellers adequately and provide relocation and rehabilitation assistance. Such 
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interference is also allowed only if the affected forest dwellers give consent 
based on negotiations.
The Supreme Court, through a series of judgments, has tried to strike a balance 
between the rights of forest dwellers and the needs of national development. 
In Banwasi Seva Ashram vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (1987), the main 
issue was whether the location of development projects in or near a forest area 
could adversely affect forest dwellers. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh, 
with a view to transferring forestland to a thermal power company, wanted to 
declare a part of the forest that was occupied by forest dwellers and other tribal 
peoples as reserved forest. The Supreme Court tried to balance the interests 
of the forest dwellers with national development priorities by paying special 
attention to sustainable development. It held that although development 
projects might have adverse impacts on forest dwellers, such priorities should 
go ahead for the benefit of the nation. However, while endorsing the project, the 
Supreme Court gave equal importance to national priorities and forest dwellers’ 
interests and rights. It issued several orders regarding the relocation of the forest 
dwellers and the restoration and improvement of their income and livelihoods. 
It also requested the state to provide free legal aid to all displaced persons, 
if required. The court appointed a board of commissioners to supervise the 
implementation of its orders. 
In the second case of Banwasi Seva Ashram (1992), the Supreme Court imposed 
additional responsibilities on the thermal power company. It ordered it to find 
alternative land plots to relocate the displaced forest dwellers; pay subsistence 
allowances; provide free transport; reserve jobs for affected persons at the 
project work sites; and provide facilities such as roads, water, health care, 
and electricity facilities at the relocation sites. The court pointed out that the 
displaced forest dwellers could have been given land plots in reserve forests 
for cultivation. However, forest dwellers were not allowed to fell, transport, or 
sell trees that belonged to the state government. This decision was reaffirmed 
by the court in State of Orissa vs. Duti Sahu (1997). 
In all three cases, the Supreme Court took the position that if forest areas cannot 
be preserved because of the demand for national development projects, forest 
dwellers should also be allowed to become beneficiaries of such projects. In 
other words, projects that would displace forest dwellers economically, socially, 
and culturally should be implemented as development opportunities for them 
so that their life prospects could be enhanced. 
In Pradeep Krishnan vs. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court further clarified 
forest dwellers’ rights to forests as a source of livelihood. The Government of 
Madhya Pradesh granted fishing permits to displaced forest dwellers in the 
Toltadoh Reservoir, which is in the Pench National Park bordering the State of 
Maharashtra. The Government of Maharashtra objected to the issuing of fishing 
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permits by the Government of Madhya Pradesh on environmental grounds 
such as the potential danger of felling trees, harm to crocodiles and turtles in 
the reservoir, disturbance to water birds and migratory birds, and the possibility 
of lighting fires and throwing garbage and polythene bags around and into the 
reservoir. The court pointed out that although the presence of the fishers could 
cause environmental damage, as claimed by the Government of Maharashtra, 
the overriding rights of the forest dwellers to livelihood take precedence over 
environmental issues. It also emphasized the importance of preserving the 
fragile ecology of the forest by systematically rehabilitating the displaced forest 
dwellers where they are “in a position to earn their livelihood.” Until such time, 
the court ordered strict vigilance on the exercise of fishing rights by opening 
check posts to stop transgress into other areas, recording the daily fish catch, 
and prohibiting the lighting of fires on the banks of the reservoir. 
The case of Fates and Gimba vs. State of Gujarat (1997) illustrates the impact 
of forest reservations on forest dwellers’ lives. The forest officials of the State 
of Gujarat blocked the transport of bamboo mats made using tribal labor from 
the reserved forest areas on the ground of possible reckless exploitation of 
forests by forest dwellers. The High Court of Gujarat held that forest dwellers 
have the right to depend on the forest for their livelihood and that the forest 
officials cannot block the economic activities on which their livelihoods 
depend. In Suresh Lohia vs. State of Maharashtra (1998), the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment in Gimba (1997), stating that when a bamboo product 
is a commercial product, it could not be treated as forest produce. The Forest 
Department pointed out removing bamboo products from the definition of 
forest produce frustrates the objective of the Forest Protection Act of 1980, as it 
allows unscrupulous dealers an opportunity to denude the country of its forest 
wealth. The court rejected the plea on the ground that, while it cannot legislate, 
it could intervene in administrative actions, based on laws, if they amount to 
removing the rights of forest dwellers to their habitat and livelihood. 
In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union of India and Ors (1996), the Supreme 
Court stated that “it is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of 
customary international law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be 
deemed to have been incorporated in domestic law and shall be followed by 
court of law. But lower courts continue to take the view that municipal law under 
the statute takes precedence over the rights or privileges that are recognised 
under customary practices or conventions.” This ambiguity in interpreting the 
customary rights of forest dwellers and other tribal peoples frequently surfaces 
in Indian jurisprudence. However, in the following two cases, the Supreme 
Court has established some firm interpretation of the interests of forest dwellers 
over forestland and its produce.
In Godavarman Thirumulpad vs. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court 
liberally interpreted “forest,” establishing a watershed in forest protection 
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and conservation in India. It held that “forest” is not only to be understood 
in the dictionary sense of the word, but also as any land area designated as 
forest in government records. It held that the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 
applies to all forests, irrespective of whether they are public or private and 
irrespective of the nature of their other classifications. It also held that sawmills 
and mining are nonforest activities, and prior permission must be obtained 
from the central government before embarking on such activities. It directed 
each state government to ensure the cessation of such unapproved activities 
in forest areas. The Supreme Court imposed on each state government the 
responsibility to report on the number of sawmills and their capacity, proximity 
to the nearest forest, and sources of timber. The court also imposed a complete 
ban on the felling of trees in tropical wet evergreen forests and on the movement 
of timber with the exception of certified timber required for defense purposes. 
It ordered each state government to constitute an expert committee to identify 
forest areas, denuded forests, and areas covered with plantation trees, and 
to assess the sustainable capacity of forest sawmills. Plantations were barred 
from further expansion and forests encroachment through clearing or other 
means. These measures assured that the takeover of forestlands for public 
or private development purposes would not take place unless the central 
government authorized such actions. 
In Samata vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997), Samata, an advocacy and social 
action group, was involved in a dispute with the State Government of Andhra 
Pradesh in 1992 over the leasing of some tribal lands in the scheduled areas 
to private mining industries. Under the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land 
Transfer Regulation, 1959, and its amendment in 1971, tribal land could not 
be transferred to nontribal people. The Supreme Court held that scheduled 
areas in a state are, as per the constitutional scheme, a separate category 
of land. As a result, those who live in or depend on such areas have specific 
social, traditional, and environmental interests and rights in such lands and 
forests. Therefore, such interests should be respected and protected. Justice 
Ramasaswamy observed:
The tribals have fundamental right to social and economic 
empowerment. As a part of right to development to enjoy 
full freedom, democracy offered to them through the states 
regulated power of good government that the lands in scheduled 
areas are preserved for social economic development of the 
tribal people (1997, 769). 
The judgment further stated that tribal people can exploit minerals in scheduled 
areas without disturbing the ecology or forestlands, either individually or through 
cooperative societies, with financial assistance from the state. It further held 
that in the absence of a total prohibition on the transfer of lands, any licensee 
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or lessee must provide certain duties and obligations to the tribal people who 
are affected by the projects. At least 20% of the lessee’s net profits must be 
set aside as a permanent fund for the affected tribal peoples’ development 
needs in addition to any expenditure on reforestation and the maintenance of 
ecology. However, the Supreme Court stated that the transfer of tribal lands to 
state-owned agencies or corporations is excluded from such prohibition, since 
a public corporation acts in the public interest and not for private gain. 
The Supreme Court directed the Prime Minister of India to convene a 
conference of all relevant ministers to develop a national scheme based on 
the guidelines laid down in the judgment in relation to tribal lands throughout 
the country. Several state governments and the central government appealed 
to the Supreme Court to amend the judgment and reinstate the states’ powers 
to grant leases to private mining companies. The court dismissed this appeal. 
The underlying theme of the Samata judgment is the concept of sustainable 
development and the precautionary principle. When development is controlled, 
regulated, or supervised by the local tribal community or state instruments 
(assuming the social welfare mandate of the state), there is less chance of 
environmental degradation and social destruction. The Samata judgment 
stands as the custodian of tribal peoples’ constitutional rights in India. 
Regarding the rights of forest dwellers, three trends in Indian jurisprudence can 
be identified from the foregoing discussion. The first concerns forest dwellers’ 
livelihood rights. In the Samata case, the Supreme Court held that the right of 
a tribal person over his or her land is primary. This has limited the state’s power 
in exploiting mineral resources in scheduled tribal areas. The judicial concern 
for the sustenance of forest dwellers and other tribal people who depend 
on forests and forest produce is also reflected in the cases of Fates and 
Gimba, and Lohia. The second is the judiciary’s environmental sustainability 
concerns, which have a direct impact on forest dwellers’ livelihood and 
incomes. In Godavarman, the Supreme Court underlined the importance of 
sustaining the carrying capacity of forests. Its desire to preserve the forest’s 
wealth from industrial depredation is also obvious from a series of judgments 
on regulating mining activities in forests. The third is that the state and other 
agencies should avoid adverse impacts on forest dwellers and other tribal 
peoples who depend on forests for their livelihood and sociocultural identity. 
If such impacts are unavoidable, every effort should be taken, as emphasized 
in Banwasi Seva Ashram, to improve their livelihood and social status at the 
expense of the project. In other words, development interventions should 
provide development opportunities for forest dwellers. 
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Laws into Action
In the State of Orissa, Vedanta Aluminium, a company based in the United 
Kingdom, started a bauxite mining operation with state government’s support 
in an area that the Dongria Kondh tribal communities consider as their 
ancestral domain. Several local and international nongovernment organizations 
challenged the operation in a global campaign, alleging that environmental, 
religious, and cultural rights of the tribal peoples of the Niyamgiri Hills were 
being violated. In 2010, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) 
reviewed the project’s scope and impacts on forest dwellers with the help 
of the Saxena Committee, and rejected the mining project. The committee’s 
report stated that Vedanta Aluminium had acted with “total contempt for the 
law,” ignoring the Environmental Protection Act of 1986 and other legislation. 
The report recognized the proposed mining area as the cultural, religious, and 
economic habitat of forest-dwelling Kondh communities. It pointed out that 
these communities have legal rights under the Forest Rights Act of 2006 to 
withhold the use of their land for industrial purposes unless their free, prior, and 
informed consent is obtained. 
Vedanta Aluminium, with the support of the State Government of Orissa and the 
state-sponsored Odisha Mining Corporation, challenged the MOEF’s decision 
to reject its mining project before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme 
Court considered several key issues, including whether a tribe could claim a 
whole mountain range as its habitat and as a sacred place where they worship 
their Gods. Vedanta Aluminium agreed that the Forest Rights Act mandates 
that forest dwellers cannot be evicted from land under their occupation until 
the recognition and vesting of rights under the act is complete. It argued that 
this mandate applies only to the land that forest dwellers occupied and not 
to the undefined territories used by the communities for their religious and 
cultural purposes. Vedanta Aluminium defined “habitat” under the act to mean 
a specific area of land that a community occupied, arguing that it does not 
mean an entire mountain over which a community could claim user rights. It 
pointed out that the community’s claim to the mountain as a place of worship is 
not valid because the Forest Rights Act does not refer to religion, and therefore 
sacred rights are not part of forest dwellers’ rights that have been recognized 
by the act. At best, religious rights give the community the right to worship, 
but not the right to property. The Solicitor General of India argued that even if 
mining might not be directly displacing the tribal peoples, it will certainly have 
a severe impact on their lives. He stated that religious and sacred rights come 
under the purview of the Forest Rights Act. He based his submission on section 
3.1 (j) of the act, which states “rights…which are accepted as rights of tribals 
under any traditional or customary law of the concerned tribes of any State,” 
and on section 3.1 (l) which states “any other tradition customarily enjoyed 
by the forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes or other traditional forest dwellers…” 
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His argument was that a religious right in the form of a right to their sacred 
mountain must be read as a customary and traditional right that falls within the 
meaning of rights elaborated in the Forest Rights Act.
The Supreme Court justices were interested in how the affected communities 
could share the benefits of the proposed project. Questions such as “Have the 
tribals been made aware of the material benefits that will come to them under 
the orders of the court? Have they specifically rejected such benefits? Should 
the communities live as primitive communities many more years to come?” 
indicated the court’s desire to strike a balance between the protection of forest 
dwellers’ rights and the development benefits that would accrue to the nation 
and the affected communities. 
A lawyer for the tribal communities pointed out that the parameters used for 
mainstream society cannot be used to decide what the tribal communities 
want. The overwhelming desire of the affected tribal communities was to 
protect their integrated way of life. He stated that the affected communities 
were aware of many adverse impacts of the proposed project and that they 
would be the best judges to decide what benefits it would bring to them. Their 
fears of groundwater contamination by the refinery and the possibility of drying 
up of rivers that originate at the top of the mountain were realistic, as such 
effects would destroy their sources of livelihood and income. He further argued 
that “it is the responsibility of the state to provide and facilitate for development. 
The state has not been doing that, and how can we expect a private company 
to come in now and do this?” 
The Supreme Court in its judgment6 declared that whether the affected tribes 
such as Dongria Kondh and Kutia Kandha “have got any religious rights i.e. 
rights of worship over the Niyamgiri hills…have to be considered by the Gram 
Sabha” (village council). Gram Sabhas can examine whether the proposed 
mining area located about 10 kilometers from the peak of the hill would in any 
way affect their sacred sites and religious practices. If the project “affects their 
religious rights, especially their right to worship their deity…in the hills top of 
the Niyamgiri range of hills, that right has to be preserved and protected... 
The Gram Sabha is also free to consider all the community, individual as 
well as cultural and religious claims, over and above the claims which have 
already been received from Rayagada and Kalahandi Districts.” The Supreme 
Court directed the state government and the MOEF to determine the merit of 
Vedanta’s application for the acquisition of more land from the tribal areas and 
for the expansion of its industrial estate, based on the decisions of the Gram 
Sabhas. Twelve Gram Sabhas held consultations in their village communities 
and unanimously declared the proposed project sites fall within the ancestral 
6 Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. vs. Ministry of Environment & Forest, 18 April 2013. 
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domain of the tribes who live in the area and any attempt to mine the Niyamgiri 
hills will violate their cultural and religious rights.
Broadly, the Supreme Court of India has equated the right to a clean 
environment with the right to life. Based on this principle, the Indian courts 
have created laws and regulations for effective environmental compliance 
and enforcement. Such efforts by the Indian judiciary have resulted in the 
enactment of the National Green Tribunal Act of 2010. The tribunals hear 
cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of forest and the 
natural resources including enforcement of legal rights relating to environment 
and giving relief and compensation for damages to persons and property. 
It has the power to order, direct, and settle disputes, and provide relief and 
compensation. The compensation includes restitution of damaged property 
and damage to the environment. 
Conclusion 
Over the past 150 years, the relationship between tribal peoples and their 
environment in India has been eroded by dispossession or forced removal 
from their traditional lands. The history of colonial British India shows how the 
state began to claim huge expanses of territory under the rubric of forestland, 
reserve forests, village forests, revenue villages, and protected forests. These 
forest categories not only revolutionized tribal peoples’ lives and livelihoods, 
but also created new, almost inescapable ways of thinking about land, natural 
resources, and people who live on land and use such resources (Peluso and 
Vandergeest 2001). In this process, environmental interests and the rights of 
forest dwellers and their communities became “residual interests” subject 
to state scrutiny and approval (Scott 1998). In addition, large areas of land 
are cordoned off for national parks and wastelands without paying much 
attention to the forest dwellers that live on such lands or depend on them for 
their livelihood.
The forests created as state property through different forest laws could be 
labeled “political forests”. These were a critical component of state-making in the 
colonial era both in terms of “territorializing” and “legal framing” of forests, and 
in institutionalizing their management as an instrument of state power (Peluso 
and Vandergeest 2001). In such a frame, customary rights usually remain as 
a residual category of community rights. The state enacted specialized legal 
codes to individualize and aggrandize its power regarding forestland. Forest 
laws criminalized many of the common customary practices of forest dwellers 
such as collection of forest produce and forestland cultivation. Some legal 
exemptions granted to tribal populations in villages were redefined first as 
privileges and later as customary rights of forest dwellers (Wiggins 2004). This 
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is essentially the structure of the forest-related legal framework in both colonial 
and post-colonial India. 
When the judiciary took an active interest in interpreting (and sometimes 
reinventing) people’s customary rights in the context of domestic and 
international law, the state responded first reluctantly, but later more positively. 
A key factor that contributed to the changing perspective of the state in the late 
20th century on forest dwellers and their environmental and forest rights was the 
growing body of international law and human rights law that specifically focused 
on the rights of indigenous peoples worldwide. The Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006 shows 
the Government of India’s response to mounting demand from forest dwellers, 
nongovernment organizations, and the United Nations for the recognition of the 
environmental and forest rights of forest dwellers. Although the policy and legal 
changes are remarkable, other national and state laws have the superseding 
power over customary laws and forest rights, especially in arenas of national 
development, national security, emergencies, and distribution of resources and 
benefits. In other words, most of the customary rights of forest dwellers exist to 
the extent the Constitution of India (especially its Schedule VI and V) and state 
laws recognize them. The Forest Rights Act brought such residual interests 
into a charter of forest rights of individuals and communities with specific 
procedures and limitations. The judiciary, too, has contributed to changing the 
environmental (forest) interests of forest dwellers into forest rights, sometimes 
innovatively interpreting forest laws and referring to international conventions 
such as International Labour Organization Convention 169 and human rights 
law, which emphasize the right to life, cultural rights, subsistence rights, and 
collective rights (ILO 1989).
In recent years, three broad processes could be identified with regard 
to scheduled tribes in general and forest dwellers in particular. The first 
concerns the remarkably wide array of ongoing forest struggles, conflicts, and 
movements, spanning almost the entire northeast region and several pockets 
of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, and Kerala states. These involve a wide 
range of stakeholders with diverse interests with respect to forests. Essentially, 
they either support or oppose the recognition of the environmental interests 
and rights of forest dwellers. The second is the rise of broader national concern 
over the powerful negative impacts arising from the destruction of forests in 
the name of development. With the enactment of the Forest Rights Act, the 
sincerity of the government’s concern for the long-term sustainability of forests 
and the environment became clearer. The third is the resolution of trade-offs 
and conflicts of solutions to the problems of forests and those who live in and 
depend on them. Does the new emphasis on the place of nature and human 
rights of forest dwellers throw up answers to the questions it raises? One 
thing is certain: The judicial activism that is embedded in the Indian polity has 
been playing a vital role in safeguarding the interests and human rights of the 
tribal peoples. 
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4.  Living Displaced:  
Post-Displacement Livelihood 
Strategies of Displaced 
Muslims in Sri Lanka
by Razaak M. Ghani
I came here with my parents when I was about 10 years old. I 
saw my umma [mother] and waapa [father] struggling to feed 
us in those days…I remember, when I was in Mannar, my native 
place, one of my uncles used to go deep-sea fishing and he was 
a good diver…After my A-level studies I went to Saudi [Arabia]. I 
worked on a farm and learned diving. I came back after 2 years 
and started deep-sea fishing to catch sea leeches. One of my 
friends in Saudi gave me contacts for a few foreign [German] 
tourist hotels where there is a good demand for sea leeches. 
I made contact with them. I started catching sea leeches with 
two other friends. Now I get requests from foreign countries to 
export sea leeches. It is a hard business, but it is good money. 
It is also considered illegal. Since the local police are good 
to me, I have no problem yet. But many local fishermen are 
unhappy about my business. (A displaced person from northern  
Sri Lanka living in Puttalam)
T his chapter discusses the coping strategies of resettlers and how such strategies promote or impede their assimilation and integration into their host communities. The chapter is based on the findings of research 
conducted among a group of displaced people who lost their property, identity, 
and residence because of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka. It describes how most 
of the resettlers at a new location have developed coping strategies to deal with 
their socioeconomic impoverishment and vulnerability. 
Living Displaced: Post-Displacement Livelihood Strategies of Displaced Muslims in Sri Lanka 59
Their physical displacement did not arise from land acquisition for a public 
purpose, but from the violence of an ethnic community that waged war against 
the state. From the early 1980s, a civil war that lasted 30 years raged in the 
northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. A group of Tamil rebels fought for 
a Tamil homeland under the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), banishing 
Muslim communities from Northern Province,1 which they identified as part 
of their homeland. The physical displacement of the Muslims was swift and 
total, and came without warning. Such a traumatic, abrupt, and devastating 
displacement does not fit any of the theories or models of physical displacement 
and involuntary resettlement. 
This chapter describes and analyzes how some of the displaced developed 
coping strategies, and how, through social networks at their relocation sites, 
they succeeded in restoring and improving their life chances. What little outside 
help they received consisted of resettlement assistance from the state in the 
form of meager food rations. Therefore, many displaced Muslims drew on their 
past to reinvent their lives on the dry and uninhabited lands of Puttalam District 
where they found refuge.
Displaced Muslims in Puttalam
The Tamil-speaking Muslims of Northern Province are one of the refugee 
groups that have been living for a protracted period in self-initiated settlements 
in Puttalam District, North Western Province. The LTTE forced them to leave 
their homes in October 1990, and about 75,000 persons were displaced within 
a week (Shanmugaratnam 2000; Hasbullah 2001). Since then, they have lived 
in the settlements in Puttalam District for more than 20 years. They are among 
the largest and longest-staying of the conflict-affected displaced communities 
in Sri Lanka.2 The Muslims in Northern Province are Tamil-speaking, and had 
shared a common culture and life chances with Tamil Hindu communities 
for centuries. They lost their homes, possessions, livelihoods, and personal 
histories during the forced expulsion. The memories of homes, flight, and 
experiences of the past are still alive among the first generation of displaced 
Muslims who live in Puttalam District. At the end of the civil war in 2009, the 
Government of Sri Lanka requested all internally displaced persons to return to 
their places of origin. But the displaced Muslims in Puttalam District (hereafter 
displaced Muslims) are still debating whether they should stay where they 
currently live or return to their original villages in the Northern Province.
1 Northern Province consists of five districts: Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaithivu, and 
Vavuniya.
2 The other displaced persons living in camps and welfare centers for a protracted period are 
Tamils in Northern Province and Eastern Province, who were evacuated by the Sri Lanka security 
forces to establish high security zones in their fight against Tamil rebels.
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Post-Displacement Livelihood Strategies
When the displaced Muslims were expelled by the LTTE, they not only lost their 
homes and properties but also their social status, social networks, livelihoods, 
and freedom. Their economic losses were disastrous because they owned 
large livestock and cultivated very fertile agricultural land. Most of them earned 
their living from farming, fishing, and trade. As a result of the sudden and 
violent physical displacement, they lost everything they possessed, except 
their expertise in agriculture and fishing. Since settling down in Puttalam, 
they have gradually overcome their difficulties and moved away from living 
in limbo to become catalysts of socioeconomic change. In spite of the 
losses and psychological trauma, the displaced Muslims’ economic recovery 
during the past 20 years has been quite impressive. In the four administrative 
divisions of Puttalam where the large majority of displaced Muslims live, it is 
easy to identify pockets of economic growth that they have initiated.3 They 
now constitute more than one-third of the labor force in the four divisions. In 
Kalpitiya Division, they constitute the majority of both the agricultural and non-
agricultural labor forces. 
1. Wage Labor: The Key Survival Strategy
The period 1991–1995 was a turning point for the displaced Muslims. During 
this time, they capitalized on the demand for wage labor created by rapid 
economic growth in the district. As middle-class landowning cultivators in their 
native villages, they never would have thought that one day that they would 
have to cultivate other farmers’ sandy barren land as wage laborers in a very 
inhospitable climate. Those who had owned farmland and fishing boats and 
had had secure livelihoods suffered initially as they adjusted to their new 
status as socially marginalized and vulnerable persons at the resettlement 
sites. Working on onion and chili farms was not new to most of the resettler 
households. But working as wage workers on others’ land was an unfamiliar 
and socially degrading experience that for many years they found hard 
to accept. 
The initial support they received, largely from local people, local mosques, 
temples, churches, other faith-based and philanthropic organizations, and from 
some international nongovernment organizations (NGOs), was limited to food 
assistance and support in finding temporary settlements to live in. However, 
such support did not continue for long, and as a result, within a few months of 
resettlement, they found it extremely difficult to meet their basic daily needs. 
3 Puttalam District consists of four divisional secretary divisions: Kalpitiya, Mundal, Vanthavilluwa, 
and Puttalam Town.
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A man with three children who had owned 2 hectares of riceland in Mannar 
recounted his experience in finding a living at the initial stage of his resettled 
life:
I went out every morning in search of work. Some days I helped 
local fishers to take the fish from their boats when they arrived 
on shore around 10 or 11 in the morning. On such a day, I got a 
few fish and Rs100 as my wages. However, such work was not 
always available. As many of our people [displaced Muslims] 
were competing with each other, only a few were able to get 
such work regularly. After a few months of support from people 
and NGOs, we had to struggle for our survival. Although my wife 
had not worked as a coolie (daily wage worker) before, she had 
some farming experience on our own farm in Mannar. Therefore 
she thought that she could work as a coolie on an agricultural 
land. She began working on an onion farm with other women. 
When she went to work, I looked after the children at home.
Puttalam District, and especially its Kalpitiya Division, was undergoing an 
economic transition at the time the displaced Muslims arrived. Before the civil 
war broke out, coconuts were the main source of income of the population, 
as the district was the main supplier of coconuts to Northern Province 
(Shanmugaratnam 2000, 16). Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Vavunia districts in 
Northern Province produced onion, chili, and tobacco for the markets in 
Colombo and Southern Province. The civil war severely interrupted commercial 
crop production in Northern Province (Gunasinghe 1988), and as the armed 
conflict intensified, vast areas of farmland were abandoned. At the same time, 
border districts such as Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, and Puttalam became 
the main areas of agriculture production, and cities such as Anuradhapura, 
Dambulla, Kaduruwela, Kalpitiya, and Puttalam became the central marketing 
hubs. In particular, the significant agricultural development in Puttalam District 
was linked with its geographical location, suitable climatic conditions for 
the cultivation of cash crops such as onion and chilies, and the availability 
of groundwater to irrigate agricultural land (Shanmugratnam 2000). Also, the 
disruptions to coconut business compelled coconut farmers in Puttalam to 
invest in other commercial crops. A local Sinhalese businessman described the 
changes in the agricultural economy of Puttalam in the early 1990s as follows:
From the late 1980s, many coconut farmers incurred losses 
because they had to stop coconut trade activities in the northern 
areas during the war. As a result, lots of coconut lands were 
left unattended. Some farmers converted their coconut farms 
into onion and chili farms and continued to make profits. When 
displaced Muslims arrived from Mannar in large numbers, many 
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coconut farm owners in Puttalam District began to cultivate 
onions and chilies on their coconut lands. As the displaced 
Muslims were willing to work for low wages, some large coconut 
growers hired them to cultivate onions and chilies on their 
coconut lands and made good profits. Some other landowners 
divided their coconut lands and leased them out to those  
who were willing to cultivate onion and chilies on a contract 
farming basis.
The demand for casual labor increased as a result of contract farming. The 
displaced muslims provided the additional labor and local farm owners found 
that employing them was more profitable than hiring other workers. The 
willingness of displaced Muslims to work as casual workers for low wages 
helped landholders and contract farmers profit from farming, while the readily 
available agricultural work provided an initial source of income for the resettlers 
who had nothing to live on other than wage work. 
The arrival of large numbers of displaced Muslims and the increased demand 
for wage labor also had a significant impact on gender roles. Before the 
physical displacement, Muslim women were confined to their homes or worked 
only on their own farms without associating with strangers. However, because 
of the poverty, vulnerability, and marginalization created by their sudden forced 
displacement, many women gave up their traditional gender roles and searched 
for wage work in the area to earn their living. They worked on farms as casual 
workers earning meager wages. 
During the planting and harvesting seasons, the demand for wage labor 
increased at the farms. Some displaced Muslim men earned money by acting 
as brokers, informants on harvesting dates, and produce collectors and 
transporters. Some of them visited dwellings at the settlement camps in the 
evening to recruit women for the next day’s farm work. The women farm workers 
started at 7 a.m. and returned home after sunset. A women wage worker said:
We have no time to rest or relax while working in the field. We 
are allowed to spend about 15 minutes on morning tea and 
another 30 minutes on lunch. The farm owner stays in the field 
with us until we finish work in the evening. We are sometimes 
warned against talking to each other while working in the field. 
Therefore, we do not talk much because we all afraid of losing 
our jobs. We are paid daily in the evening and with that money 
we buy our home needs.
As competition for wage labor opportunities increased and no new land was 
opened up for cash crop cultivation because of the water scarcity, many 
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displaced women found it difficult to find regular casual wage work. At the 
same time, such work became available only through contracts and social 
networks. A class of intermediaries and brokers sprang up to monopolize 
such employment opportunities. As a result, only a few women could find work 
directly from local farmers. 
In a good cultivation season, landowners seek more wage workers and 
encourage their regular wage workers to bring their family members to work as 
wage workers. However, many displaced women do not want their sons and 
daughters to become wage workers. One wage worker said:
I do not regret working as a wage laborer because I somehow 
managed to educate my children. I was worried about them 
when we came here. We had nothing. My husband was worried 
and could not find any job that would enable him to buy clothes 
or books for our children. I worked for more than 10 years as 
a coolie. Now, masha Allah [with God’s help] my children are 
grown up and they are in good positions.
Both the displaced Muslim women and the local women found it difficult to 
find casual work as years went by, producing tension between the two groups. 
Some local men were angry because they thought that the displaced Muslims 
had taken their opportunities and created trouble for them. Today, many poor 
local households perceive displaced Muslims as a threat to their future. A host 
community member said, “We are the poor and displaced now. The displaced 
Muslims are now getting richer and living a better life compared to us. Our jobs 
are grabbed by them. Our lands are taken by them.” 
A local villager complained that he does not get any government support other 
than shamurdhi,4 whereas a displaced person receives a monthly food ration, a 
grant to replace roof materials, and other relief packages from NGOs. Working 
on farms for low wages provides additional income for them. But for a local 
household, wage work is the sole income source. Among the local population, 
there is a widespread feeling that they are being overpowered by the displaced 
Muslims. Therefore, many of them want to send displaced Muslims back to 
their native places in the north. A local villager said:
Our people are angry with some NGOs and the government 
programs because they are helping only the displaced families. 
But we cannot get such help because our interests are not 
looked after by strong political leaders. They have powerful 
4 Shamurdhi is monthly government food aid given to all households below the national poverty 
line (i.e., with a monthly income of less than SLRs2,500). 
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political leaders and NGOs to help them. But our people have 
not yet realized how cunningly these people are getting an 
upper hand in everything in the area. We hope that they will 
return to their original villages soon after the war. 
This discussion shows how initially the local people exploited the displaced 
Muslims as farm workers and helpers in fishing, but once the resettlers 
settled down and established their own economic and social networks the 
local people resented their presence partly because of the fear of losing their 
limited resources to outsiders, and partly because of jealousy. A key issue 
in this regard is whether the resettlers have successfully integrated into their 
host community. Initially, because of humanitarian and economic reasons, 
the process of integration showed good results. But as competition mounted 
for limited land resources and employment opportunities, assimilation and 
integration were threatened.
2. Fishing in Troubled Waters 
When the displaced Muslims arrived in Puttalam in 1990, the local people 
engaged in two types of fishing—lagoon and deep sea—and prawn farming. 
Prawn farming began in the late 1980s as an export-oriented business led by 
local politicians and businesspeople from Colombo. The most popular way of 
fishing was lagoon fishing. This is a relatively safe way to fish—fishers walk just 
a few meters into the lagoon to catch fish by casting nets and hooks. They also 
use small vallam (canoes) or theppam (flat boats). High-speed motor boats are 
rarely used except in deep-sea fishing. 
Nearly one-third of the displaced Muslim households from Kilinochchi, Mannar, 
and Mullaithivu districts were fishers, and some of them owned boats. Many 
of them arrived in Puttalam District as refugees to engage in fishing. They 
soon realized that the local fishers did not possess the skills to fish in deep 
water in and outside the lagoon. They first joined the local fishers as helpers, 
pulling fishing nets and going out with them in boats as assistants. Gradually, 
many of the newcomers started to fish on their own in areas of the lagoon 
that local fishers had allowed them to use. The local fishers were sympathetic 
and friendly toward them as they were struggling to make a living. Over the 
years, with the growing population and the increased scarcity of other income 
sources, the local fishers felt that the displaced Muslim fishers were becoming 
a threat to their livelihood. As a result, the local fishers’ initial goodwill toward 
the displaced Muslims began to decline. As the displaced fishers began to fish 
in large numbers, overfishing led to diminishing income from lagoon fishing 
for most fishers. This has made the local fishers feel threatened and has led 
them to attempt to stop the displaced fishers from fishing in the “local territory” 
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(the lagoon and on the shores). Serious confrontations have arisen between 
local and displaced fishers over the access to lagoon and fishing locations 
(Shanmugaratnam 2000; Ranaweera-Banda 2003).
In 1996, a group of displaced Muslim fishers in Aalankuda, a resettlement 
village in Puttalam District, formed their own organization with NGO assistance. 
But it was not active because the government officials did not recognize it as 
a legitimate organization. The officials pointed out that displaced persons 
were not residents of the area (Shanmugaratnam 2000). The host community 
also formed fishers, associations and lodged complaints with government 
authorities demanding that only local fishers should be allowed to fish in 
the Kalpitiya Lagoon. They demarcated separate fishing territories for local 
fishers and restricted “illegal” fishing by displaced fishers at these locations. 
Although this action aimed to reduce confrontations between the two groups, 
it also marked a significant change in the ownership of the fishing resources. 
The demarcation of fishing areas by local fishers and the formation of fishery 
societies changed the status of the lagoon from common property to private 
property (Shanmugaratnam 2000). As a result, the number of displaced 
fishers engaged in lagoon fishing has declined. A host community member 
explained:
When they came to our area, we felt sorry for them and let them 
catch fish in the lagoon. We thought they would leave in few 
months for their original homes. Later, our people [local fishers] 
realized that the displaced people were destroying lagoon 
resources. Therefore we decided to stop [them] engaging in 
lagoon fishing without our permission.
The confrontations between the displaced Muslim households and local fishers 
escalated over the years eroding the sense of brotherhood and the cordial 
reception extended by local Muslims toward the displaced Muslims. A local 
man expressed his feelings as follows: “We as Muslims like to share resources 
and protect fellow Muslims. But we do not need people in our villages to 
challenge our rights and grab our resources.”
Unlike lagoon fishing, deep-sea fishing requires skills, modern equipment, and 
courage. Few fishers in the host community were engaged in such fishing at the 
time the displaced Muslims arrived in Puttalam District. Many of the displaced 
Muslims from Mannar and Mullaithivu were deep-sea fishers who were looking 
for an opportunity to restart their occupation. Some of them were good divers 
who, unlike the local fishers, were skilled at catching rare fish using modern 
equipment. This gave the displaced fishers an advantage over the locals. 
Initially, the displaced fishers worked as assistants to wealthy fishers and local 
boat owners. Big boat owners took advantage of them by hiring them as skilled 
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laborers. With support from NGOs and money sent by relatives from abroad, 
several displaced fishers started their own deep-sea fishing operation. Although 
deep-sea fishing did not affect lagoon fishing, the local fishers disputed the 
displaced fishers’ landing rights on the shores of the lagoon. They complained 
that the use of heavy motor boats destroys the ecology and fish resources in 
the lagoon. After 15 years, and with the intervention of government authorities, 
rights to deep-sea fishing were established for both local fishers and displaced 
Muslim households. Meanwhile, lagoon fishing became the exclusive right of 
the local fishers. 
Deep-sea fishing has become a vibrant component of the local economy. 
Displaced fishers have made the local fishing industry more diverse and 
dynamic by using their entrepreneurial skills, experience, and resources. Their 
deep-sea fishing skills are now well accepted by all communities in the area. A 
host community member once disputed negative views of a friend stating: “If 
they [displaced Muslims] leave the area, no one will be able to keep deep-sea 
fishing going. We will gradually refocus on lagoon fishing. This area is more 
active today because of displaced people who came from outside.”
The dynamic role played by the displaced Muslims in Puttalam District 
exemplifies how forced migrants can transform themselves into economic 
migrants who create opportunities for improved livelihood and income. 
While these people face challenges and economic hardships, they also find 
alternative livelihood strategies. 
3. Government Subsidies: Uses and Abuses 
Government relief assistance and subsidies play a role in the displaced 
Muslims’ economy. As a result of expulsion from their native villages, displaced 
Muslims have become a liability for the government—a category of people 
who are both in need and are out of place. State subsidies and relief packages 
for internally displaced persons helped the displaced Muslims survive at the 
initial phase of their resettlement. The government provided them monthly food 
subsidies through ration cards. The value of the rations varied according to 
the size of the household; the maximum value of the monthly rations given to a 
household of five or more was SLRs1,200. The rations included essential food 
items: rice, lentils, coconut, oil, and sugar. 
A ration card plays the role of identity card or social security card, providing 
a household with several labels, such as “temporary residents,” “dependents 
of government food aid,” and “poor and needy.” The government issued the 
ration cards through the Grama Niladhari (village administrative officer). They 
are seen as valuable documents that can be used as proof of belonging to the 
camp, and of eligibility for state assistance. 
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Ration cards are the most reliable source of livelihood for many displaced 
Muslim households. Although the government and relief agencies wanted to 
withdraw ration card benefits from those who had found employment at the 
resettlement areas, the withdrawal was postponed because many displaced 
households continue to depend on the cards for their living. The displaced 
Muslims use ration cards not only to obtain food from cooperative stores, but 
also to trade as collateral to get money for an urgent needs. A cardholder can 
even pawn or sell the card to someone else—a practice known as ”ration card 
business.” Both local and displaced Muslims are aware of how the cards are 
being used. Government officials do not try to stop such practices; rather, in 
some locations they are partners in the card trade. 
Shop owners in local townships and Puttalam City know the timing of food 
distribution to the displaced persons and the quality of the food items available 
with ration cards. Accordingly, they engage in ration card trade with the 
cardholders to gain the maximum benefit for themselves. Ration cards are 
traded in two ways. Pawning is the most common method. A card is generally 
pawned at two-thirds of its value to the local trader, and the trader gets the 
subsidies with the card until the amount of money borrowed is paid back. A 
ration card is pawned for variety of reasons: to buy a TV, construct or renovate 
a house, purchase a piece of land, or give a dowry to a daughter. The second 
way of trading a ration card is to sell it to a local trader. The trader gets the food 
items from the cooperative shop using the ration card. The local cooperative 
shop manager plays a central role in such ration card transactions. 
Occasionally, displaced Muslims receive poor-quality food rations from the 
cooperative shops. Some resettlers sell such low-quality rations at less than 
the market price to local poor households or to traders. Local poor households 
with no permanent incomes usually know when resettlers get their food rations 
from the cooperative stores. If the resettlers are willing to sell their rations, 
poor local households buy items such as lentils, rice, and sugar at a lower 
price. This informal market for rationed food operates smoothly as transactions 
are conducted through mobile phones. Often, an intermediary facilitates the 
transactions for a small fee. On the other hand, the local traders who collect 
rationed food from the “bought” ration cards earn large profits by selling such 
items on the open market. 
Cheating and misuse of government benefits are not unique to Puttalam 
District. The misuse of aid and relief assistance is common among refugees 
and displaced persons, and is a way to maximize benefits (Kumsa 2006). 
Refugees and displaced people live in two moral systems: one that applies to 
their transactions with public institutions and agencies, and the other applies to 
their dealings with community members. Whereas they do not hesitate to cheat 
the institutions or agencies with which they have an impersonal relationship, 
generally they do not cheat their fellow community members because of the 
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complex and close informal interactions that they have developed over several 
years (Kumsa 2006). 
4. Maids in the Middle East: Gains and Losses
Living as a resettler at a resettlement site for a prolonged period waiting to go 
back to one’s native place is difficult. The economic and social security of such a 
resettler is at stake, and vulnerabilities arising from this precarious status create 
a sense of pessimism and hopelessness. Displaced Muslims, who have lost all 
their belongings and land as a result of sudden and forceful eviction, ensured 
the safety of the younger generation as their first priority when they arrive at the 
resettlement site. Displaced children who stay in camps and resettlement sites 
for a long time do not have memories of their native homes. Such young people 
therefore find it easy to migrate to the Middle East to overcome their financial 
difficulties and rebuild their lives. 
At each resettlement site and camp, there are a few households with members 
working in the Middle East. The affluent members of the Muslim host community 
and religious leaders are concerned about growing anti-Islamic behavior among 
those who return after staying 2–3 years in the Middle East. The migration of 
young women to the Middle East is often viewed as a socially unacceptable 
practice. Members of the host community believe that the willingness among 
the displaced Muslims to send their women abroad to work is a threat to the 
local Muslim culture. A local community leader commented:
Working in the Middle East has become popular in this area. We 
generally do not like this practice. Muhaam [camp] people are 
money-minded. They are always looking at ways in which they 
could raise money. This is a totally new trend. Our culture and 
traditions have been ruined by them.
Many displaced young Muslim women consider migration to the Middle East as 
a strategy for escaping poverty and vulnerability. Their parents borrow money 
from relatives, pawn their ration cards, or mortgage jewelry to pay employment 
agents. Some others already have relatives in the Middle East who can help 
them find work as maids. Temporary migration to the Middle East is not, however, 
an option that all resettler households can afford. On average, a father would 
pay an advance of SLRs25,000 to an employment agent to find his daughter a 
job as a housemaid in the Middle East. Destitute and poor people who depend 
solely on food rations and wage labor for their living cannot raise such large 
sums of money. These households therefore remain poor and dependent on 
the local labor market for employment. 
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Temporary migration of women to the Middle East has several socioeconomic 
consequences for the household and for the image of a Muslim woman 
(Brun 2008). Households that send their women to the Middle East usually 
use the remittances to buy land, a boat, or a three-wheeler taxi, or to build 
a permanent house. A few men staying at home spend the remittances on 
smoking, gambling, and recreational tours with friends. In such households, 
young children suffer as they are often assigned household chores which 
affects their education. Some children from such households report family 
violence, negligence, and depression. 
Women who work abroad for 1–2 years cannot save enough money to buy 
land or build a house as their earnings are consumed by their debts and fees 
they had to pay to their employment agents. Therefore, a returnee from the 
Middle East would try to go back to the Middle East after a short break with her 
family. Once a woman becomes familiar with the Middle East, she can easily 
find work with the same employer. Often, the employer pays the travel costs for 
subsequent journeys. Women who have already migrated help their relatives to 
obtain visas, and provide references (Deshingkar and Aheeyar 2006). A woman 
summarized her experience as follows: “Women who worked in Saudi Arabia 
like to go there again because it is a kind of freedom from home environment. 
For some of them, it is difficult to adjust to family circumstances after they 
had spent a few years abroad and enjoyed a different lifestyle” This, together 
with the respect that they receive from their community, empowers them and 
enables them to be independent.
5. Small Businesses and Local Employment 
As local employment opportunities have dwindled over the years, displaced 
Muslims have begun to explore self-employment opportunities at their camps 
and settlements, and in nearby townships, construction sites, and private 
business agencies. Self-employment is becoming more prevalent among the 
displaced Muslims. 
The younger generation of displaced Muslims who have completed university 
or technical college degrees usually find employment as school teachers, 
government officials, or NGO representatives. Those without degrees usually 
work as shop assistants, three-wheeler taxi drivers, and small entrepreneurs. 
Many of them have started small businesses such as grocery stores and tea 
shops (food stalls) at their camps and welfare centers. The tea shops are 
meeting places for the displaced Muslims. A few households have begun 
livestock farming, especially goat rearing. Others use their small land plots 
as home gardens to grow fruits such as guava, papaya, and banana. A 
guava farmer said, “Every week I send about 200 guavas to Colombo. Now 
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I have some traders coming to collect guava in the middle of the week. It is 
good money.”
Host communities acknowledge the displaced Muslims’ contribution to 
transforming their sleepy towns into vibrant business hubs. One host in 
Norachcholai (in Kalpitiya Division) praised them: 
After they [displaced Muslims] came here everything has a 
money value. They are really good at business. For example, 
before their arrival people collected firewood from nearby 
forests. Today, however, many people buy firewood. Selling 
firewood is a good business. Before they arrived in this area, 
we did not do much cloth or grocery business. Then the daily 
turnover of such a business was about SLRs3,000. But now the 
average turnover exceeds SLRs10,000 a day. I wonder what our 
fate will be once they leave the area after the civil war.
The rebuilding of devastated lives of displaced Muslims in Puttalam has 
mainly been driven by their self-confidence and hard work over 15 years. Their 
changing socioeconomic status in Puttalam suggests that they can contribute 
to the local economy while sharing local resources and opportunities with their 
host communities. But progress and upward social mobility of the displaced 
Muslims has been uneven and unequal. More than 2 decades of displacement 
and uneven socioeconomic development have changed their gender roles 
and social divisions. Although the host community views these changes as 
detrimental, they have progressively established a robust economy that 
everyone in the community—resettlers and their hosts—can share. 
Displaced Women: Pioneers of Change
Physical displacement affects men and women differently (Turner 2000; 
Gururaja 2000; Mehta 2002; Brun 2000; Giles et al. 2003). When a community 
is forced to move without notice and is relocated in an unfamiliar environment, 
it is difficult for its members to reestablish their old social support networks and 
identity that are essential to recreate a sense of community belonging. In such 
circumstances, displaced men and women adopt roles that may be different 
from the traditional roles that they played in their original communities. As a 
result, they build new social relationships. 
In the pre-displacement social context, displaced Muslim women used to 
work with their husbands and brothers on their family farms. With their lives 
largely confined to household chores and farming, they had little exposure 
to the outside world. Since their forced displacement and resettlement, the 
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women have assumed new roles at the resettlement sites and camps that 
contrast sharply with their traditional roles and the expectations of the Muslim 
community. They have taken over more economic responsibilities as income 
earners. During harvest times, for example, they work as wage workers on 
onion and chili farms and earn sufficient income to become economically 
independent and establish new social networks. As agricultural wage workers, 
they associate with male farm workers, farm owners, and subcontractors, and 
communicate with them freely without any guilt. 
Men, on the other hand, became used to doing the household chores that 
women had done in the past, such as taking children to school and collecting 
food rations from cooperative stores. At the initial phase of resettlement, many 
men did not engage in any productive activity to contribute to the household 
income as they were trying to overcome the trauma and shame that they felt 
as displaced, landless refugees. They almost exclusively depended on their 
women to earn a living. This reversal of gender roles has brought in social, 
cultural, and economic changes among the displaced Muslim communities. 
Engagement in income-earning activities, however, has not relieved women 
from their traditional household chores. Women farm workers cook food before 
leaving home in the morning for work and look after their children in the evening 
while the men were out with their friends. One displaced woman pointed out:
Since we arrived in Puttalam, we have not had a single day 
of rest. In our former homes, we spent 3 to 4 hours every day 
meeting friends and relatives. But now we do not have such 
leisure time. Not only do we find work and earn money for the 
family, but we also attend to household work. But in a way I am 
happy that I feel that I am more useful to my family than before, 
and I think that they recognize my contribution to their survival. 
As many women at the resettlement camps gained some economic 
independence and self-confidence, local host Muslim communities displayed 
their displeasure toward such changes. The increased visibility of displaced 
Muslim women in various socioeconomic spheres in the area became a 
topic of discussion and argument between local men and displaced Muslim 
men. Some local Muslims openly criticized the displaced Muslim women as 
uncultured or un-Islamic because they travel and work outside their homes. 
One Muslim local resident said:
Our women never go out without our consent or without being 
accompanied by someone. But some displaced Muslim women 
go out alone even at night and work with men on farms. We are 
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troubled by such news and observations. We think that they are 
ruining our [local] culture. 
The opportunities to migrate temporarily to the Middle East as housemaids 
have also changed the role of women in their households and communities. 
Local Muslim men believe that displaced Muslim men send their wives abroad 
to have some socioeconomic space for themselves and to spend their wives’ 
hard-earned money.
The women migrants who went to the Middle East perceive their temporary 
migration as an opportunity to improve their Islamic faith. When they return 
home they tend to wear the dresses they wore in the Middle East. Such attire 
distinguishes them from other women in the locality. In addition to the Islamic 
dress code, they have absorbed cultural practices that also distinguish them 
from others. For example, the way they talk to visitors and the manner in 
which they present themselves at social occasions indicate their level of 
assimilation of the Islamic culture. For them, behaving and dressing differently 
also is a way of expressing the newly achieved middle-class status that their 
savings give them. An orthodox Islamic outlook and economic independence 
have empowered many such displaced women. As Senanayake (2006) 
pointed out, employment in the Middle East and earning a good income have 
transformed gender relations at the resettlement camps, which in turn has 
led to the reconfiguration of everyday living within a unified pan-Islamic code 
of conduct. 
NGOs and international relief agencies have also encouraged the resettled 
Muslim women to be more economically active and have supported them 
by targeting them as the recipients of resettlement aid and services such as 
microfinance, group savings programs, and income-generation courses. A 
World Bank survey conducted in 2006 reported that about 11% of the vulnerable 
displaced Muslim households in Puttalam were headed by women. The World 
Bank’s income improvement programs assisted these vulnerable women 
groups through housing and infrastructure support services. NGOs trained 
women in skills development and income generation, and through microcredit 
programs. The orientation of NGOs to give priority to women in social and 
economic development assistance programs prompted displaced Muslim 
men to allow their wives and adult daughters to participate in such projects. 
However, some displaced Muslim young men expressed their dissatisfaction 
regarding NGOs’ targeting of women in development programs. 
The decades-long conflict and displacement opened new opportunities 
for women to overcome Islamic conservatism and achieve greater mobility 
and participation in the public domain. They have become symbols of both 
continuity and change (Brun 2008). However, it is difficult to predict whether 
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displaced Muslim women could maintain their improved social status after the 
civil war. The end of the civil war and the return to their original land would 
challenge this newfound freedom and independence. On the other hand, the 
role reversal experienced by women might be further strengthened in the post-
conflict context if men are unable to recover their previous economic status 
and assets immediately and continue to depend on their women for survival. 
In any case, Muslim women would continue to find it difficult to reach their full 
potential at the household level because of the patriarchal social organization 
of Muslim society which still considers men to be the key decision makers in 
the household.
Displaced Youth: Catalysts of Change
Displaced youth—the second generation of resettlers—regard Puttalam as their 
native home. They generally mingle with the local youth and feel at home with 
their host community. Most of them have studied well and have high hopes and 
aspirations for the future. They have engaged in income-generating activities, 
such as deep-sea fishing, and new businesses in local townships. They are 
also active in local party politics and Islamic activities. Most see Puttalam as 
a land of opportunity, a place to obtain a good education and have access to 
urban businesses and better income opportunities. 
However, many of the displaced youth have been struggling to find a place 
in the new social, economic, cultural, and political environment of the post-
displacement context. A young resettler said:
We felt very worried about our sisters when they were young. 
They didn’t have a proper place to sleep. In the camp houses 
we all slept together. Sometime we stayed up the whole night 
talking and doing things. Some of us used to go to the beach. 
In the morning we came home to sleep. By that time other family 
members had gone away from home or were doing their daily 
work such as cleaning, collecting firewood, going around to find 
some work for money etc….We should say things have changed 
a lot for the better now. We have more privacy at our homes. At 
least my parents have a house with two rooms and a toilet. We 
have a mosque in each camp. We sleep in the mosque if we 
have overnight visitors at home.
The first generation resettlers think that it is their sons’ duty and responsibility 
to work hard to help their families and themselves rebuild their lives before they 
start their own families. Their parents may not have achieved much in Puttalam; 
but their sons have the opportunity to exploit new income opportunities in the 
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area. The older resettlers believe that their sons should not depend on their 
wives and sisters, as they did, to earn a living. They should not allow them to 
work on onion and chili farms. Young men and women feel under pressure from 
their parents to take on household responsibilities as parents find it difficult to 
find work and to save money for their future.
The social pressure on young men to find work has had several negative 
consequences. Those who find it difficult to get a job are frustrated and become 
drawn to various political and religious groups as a source of consolation. 
Some young men have received free mobile phones from politicians as tokens 
of appreciation for their political allegiance. A youth described how he was 
enlisted to work as a political agent:
One day, when we were playing soccer, a group of supporters 
of our Minister [leading politician who represents the displaced 
Muslims] asked some of us to join them. None of us knew the 
reason. We were asked to get into a truck and while travelling we 
were told that there were lots of work to be done and each one 
of us could earn 500 rupees and a lunch packet by engaging 
in such work. The truck dropped us at Palavi junction [a small 
township located on the Puttalam–Colombo main road]. 
We were taken to participate in a political demonstration. We 
shouted slogans with others. We did not know the politicians 
and why we had to shout. But we are helpless and are scared to 
resist such invitations. 
Despite occasional conflicts between local and resettled youth regarding the 
sharing of limited resources and employment opportunities in the area, they 
generally maintain good contacts with each other. They play soccer and cricket 
together outside their camps and settlements. They meet at teashops, three-
wheeler taxi parks, and mosques to share information. Such networks are 
also a means of reaching out to people with whom their parents have had no 
contact. For example, a dispute between a displaced family and a local family 
over a love affair between a local boy and a displaced Muslim girl was resolved 
peacefully by a group of local and displaced young men. During Ramadan, 
local and displaced youth engage in social work such as distributing food to 
devotees at mosques. Young displaced men who are active in social work and 
have wider social circles are seen as influential. However, there are sporadic 
clashes between local youth and displaced Muslim youth. 
Despite the visibility and prominence of the youth in everyday life in displaced 
and resettled communities, limited attention has been paid to them in the 
literature on forced migration (Brun 2000). Moreover, international and local 
agencies have not yet recognized the importance of gender roles and their 
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radical changes at resettlement camps which, in turn, influence the social 
positions of the displaced youth. For example, NGOs provide resettlement 
assistance to first-generation displaced men and women in Puttalam, but 
almost ignore the displaced youth, and their aspirations and capabilities. One 
young man complained: 
Sometimes we feel frustrated because we are ignored. It is 
good if somebody could help us by providing vocational training 
such as carpentry. When we are not productively engaged in an 
employment, we feel parental pressure on us. Our frustrations 
lead some of us to get addicted to alcohol. Drinking and 
smoking are bad habits. Some of our boys have joined killi 
[gangs] groups, although most of us keep our distance from 
those killi groups. We need somebody to help us to make our 
lives better. 
Social Differentiation 
Humanitarian aid agencies generally view displaced people as an 
undifferentiated mass, and believe that they share common problems and 
needs (Shanmugaratnam 2000; Porter and Haslam 2005). Stereotypical 
notions of displaced and resettled people as helpless and dependent on 
aid and assistance often obscure social divisions that exist among them. 
Displaced persons may be ethnically or religiously homogenous, but they 
are often differentiated in terms of place of origin, political connections, and 
pre-displacement class and social status. Apart from gender and age-related 
social differentiation systems, several other hierarchical relationships have 
emerged among the displaced Muslims during the post-displacement or 
resettlement phase. 
1. Social Divisions Based on Place of Origin
The most visible form of social differentiation among the displaced Muslims is 
based on their place of origin. More than 70% of displaced Muslims arrived in 
settlement and camps from Mannar District. They arrived early and established 
access to fertile lands in Puttalam District. Later, others came from Jaffna, 
Kilinochchi, and Mullaithivu districts and established temporary settlements in 
resource-scarce localities.
The resettlers from Mannar District soon exploited the new opportunities created 
by the economic growth in the region, and especially by the boom in onion-
growing in the area. Some of them became intermediaries and brokers in the 
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land or labor markets. The most deprived group of displaced Muslims came 
from Mullaithivu District. They constitute only 6% of displaced Muslims, and 
most of them still live in camps and welfare centers run by government agencies. 
Many resettlers in camps think that they are being discriminated against in 
benefit distribution. A displaced Muslim school teacher from Mullaithivu District 
described how his community became marginalized because of the displaced 
Muslims of Mannar District:
We have been living in these cadjan (temporary) houses in the 
camp for the past 15 years. Most of us do not have any land. 
We live on government land. For the past 5 years, we have been 
requesting the government to regularize our land plots, so that 
we can apply for housing grants. But the district secretariat has 
not taken any action so far. Many NGOs have visited our camp 
many times and promised that they would help us to get better 
housing and other facilities. About a year ago, a Cabinet minister 
came here to promise assistance. He promised that all settlers 
would be resettled in new houses. But nothing has happened 
so far. We are now becoming a show piece for politicians and 
government agencies to get foreign funds. Once funds are 
received, nobody wants to implement projects for our benefit. 
After 15 years, many displaced Muslims from the north live in camps and 
welfare centers and remain poor and marginalized. Several processes have 
contributed to this scenario. First, they can leave the camps only when the 
state provides them with land, but they lack political networks through which to 
pressure government officials into implementing land distribution programs in 
their favor. Second, people from rural and farming backgrounds have limited 
social networks outside their own communities. This restricts their capacity to 
move out of the camps and forces them to depend on government subsidies 
and on wage labor. Third, they prefer to live in camps that have evolved into 
neighborhood communities where they find security, mutual support, and 
social and economic aid. They are reluctant to move out of the camps and 
resettlements to face risks and competition. 
2. Social Divisions Based on Political Affiliations
In Puttalam, the displaced Muslims are affiliated with political parties. In Sri Lanka, 
political affiliations and networks are important prerequisites to benefit from 
government and external assistance programs (Perera 1985). Such affiliations 
not only regulate the assistance that they receive from outside but also create 
new socioeconomic hierarchies. Displaced Muslims can be broadly divided 
into three main political groups. The most influential and politically powerful 
displaced Muslims belong to the All Ceylon Muslim Congress, a break-away 
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political party of the second political group, the Sri Lanka Muslims Congress. 
The third political group among the displaced Muslims consists largely of 
people who were displaced from Jaffna District. They seek political patronage 
from Tamil politicians to get assistance and benefits from the government. 
However, they do not expect to receive support from the All Ceylon Muslim 
Congress or the Sri Lanka Muslims Congress. Therefore, they trust a local Tamil 
politician whom they think could resolve their grievances. This individual helped 
some of the displaced Muslim households obtain government land to resettle. 
Affiliation with political parties is an important dimension of the social 
hierarchy among displaced Muslims. A person who has close connections 
with political leaders could become influential in a resettlement camp. Camp 
officers appointed by politicians wield such power. They are the key players in 
selecting beneficiaries for rehabilitation and resettlement, and for humanitarian 
assistance from the government and external agencies. Such favors and 
discrimination based on political affiliations sometimes trigger clashes among 
political groups. 
3. Emerging Class Stratification 
Political affiliations and regional groupings of the displaced Muslims are now 
gradually evolving into a class-based5 hierarchical structure. In addition to 
enjoying the comparative advantage in wielding political power shared by 
the displaced Muslims of Mannar District, those from Erukkalampitty6 in the 
same district are more entrepreneurial and better educated than their fellow 
settlers. Some of them started small shops and businesses such as firewood 
stalls and fast-food outlets. Educated members of this community formed 
nonprofit organizations and private education institutions. Some of them work 
as agents of overseas employment companies to recruit employees for foreign 
households. This small business community has grown fast from the late 
1990s, as they have been able to accumulate capital from buying and selling 
land; selling construction materials such as sand, hardware, and bricks; and 
operating taxi services in local towns. Their economic advancement has been 
strengthened further as their political leaders obtained prominent positions in 
the national and local governments. 
The emerging new hierarchy among the displaced Muslims in Puttalam District 
consists of five classes (Table 4.1). Each class displays distinct characteristics 
based on occupation, political affiliations, and place of origin.
5 The term “class” is used in a generic and descriptive sense to denote different socioeconomic 
positions held by individuals in a hierarchal structure, based on employment, social status, and 
political linkages.
6 People who lived in this locality in Mannar District are considered to be in a better-off community.
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Table 4.1 Class Categories and Their Characteristics
Class/ 
Socioeconomic 
Category
Percentage 
of Displaced 
Persons Characteristics
Rich and affluent 
(upper class)
 
1–5 •	 Live in private houses on large blocks of land with 
concrete fences 
•	 Own trade stalls and vehicles including commuter 
buses
•	 Some engage in businesses in Colombo and are the 
key political agents in the resettler community
•	 Children study abroad, in Colombo, or in international 
schools
•	 Live in Puttalam town, along the Colombo–Puttalam 
main road and in Norachcholai town
Better-off  
(upper-middle class)
15–20 •	 Live in permanent houses at resettlement villages 
and town areas of Puttalam and in Kalpitiya
•	 Own land and vehicles especially three-wheeler taxis 
•	 Engage in retail trades, and in government and 
private sector jobs
•	 Children study in town schools
Moderate  
(middle class)
15–20 •	 Live in partly built permanent houses in settlements 
and relocation villages
•	 Own small plots of land
•	 Engage in small-scale trade, farming, and 
government jobs—mainly in teaching
Poor  
(lower-middle class) 
20–25 •	 Live in camps and welfare centers
•	 Few own small land plots
•	 Engage in wage labor, fishing, or taxi driving
•	 Women work in the Middle East as housemaids
Destitute or poorest 
(lower class)
25–30 •	 Living mainly in cadjan (temporary) huts at camps 
and partly built houses at welfare centers
•	 No land or other assets
•	 Wage workers in agriculture
•	 Depend mainly on rations and subsidies from the 
government
Source: Field Notes (2009–2010).
The hierarchical social structure of the displaced community influences 
community members in different ways. The powerful groups use their positions 
to strengthen their dominance over the less fortunate and vulnerable by 
manipulating the resources and opportunities provided by NGOs, development 
agencies, and the government. The patterns of exclusion and discrimination 
in the distribution of assistance also underline the greater vulnerability of 
underprivileged groups. 
How this new class hierarchy would adjust if the displaced Muslims were to 
return to their original villages in Jaffna, Mannar, and Mullaithivu districts is 
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a key research question. Another important question is whether the affluent 
settlers would prefer to return to their original places or stay where they are. 
The second generation has already indicated that they would prefer to remain 
in Puttalam District. A third question is: If settlers were to return to their original 
village, would they be able to transfer the total value of their assets in cash? 
Summary
The central argument of this chapter is that the life chances of the displaced 
Muslims in Puttalam District are similar to those of the victims of a development-
induced physical displacement. At resettlements, they use their skills and 
experience gained at their original communities to tackle difficulties and risks 
in their new environment, and to overcome obstacles they face from their 
host community. To survive in an unfamiliar social space, they adopt different 
strategies, depending on its socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions. 
Many displaced Muslims began their new lives in Puttalam District as wage 
workers applying their skills and experience, and gradually moved into different 
and innovative occupations.
Cheating and misuse of relief and other external support are coping mechanisms 
they use to survive, at least in the initial phase of resettlement. Such mechanisms 
are accommodated and accepted by the local administration, host community, 
and camp and settlement officials. This is because the strategy does not harm 
social relationships; indeed, such transactions reinforce mutual understanding 
and dependency in the community.
Women are prominent contributors to the incomes of displaced Muslim 
households. They are respected for their contribution as breadwinners, and 
over the years this has directly contributed to reversal of traditional gender 
roles. Temporary migration to the Middle East for employment has further 
strengthened their socioeconomic status. Young displaced men, despite their 
innovative skills and capabilities, however, find it difficult to develop a visible 
presence at the household and community levels. They are often excluded 
and viewed as dependents of the first-generation settlers. This has made 
them socially isolated and subject to exploitation by political and religious 
interest groups. 
Physically displaced people are not passive recipients of aid and assistance. 
Some of them have contributed significantly to the transformation of the local 
economy, and in so doing have transformed themselves from a dependent, 
subordinate community to a dominant, catalytic group in the area where they 
live. This shows that, after their initial dependence on aid and NGOs, displaced 
people have become dynamic social agents rather than a prolonged social 
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problem (Muggah 2000). Their dynamism and innovativeness combined with 
their economic achievements enabled a complex social hierarchy to emerge in 
the area. This structure provides indicators to ascertain social status, as well as 
mechanisms to handle day-to-day crises frequently found at resettlement sites.
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5.  Resettlement Planning 
and Pre-Displacement 
Impoverishment 
by Jayantha Perera
I nvoluntary resettlement models deal with how to manage adverse impacts of physical displacement on persons and communities caused by development projects. These “reformist-managerial” (Dwivedi 1998) 
models consider development-induced physical displacement of populations 
as an inevitable, legitimate cost of development. The losses incurred by such 
populations, the models explain, can be dealt with adequately through relocation 
and income restoration programs, which offer them an opportunity to improve 
their income and livelihood. The focus on post-displacement management of 
the welfare of the populations downplays the trauma, impoverishment, and 
social disarticulation that populations undergo during the planning of their 
displacement and relocation. 
This chapter focuses on “planned-only projects,” which are development 
projects that have been in the planning phase for several years, and sometimes 
several decades. It highlights the risks and realities persons and communities 
encounter without being displaced. In such projects, borrowers, lenders, and 
affected populations engage in socioeconomic surveys, consultations, and 
scientific studies, and in formulating development plans such as resettlement 
plans, indigenous peoples’ development plans, and community development 
plans, as if their implementation is imminent. This chapter argues that such 
project planning activities themselves have major adverse impacts on persons 
and communities in areas demarcated for such projects, and such impacts 
and experiences should be part of resettlement theories and models. 
The chapter expands and fine-tunes the planning and recruitment phase of 
Scudder’s four-stage framework, and the eightfold impoverishment risks 
outlined in Cernea’s impoverishment risks and reconstruction model by including 
planned-only project scenarios in the scope of resettlement theory and practice 
(Scudder 2005; Cernea 1997). It also demonstrates that borrowers and lenders 
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usually pay little attention in their protracted negotiations to the traumas, 
impoverishment, fears, uncertainty, social disarticulation, and temporary coping 
strategies of the populations that have been identified and notified that they will 
physically be displaced in the name of development. Feasibility reports rarely 
touch on such palpable and critical social situations. Borrowers and lenders 
are usually embroiled in negotiations on profitability, internal rate of return, and 
the distribution of tasks among competing contractors. If negotiations fail, the 
proposed project is abandoned or shelved until a fresh round of negotiations 
between the borrower and new lenders are started. 
Often, such negotiations widen the scope of the proposed project, revise the 
lists of potentially affected persons and communities, and recalculate the 
compensation packages. If preliminary negotiations are successful, fresh 
rounds of project planning and consultations will take place, and the new 
project proponents will promise new packages for socioeconomic improvement 
of the affected persons, especially of those who will be physically displaced. 
The information on physical displacement and socioeconomic impacts of a 
proposed project will soon be spread among those who live in the identified 
project areas, fuelled by rumors and threats, creating new fears and trauma 
among the people living there. 
Moreover, such project planning identifies potential host communities where 
the displaced will eventually be relocated. Sooner or later, this information 
reaches the potential host communities triggering trauma and agitation, as well 
as hostility toward potential resettlers well before their arrival at the resettlement 
sites. The state, particularly its local administrative organs, begins to consider 
the demarcated project areas and the identified resettlement sites as land 
lost to the project and excludes them from local development programs 
and infrastructure maintenance programs. The traumatized communities of 
potential resettlers as well as potential host communities suffer from such lack 
of development assistance to their communities. 
This chapter illustrates these scenarios by describing the planning processes 
of a proposed hydropower project in Nepal that has been in the planning phase 
for more than 3 decades. Several social impact assessments, population 
records, and resettlement planning documents have been formulated by 
different potential lenders, making the project’s planning framework repetitive, 
cumulative, and complex. 
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Theoretical Models:  
Their Scope and Adequacy
Two theoretical models dominate involuntary resettlement literature: the four-
stage framework, and the impoverishment risks and reconstruction model. 
Both models focus on large-scale physical displacement of populations 
arising from infrastructure development projects. The four-stage framework 
claims to provide “a successful process of involuntary resettlement with 
dam construction, with success simply defined as development that is 
environmentally, economically, institutionally and cultural sustainable into 
the second generation” (Scudder 2005, 32). The framework helps to predict 
how persons displaced by a development project could benefit from such 
relocation, provided sufficient opportunities and resources are available at 
the resettlement sites. It presents involuntary resettlement as a process with 
four distinct stages or phases: planning and recruitment, adjustment and 
coping, community formation and economic development, and handing over 
and incorporation. For the purposes of this chapter, the relevant part of the 
framework is the planning and recruitment phase. During this phase, according 
to the framework, all potentially displaced people are to be engaged in project 
planning and decision making. The prescriptive part of the framework says that 
this is the time to inculcate the idea that they will eventually become the project 
beneficiaries, not mere project-affected persons. Although the framework 
recognizes that this phase could stretch into several years, it does not anticipate 
that it could go through several successive project planning phases spanning 
decades. In addition, the framework does not consider the trauma, frustration, 
disarticulation, and hopelessness associated with prolonged planning of 
unimplemented development projects that impoverish people at their original 
locations without physically displacing them.
Like the four-stage framework, the impoverishment risks and reconstruction 
model follows a linear path of change to describe the impacts of a project 
on a population. It has three main phases: displacement, relocation, and 
rehabilitation. It measures the severity of “multiple vulnerabilities” that displaced 
people would experience in the resettlement process and helps find ways to 
offset such vulnerabilities through appropriate resettlement planning and 
implementation. In other words, it elaborates the risks associated with physical 
displacement, explains the behavioral responses of displaced people to such 
risks, and guides the reconstruction of their livelihoods to counterbalance them. 
Thus, the model is essentially a resettlement planner’s tool. It deals extensively 
with the impoverishment risks of affected persons. The model considers the 
risks of losing property, livelihood, and social networks arising from physical 
displacement to be temporary and bearable, as they can be counterbalanced 
by appropriate actions, thereby turning the loss to a gain. “Displacement is a 
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socially caused disruption, not a natural disaster, and can be counterbalanced” 
(Cernea 1997, 1570). 
The impoverishment risks and reconstruction model cannot adequately deal 
with the impoverishment and psychological trauma generated by planned-
only projects or by projects that have remained unimplemented for several 
decades, because it assumes that physical displacement will take place soon 
after the planning phase of the project is complete. It also assumes that if the 
project is properly planned, risks arising from physical displacement could be 
avoided or at least mitigated. The model does not predict that the potentially 
displaced persons of a failed or delayed development project would force 
people to encounter all or most of multiple vulnerabilities listed in the model. 
The case study of the West Seti Hydropower Project in Nepal demonstrates that 
the vulnerabilities and risks of displaced persons and communities elaborated 
in the model can also be found among those who have been waiting several 
decades to be displaced and relocated. Risks such as food insecurity, loss 
of access to common property, marginalization, and disarticulation are not 
exclusively suffered by those who are actually displaced; they are also shared 
by those who have been identified as potentially displaced. Although the 
potentially displaced persons live in their natural communities, hopelessness, 
anxiety, and fear of eviction corrode their entrepreneurship and desire to 
improve their livelihoods or land. 
The West Seti Hydropower Project
Sogreah Consultants, a French firm, conducted preliminary studies with a grant 
from the Government of France in 1980–1981 on the West Seti River to identify 
a location to develop a run-of-river hydroelectric scheme. The river flows 
through the Far-Western Development Region, a sparsely populated region rich 
in biodiversity that is one of the least developed areas of Nepal. The studies 
recommended a 37-megawatt (MW) run-of-river hydropower project, triggering 
the interest of the Government of Nepal and several international development 
investors. Feasibility studies completed in 1984 assessed the proposed 
scheme’s preliminary design feasibility and proposed a site for a much larger 
hydroelectric storage scheme on the same river. As a result, the storage scheme 
concept was adopted and the run-of-river scheme proposal was discarded. 
More studies were carried out to ascertain the potential capacity of the river 
to generate hydropower. These studies, completed in 1987, recommended a 
360 MW storage project on the West Seti River.
Two detailed feasibility studies were undertaken between 1987 and 1991 to 
investigate further the hydrological, geological, and seismic aspects of the 
proposed project. The studies confirmed the findings of the previous studies, 
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and increased the anticipated average annual energy production of the 
proposed scheme from 2,042 to 2,437 gigawatt-hours. In 1992, the Snowy 
Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC), an international engineering firm, 
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Electrical Development 
Center of the Ministry of Water Resources to secure the rights to develop the 
hydropower project plan on behalf of the Government of Nepal. In September 
1994, the government granted the company survey licenses to proceed. 
The proposed reservoir area of the West Seti Hydropower Project is in Baitadi 
and Bajhang districts. The other project components, including the power 
house, will be in Doti and Dedeldhura districts. The total project area extends 
from the Shivalik Mountain Range in the north to the Terai (plains) in the south. 
The proposed project area will occupy the land to the west of the Karnali 
River which remained relatively isolated from the rest of the country until the 
opening of the East–West Highway and the construction of a bridge across 
the Karnali River. 
In 1995, the SMEC conducted a comprehensive review of the project feasibility 
studies. The studies resulted in the selection of a single-stage 750 MW 
storage scheme. The dam was to be located 67 kilometers upstream of the 
confluence of the West Seti and the Karnali rivers. The proposed project was 
expected to generate year-round electricity by storing excess rainy season river 
flows in the reservoir. The storage scheme was to be maintained to provide 
a constant, stable power supply throughout the year. From 1995, the SMEC 
engaged consultants who conducted further engineering, financial, social, 
economic, and legal studies and investigations. In April 1997, the SMEC West 
Seti Hydroelectric Corporation was established as an independent Nepalese 
company, and took over the responsibility for the proposed project. A project 
agreement was signed by the Government of Nepal and the SMEC West Seti 
Hydroelectric Corporation in June 1997. In the same year, the corporation was 
renamed West Seti Hydro (WSH).
From 1997, the proposal went through various complicated negotiation and 
planning phases. As there was no large-scale private sector power project in 
Nepal, several unknown issues needed to be explored through more studies 
and political dialogue within Nepal, and between Nepal and India. Drafting and 
negotiating the power purchase agreement between the two countries only 
became possible after the introduction of the Electricity Act in 2003 in Nepal 
and the establishment of the Power Trading Corporation of India.
WSH found that private banks were reluctant to finance the project because 
of its size and cost, and the political uncertainties in Nepal. Therefore, it 
approached development finance institutions such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). From 2005, WSH discussed with ADB the possibility of obtaining 
financial support to the proposed project. Based on the discussions, ADB found 
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that the proposed project had sound fundamentals. The government thought 
that ADB’s participation in the project would bring in significant development 
benefits to Nepal. The government welcomed ADB’s partnership in the project, 
as it would send an important signal to the private sector, encouraging it to 
participate in renewable energy development and building confidence in 
financing hydropower projects in Nepal. The proposed West Seti Project was 
recognized as a pioneer in generating renewable energy that could provide a 
long-term, reliable supply of electricity for domestic use while also rectifying 
power shortages in Northern India. 
Several planning activities were swiftly completed between 2005 and 2009 
to launch the project. One key planning activity was the approval of the 
shareholding arrangement. The government obtained Cabinet approval to 
participate in the project as a minor shareholder with financial support from 
ADB. The Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation and Infrastructure Leasing 
and Financial Services of India agreed to join as shareholders. In August 
2007, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the proposed project was 
reviewed and updated. A summary EIA, a vulnerable community development 
plan, and an updated resettlement plan were also posted on ADB’s website to 
meet its safeguard policy requirements. The requirement for WSH to achieve 
financial close by the end of 2008 under the power purchase agreement was 
extended until the end of 2009, enabling the completion of negotiations and 
other administrative requirements. The widespread news at that time was that 
the impounding of the land for the reservoir and construction of the hydropower 
plant and its associated facilities were imminent. 
As project processing did not progress as planned, in 2010, WSH lost two 
important investors: ADB and the China National Machinery and Equipment 
Import and Export Corporation. At the same time, a well-organized campaign 
against dam construction and impounding of fertile agricultural land for 
reservoir construction gathered momentum in local and international forums. 
The campaign premised its opposition to the proposed project mainly on its 
environmental, physical displacement, and resettlement issues. In May 2011, 
China Three Gorges Corporation expressed interest in developing the project. 
Nepal’s Ministry of Energy proposed a public–private partnership after learning 
of the corporation’s interest in the proposed project. An official from the ministry 
stated that “the Government is committed to construct the project at any cost.” 
A technical team of experts from CWE Investment Corporation, a subsidiary 
of China Three Gorges Corporation, initiated a preliminary study of the project 
site in August 2012 to examine the technical and financial feasibility of the 
proposed 750 MW hydropower project. The team reassessed the proposed 
project’s hydrology, geology, migrant planning, project hydraulics, and 
engineering. In August 2012, the Government of Nepal and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a fresh MOU to develop the 
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West Seti Hydropower Project. The estimated project cost was NRs180 billion 
($2.2 billion). Project work was scheduled to commence in 2012 and to be 
completed in 2020. The revised and updated MOU stated that CWE Investment 
Corporation would provide a 10% stake to the local investors and agreed to 
make the project multipurpose by including irrigation, fisheries, and water 
transport as components of the project. About 150 MW of electricity would be 
allocated for local industrial development. CWE Investment Corporation also 
agreed to help generate funds for the construction of the transmission line to 
minimize delays in connecting the power generated to the national grid. 
Potential Social Impacts 
1. Impacts of Land Acquisition 
The dam, reservoir, and downstream project components, including the power 
station and reregulation weir, will be located in Baitadi, Bajhang, Dadeldhura, 
and Doti districts and will affect parts of 20 village development committee (VDC) 
areas. The consolidated findings of various socioeconomic surveys estimated 
that the proposed project would acquire 660 hectares (ha) of cultivated land, 
806 ha of forestland, 415 ha of grassland and shrubland, 14 ha of abandoned 
settlement land, and 432 ha of river valleys and hilly areas. The transmission 
line would require a right-of-way that would affect about 600 ha of land.
Construction of the storage dam, reservoir, tunnels, reregulation weir, power 
station, access roads, workforce camps, work areas, and office buildings, 
including the transmission line, will require the acquisition of about 2,340 ha 
of private and state land. About 5.1 ha will be acquired for the construction 
of 356 tower pads for the transmission line. 600 ha of land will be acquired 
partially for the right-of-way of the transmission line, while another 15 ha of 
land will be leased temporarily for the camps and storage areas adjacent to 
construction sites.
2. Displacement Impacts 
About 2,400 households with about 18,200 persons will directly be affected by 
the project. About 1,700 (70%) of these households live and earn their living 
from the land that will be inundated by the reservoir. They will be physically and 
economically displaced from their land and will have to move away from the 
hilly valleys and relocate in the Terai region. Another 200 households (8%) are 
expected to relocate locally. About 440 households who live in the downstream 
areas of the project will be partially affected by the flow level fluctuations in 
the river because of discharges from the dam. The project’s impacts on them 
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will be mainly economic, and although they will experience various degrees of 
economic displacement, they could continue to live on their original land and in 
their original communities. Another 1,500 households (about 11,000 persons) 
in the downstream riparian zone between the dam site and the reregulation weir 
site will be affected by the project in varying degrees as a result of permanent 
reduction in the flow of the West Seti River, and by increases and decreases in 
river flow because of discharges from the power station. About 300 households 
(about 2,000 persons) will be affected by the construction of the transmission 
line. Of them, 186 households will be relocated locally, adjacent to the right-of-
way of the transmission line.
The populations that will be affected by the project live mainly in the West Seti 
River Valley in settlements such as Chaudam, Deura, Dhungad, and Talara, 
and along some of the river’s tributaries. Bagthala, Deura, and Dhungad are 
important marketplaces in the valley. The village communities are scattered 
and sparsely populated. The number of households per village averages 20, 
ranging from 2 to 30. Most of the communities are not accessible by motor 
vehicles. The need to walk many miles over difficult terrain to reach a village 
makes it an independent and self-sufficient entity. Education facilities are rare 
and are usually catered for by local teachers. Similarly, medical facilities are 
seldom found, and are typically staffed by native physicians. The inhabitants 
receive information about regional or rural development and proposals for 
development interventions in the valley mainly through visiting travelers and 
itinerant businesspeople. The downstream part of the valley is much more 
accessible because of the Seti–Rajmarg Highway, which connects several 
VDCs and small towns. The communities in Kailali and Kanchanpur districts 
in the lower hilly areas are larger and more densely populated than the small 
village communities in the hilly areas in Deura and Dhungad.
Subsistence agriculture plays a dominant role in the local economic activities 
and livelihoods of the proposed project areas. Households use a range 
of forest resources such as fodder, fuelwood, timber, wild fruits, medicinal 
plants, and vegetables to earn a living. Animal husbandry is also an important 
subsistence and income source. Households rear cattle, goats, poultry, and 
sheep. Cattle and buffalos are kept for milk and ghee for household use, while 
goats and sheep are kept as a source of ready income. Off-farm employment, 
such as professional services, petty trade, and cottage industries, is rare. Other 
household income sources include wage labor, the sale of forest products, and 
occasional sharecropping. A farmer who will be physically displaced by the 
project succinctly described the environment of their communities: 
The simple meaning of society is a group of people living 
together in one place by sharing joy and sadness of each 
household. Thus what we would like to say is that we have been 
here since our ancestors’ time and following the same social 
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norms and values. We have unity and we share cooperative 
feelings and closely associate with others in the community 
for various social events such as religious festivals, agricultural 
work, cultural, and education programs. In this social context, 
our community has been living since time immemorial by 
having very basic amenities such as drinking water and primary 
education for our children (Consultation notes with 92 affected 
persons in Talara village in November 2006).
Compensation Package
Based on surveys, censuses, and studies conducted in the project area by 
various agencies, WSH planned a comprehensive compensation package, 
based mainly on the land-for-land compensation modality. The key characteristic 
of the package is the determination of the government to provide replacement 
value for the land acquired, as well as additional assistance for relocation. The 
following principles on land exchange (land-for-land) were determined by WSH:
•	 Landowners will have the productivity of their land recognized in the amount 
of exchange land provided.
•	 Landowners will be provided with an additional 10% of their current 
landholding productivity and a residential plot as a direct project benefit, in 
addition to the land exchange based on productivity.
•	 Landowners will have their current community resource usage recognized 
and will be given land to compensate for the lost user benefits received 
from these resources.
•	 A landowner who would be entitled to a less-than-subsistence-level 
landholding will receive a subsistence-level landholding. 
To recognize land productivity as the prime determinant of land exchange, 
irrigated land and rainfed land are considered as the two major types of 
cultivated land. In the case of titled land, “irrigated cultivation” refers to rice 
(paddy) cultivation, while “rainfed cultivation” refers to maize cultivation. 
Marginal land, such as “house and land,” or “thatch grass,” that does not fall 
into irrigated or rainfed land categories, will also be categorized as rainfed land. 
In the land-for-land exchange for cultivated land acquired, an extra 10% of land 
will also be given to a relocated household. This will provide the relocated 
household with a direct project benefit of 10% more crop production over and 
above of its current production level in the proposed West Seti project area. 
The land-for-land package will be supplemented with another parcel of land of 
300 square meters as a residential plot to each relocated household.
Resettlement Planning and Pre-Displacement Impoverishment 91
Project-affected households will lose their access to communal resources. 
From the household income sources point of view, smaller landowners are 
more heavily reliant on community common resources for their daily food and 
other household requirements than large landowners are. But each household 
has equal access to their community’s common land and other resources 
regardless of the amount of land it owns or the types of employment of its 
members. Communal resources include fodder; timber; wild fruits; ferns; 
vegetables; medicinal herbs; chuiri (ghee) products; stone, sand, and gravel; 
thatching grass; fuelwood; and fish. The compensation package will provide 
each relocated household with 0.47 ha of land in compensation for their loss 
of community resources. The compensation and rehabilitation package was 
disclosed widely to all project-affected communities. Several rounds of detailed 
consultations were held to fine-tune entitlements and discuss the fears, worries, 
and aspirations of individuals who have been informed of their relocation. 
Pre-Displacement Uncertainties, Confusions, 
and Trauma
After more than 40 years since the first feasibility studies were conducted in the 
project area, the project is scheduled to start soon. Its scheduled completion 
date has been revised to 2022. During the past 30 years, the boundaries of 
the proposed project area and the number of affected village communities, 
households, and persons have changed as the engineering designs have been 
revised and new project components have been added by different project 
planners. With the changing boundaries of project components, households in 
many village communities targeted and potentially targeted for land acquisition 
and displacement have had lived with uncertainty engulfed in a threatening 
atmosphere. This situation was aggravated by the civil war started by the 
Maoists in rural areas. Life in the remote areas became dangerous, as both 
Maoists and the military harassed them to collect information on each other 
and to obtain food. At the peak of the civil war, the villagers did not get sufficient 
information about the proposed project and, as a result, did not know whether 
they were in the list of households to be displaced. Some villagers were waiting 
for an opportunity to move out of their communities to escape the impact of the 
civil war. As a result, some of them welcome their proposed physical relocation 
to the Terai region, where they expect to find better life chances for themselves 
and their families.
When the government authorities began to review and approve the plans of the 
project, local authorities in the West Seti area started preliminary administrative 
work to pave the way for land acquisition and relocation of affected persons and 
households. They gradually demarcated common and state land from private 
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land, and imposed some restrictions on the access of villagers to common and 
state land. This was the first time that some villagers felt the presence of the 
state and its command over common and state land. The trauma of pending 
physical displacement and curtailed access to common land generated 
a scenario of “suspended communities” in the proposed project areas. 
Uncertainty about future, the lack of information, disinformation campaigns run 
by interest groups, escalating hostilities between the government and Maoist 
forces, and progressive impoverishment of communities have exposed a 
large number of households in the proposed project areas to psychological 
and socioeconomic hardships. These households did not know when they 
would be physically displaced or where they would be relocated. Information 
on compensation, relocation, and rehabilitation was often scanty and did not 
reach them until the first decade of the 21st century. 
In Deura, a key community center in the project area, 130 wealthy, high-
caste landowner households formed the West Seti Affected Concern Group, 
together with political party workers, government servants, businesspeople of 
Deura Market, and farmers. It held a series of meetings with WSH to show 
their displeasure regarding the lack of project information, and their anxiety 
over losing their fertile land and animal husbandry. They pointed out that WSH 
had not shown sufficient interest in maintaining a healthy dialogue with the 
people in the project area and had sometimes attempted to withhold important 
project information from them. They highlighted the deteriorating pattern of 
WSH’s disclosure of project information. In 2006, it requested project-affected 
households through a newspaper notice, issued by the Ministry of Population 
and Environment, to send their comments on the EIA of the project within 30 
days. They were not provided with sufficient information about the EIA or its 
contents. People thought it was a very short period and felt it was an attempt to 
deceive them. In the minutes of the group meeting, they recorded two points. 
First, SMEC prepared the EIA reports without consulting the potential project-
affected persons or their representatives, environmental specialists, water 
resources specialists, human rights activists, and other project stakeholders, 
and submitted them to the Ministry of Water Resources and Environment for 
approval. Second, various socioeconomic and environmental surveys and 
studies conducted during 1997–2000 would not provide an accurate picture of 
the current state of affairs in the project area, especially the number of persons 
and households affected, and the amount of land the project would acquire 
permanently and temporarily. Therefore, the West Seti Affected Concern Group 
asked for new surveys and studies to capture the changes that had taken place 
in the area since 2000. 
Partly as a response to this complaint and partly to resuscitate the construction 
plans of the hydropower project, in 2008, WSH decided to conduct a household 
consultation program. It found that such a program was overdue because the 
curtailing of activities in the project area during 2000–2007 owing to rural unrest 
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unquestionably had an effect on the project’s consultation program and its 
working relationship with the stakeholders. By conducting a fresh consultation 
program, the company expected to reestablish contact with the potentially 
affected persons and their communities. WSH implemented a multifaceted 
communication and consultation program in the project areas that (i) updated 
the socioeconomic survey of all affected households; (ii) met each potentially 
affected household to discuss project impacts, mitigation measures, and 
entitlements; and (iii) established district resettlement coordination committees 
to finalize the monetary exchange values of the entitlements. As part of the 
consultation team, 12 community liaison assistants were appointed from among 
the youth in the main project areas and transmission line corridor to increase 
people’s awareness about the project, especially its benefits to individuals, 
communities, and the region. WSH also deployed resettlement tasks teams 
in collaboration with the community committees to work with small groups of 
affected households on entitlements and household relocation preferences. It 
employed communication and consultation officers to manage and coordinate 
local communication and consultation at each key project site, including the 
transmission line. 
The presence in the field of a dedicated group of communication specialists and 
the launching of various consultation programs have qualitatively changed the 
relationship between WSH and the people in the project area. With more project 
information, the affected people’s awareness about the project has increased. 
Through their own organizations or with the assistance of local and international 
NGOs, they articulated their demands and conditions for surrendering their 
property, acceptance of compensation packages, and physical relocation, and 
negotiated mutually beneficial comprehensive compensation packages. The 
careful and detailed compensation and relocation planning and their disclosure 
and discussions with a variety of groups of project-affected persons and other 
project stakeholders functioned as the project’s social preparation phase of 
the project. While the poor and marginalized groups moved rapidly toward 
negotiation of their compensation and relocation options with WSH, several 
landowning groups protested against the project, mainly because they were 
reluctant to surrender their land. 
Several local interest groups who were against the proposed project have 
organized ad hoc protest groups against the proposed project, and sabotaged 
social surveys and public consultation programs organized by WSH. Meanwhile, 
international and regional advocacy groups agitated against the project partly 
on behalf of the local interest groups and partly out of genuine concern for 
the potential adverse environmental impacts of the project. Such agitations 
caused confusion and anxiety among local communities. The agitation took two 
forms: agitation against the project on ideological and personal grounds, and 
agitation against the compensation and entitlement packages. Some NGOs 
spread misinformation, stating that although WSH promised to compensate 
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them land for land and to give them more land in the Terai region, people in 
the region were against the arrival of the displaced hill people. In reality, most 
of the large, fertile tracts of irrigated land in the Terai region were owned by a 
small group of rich absentee landholders from Kathmandu who were willing to 
sell large portions of their land to the project to establish resettlement sites for 
the displaced from the project area. Such contradictory information confused 
those who were willing to relocate to the Terai region with the support of the 
project. Some were scared to move, even though they aspired to own land in 
the region, as doing so would improve their life chances. 
Sporadic intimidation and disinformation also discouraged households 
from investing in livelihood development, land and house improvement, and 
children’s education, as well as from engaging in community activities. They 
were living a community that was in an imagined transition without knowing 
whether they would ever leave their ancestral lands. Data collection and 
incessant consultations organized by the project authorities, potential lenders, 
researchers, and NGOs periodically reminded the communities of their imminent 
physical displacement, rekindling their anxieties and fears. The psychological 
traumas of impending loss of land, businesses, community, culture, and 
social networks have already generated depression, family breakup, and 
hopelessness, and impoverishment risks such as social disarticulation and 
food insecurity have gradually become realities for many households. Because 
of the pain of prolonged uncertainty, some villagers in the project area began 
to hope for the earliest possible commencement of the project. They found that 
waiting would ruin them and deprive them of improving their life chances. 
Initially, few people in the project area knew about the project. Those with 
some knowledge did not know when it would be implemented or which areas 
and communities would be affected. Over the years, because of various 
consultations held by project authorities, NGOs, and agitation groups to 
discuss the project and its benefits and risks with villagers, village communities 
have come to know about the project, its impacts, and what they could expect 
from the project as displaced persons and resettlers. This knowledge triggered 
more problems and demands from local people who believed that, although 
the project would affect them adversely, they would not get any assistance or 
benefit from it.  
A group of communities that live on the upper reaches of the West Seti Valley 
where the proposed reservoir will be located found that the project authorities 
did not pay attention to their predicament. They found out that their land would 
not be acquired for the reservoir, but they would be seriously affected by the 
project. They think that the project authorities should acquire their lands, 
even though they are located above the highest watermark of the proposed 
reservoir. They have good relations with people in the valley, and they are part 
of the local economy, society, and polity. They are anxious about their future as 
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access of their communities to schools, hospitals, administrative offices, and 
other facilities in the valley will be cut off by the reservoir, and they do not want 
to miss out on the development benefits of the project. A group petition that 
they submitted to WSH in 2006 sums up this confusion, anxiety, and desire to 
improve their life chances: 
The largest hydroelectric project to be implemented in the 
rural areas of Far Western Region is welcome by the people of 
this area. But the survey conducted has not focused on long-
run [impacts] on us [communities in the upper reaches of the 
valley]. There has been no mention about the adverse impacts 
to be endured by more than 1,000 households [who will be] 
affected by the project. It just seems that the project is trying 
to displace the people of the area for the sake of the project. 
Before the start of the project, it is essential to have a good 
knowledge about the real situation of the area. Till now surveys 
focused only on the reservoir area and not on us. Now the 
question arises, where will [we as] affected people go and what 
will they [authorities] do? The government and nongovernment 
agencies need to acknowledge this fact and act accordingly. 
The EIA approved by the government in 2000 covers only 
reservoir area [and not the area above the full supply level (FSL) 
+100]…We request the concerned authorities to acknowledge 
the facts and agree to resolve the following issues. The main 
effects of the reservoir on our communities are listed below:
•	 Our fertile land in the upper reaches of the proposed 
reservoir is susceptible to landslides.
•	 Forests and community forests in the upper reaches of the 
reservoir on which we depend for livelihood will adversely 
be affected by the reservoir; villagers will be deprived of 
collecting forest products.
•	 Communities in the upper reaches of the reservoir will be 
cut off from the rest of the valley as a large water body will 
separate them. 
•	 Access to schools, temples, and other institutions in the 
valley will be cut from the upper reaches of the valley where 
we live.
•	 There will be effects on habitats due to the climate change 
triggered by the project. 
(Petition of the People of the Area above FSL + 100 
[November 2006])
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Dalits and Other Vulnerable Households
The Dalits are the vulnerable group in the proposed project area. The total 
number of Dalit households affected in upstream and downstream project sites 
is 274 households with about 2,000 persons. In 2009, there were 28 households 
headed by women among them. About 45% of dalit households fall into the 
category of absolute poor. Illiterate and lacking land-ownership, members of 
these groups are often unable to make their voices heard effectively. In its 
resettlement policy, WSH states that account will be taken of this category of 
persons in consultation and planning processes, as well as in the establishment 
of grievance procedures. Based on this policy, WSH stated that it is “committed 
to ensure that viable options are prepared and made available to households 
to be displaced by the project.” The project planners prefer to relocate the 
Dalits in the Terai region, as it offers viable land-based livelihood restoration 
opportunities. 
When information about the project was widely disseminated and consultations 
were organized in remote areas, the Dalits formed their own associations to 
negotiate their entitlements with the project authorities. The key question they 
raised was: “We, dalit people, depend on high-caste groups for livelihood. After 
the reservoir is built, landholders will get land for land. What will dalit people 
get?” They indicated that they should be prioritized in the relocation process, 
as they are vulnerable and easy to ignore in relocation programs. They 
demand that they should get first preference in the allocation of project-related 
employment, as such work would allow at least some of them to get out the 
poverty cycle in which they are now fully embedded. In this regard, they wanted 
the project to provide them with skills training. As with the other physically 
displaced households, they too are entitled to move to new resettlement sites 
and should receive land to cultivate and houses to live in, thereby improving 
their life chances. Those dalit households who earn their living from fishing 
want to continue fishing in the project area or at resettlement locations. The 
provision of such assistance is the direct responsibility of the project managers 
who should take necessary action not to commence project implementation 
until such arrangements are place for the benefit of Dalits.
The landholders who employ Dalits as their agricultural workers want the Dalits 
to move with them to the Terai region, so that they can continue to work on 
their land. However, the landholders do not expect their Dalits to become 
landowners for two reasons. First, such a structural change would adversely 
affect the social hierarchy and honor system in the society; and second, if 
Dalits were to become landowners, there would be no agricultural workers to 
help the landholders. WSH formulated a vulnerable community development 
plan to ensure that Dalits and other vulnerable communities such as Janajatis 
(indigenous peoples) receive their entitlements as displaced and resettled 
persons. The project’s resettlement policy states that particular attention will be 
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paid to collective adverse impacts on vulnerable groups and social categories 
who may be vulnerable to changes brought about by project activities or who 
may be excluded from its benefits. Dalits and other vulnerable households 
would be classified as subsistence farmers with small holdings or without 
any land other than homesteads in the scheme of allocation of land in the 
Terai region. Each such household is to get a subsistence-sized plot of land to 
cultivate at the resettlement site in addition to a residential plot of 300 square 
meters. Furthermore, as off-farm employment opportunities are abundant 
in the Terai region, they could easily supplement their household income by 
engaging in employment such as transport, food processing, construction, 
and fishing. These opportunities would allow the Dalits to escape from poverty 
and bondage.
The generous resettlement plan triggered the Dalits’ interest in the project. 
Some of them visited the potential resettlement areas and are awaiting 
relocation. These high expectations among Dalits disturb the economic and 
social harmony in the project areas. Their organization into “demand groups” 
to negotiate their entitlements under the project is seen as the beginning of a 
radical change in rural Nepalese society. 
Perceptions of the Host Community
Most of the households that will be physically displaced prefer to relocate 
themselves in the Terai region, provided they get a generous compensation 
package that includes irrigated land and permanent housing. The amount of 
land needed to relocate 1,200 households from the project area was estimated 
at 2,300 ha in 2009. The project checked the availability of suitable land in 
the Terai region in 1997–1998, 2007, and 2009. The project contacted about 
40 village development committees in Baridya, Kailali, and Kanchanpur 
districts and more than 200 large landowners. The investigations were done 
along the East–West Highway and in the Terai section of the Far-Western 
Development Region.
The investigations focused on (i) assessing the physical characteristics of land 
available for purchasing, (ii) identifying owners of large estates who are willing 
to sell some of their land to the project, (iii) understanding current land-use 
patterns, (iv) recording information such as GPS locations, and (v) establishing 
land values.
WHS identified 1,954 ha of land as being available for purchase. The land 
is fertile irrigated agricultural land located either adjacent to rural roads or 
within 10–15 minutes walking distance from village centers. However, further 
discussions with landowners and cultivators revealed that much of this land 
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had already been “confiscated” by the Maoists during the civil unrest and 
distributed to Maoist cadres and supporters who were mostly the bonded 
laborers of large landholders. A central government directive issued in 2009 
requested the handover of all the confiscated land to its rightful owners, but the 
sharecroppers who had received the land from the Maoists refused to return it. 
Several interviews with them indicated that they had suffered for many centuries 
as bonded laborers, although as tribal peoples of the area they have the right 
to own and use the land. 
The landowners are mainly absentee landholders who live in Kathmandu and 
other cities. They are of high caste and literate. Many of them are businesspeople 
in addition to being landowners. They wanted to take advantage of the 
presence of international development agencies to express their concerns and 
expectations, particularly in drawing attention in the area to the difficulties they 
had experienced during the Maoist insurgency. They are willing to sell their land 
as they have no control over their sharecroppers. 
From the project viewpoint, the landowners are willing to sell their land at a 
reasonable price and the available land matches the relocation requirements 
of about 1,000 households. The sharecroppers are displeased to learn that 
farmers and Dalits from the hilly areas will arrive as resettlers in an area which 
they had just “liberated” from bonded labor. The caste affinities between most 
of those who will lose land to the reservoir and the big landholders in the Terai 
region led them to doubt the intentions of their landholders. The sharecroppers 
think that by bringing in high-caste resettlers from hilly areas, the landholders are 
trying to achieve numerical dominance over Tharus (tribal peoples) in the Terai 
region, which would harm their cultural, economic, and social interests. They 
argue such a radical change in the Terai region would once again marginalize 
the tribal population. 
Perceptions of the Resettlers
The potential resettlers from the project areas view the possibility of obtaining 
land and housing in the Terai region as a great blessing. The vectors of social 
and economic mobility are from the hill areas to the Terai, and from the Terai 
to Kathmandu and other major cities and towns in Nepal. They believe if they 
get better land in the Terai region, they could further their economic and social 
interests. The Dalits and Janajatis who will be displaced from the project area 
also demand a generous compensation package to enable them to overcome 
their current social and economic inferiority, landlessness, and illiteracy.
The proposal to give ample land in the Terai region for resettlement encouraged 
the potential resettlers to articulate their demands. Their key demands are that 
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(i) resettlement sites should not be located close to the Indian border or to 
major flood-prone rivers; (ii) a community displaced from the project area 
should be resettled as one unit; (iii) the land that will be distributed should be 
irrigated land with high potential for crop production; and (iv) the sites should 
be close to markets, roads, and town centers. 
Nongovernment and Community-Based 
Organizations
Because of the project’s significant social and environmental impacts, a 
wide range of actors have become involved either to represent the affected 
communities or to agitate against the project. The main group of actors 
comprises local community associations, who demand comprehensive 
compensation and rehabilitation packages as a precondition to leaving their 
native land and being resettled in the Terai region. This group is made up of 
well-organized intervillage people’s associations such as the West Seti Affected 
Concerns Committees. Local nongovernment organizations (NGOs), such as 
the Water and Energy Users’ Federation (WAFED), work with them, provide 
information, muster regional NGO support, and control local agitations and 
demands. They sometimes reformulate affected people’s needs to suit their 
own political and development agendas. 
International NGOs generally follow an anti-hydropower agenda with or without 
local NGO support. The Japan Center for Sustainable Environment and 
Society (JACSES), a Japanese NGO, is closely associated with WAFED. Both 
organizations consistently follow an anti-hydropower agenda. Working with local 
groups has enabled these NGOs to spread information more effectively among 
remote communities concerning project risks, inadequacies of project planning, 
and the entitlements that affected people should demand, and to organize 
them into agitation movements. As the project activities get delayed, NGOs 
and local associations demand more and more information from the project 
authorities, including clarifications on minor technicalities, and the translation 
of all safeguard planning documents including their technical appendices into 
local languages. For example, a key demand of NGOs was to translate the six-
volume environmental impact assessment into local languages. They organize 
large anti-project demonstrations at short notice and transmit photographs and 
highlights to the local and international press. 
Based on discussions about the project, and reading of project planning 
documents and newspaper articles, local community-based groups and NGOs 
have gained a good sense of the scope of community and individual losses 
and have framed community demands in a systematic manner. For example, 
Sunaulo Gaun Nepal, a community-based organization in Dadelhura, an area 
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that will be affected by the construction of an access road to the reservoir’s 
dam area, prepared a concept paper outlining their observations and risks, 
expectations from the project, and questions for project authorities. One of 
their short-term demands was that cash compensation for land should be 
calculated according to their market value. They have asked for the timber that 
will be chopped and the cash compensation that will be paid for the damage 
to the forests to be given to local people through their concerned consumers’ 
committees. They have also demanded that a water channel should be dug to 
the village from the upstream river. Other demands include land for a cemetery, 
employment at worksites, contracts to transport construction materials, and a 
project information center at the village. Medium-term demands include a base 
hospital with 15 beds, and a new road to connect the village with two nearby 
villages. 
One unintended benefit of prolonged resettlement planning is the opportunity 
it provides to potential resettlers to participate in resettlement planning. In this 
regard, NGOs played a key role in checking the proposed resettlement sites, 
assisting the project authorities in establishing “equivalence” between the 
fragmented, low-fertility, hilly landholdings and the large-scale, fertile, flat Terai 
land. A critical demand of local NGOs and community organizations is that 
each displaced household be given 300% of the lost land as compensation. 
They also specified that they should get irrigation facilities and the land 
allocated should be productive. A small town in the reservoir area demanded 
1:7 land compensation at resettlement sites on the ground that the land that 
they currently cultivate is inadequate to earn their living. A total of 170 potential 
resettlers of Deura village in Bajhang District sent the following letter to SMEC 
outlining their requirements at new resettlement sites:
We the people on behalf of Bhajhang District—Rayal Village 
Development Council, Ward 3, Deura Village—demand that 
the following conditions/requirements be fulfilled if we are to 
be resettled in new areas: irrigation facilities to cultivate new 
land; schools and high school campuses; good roads with 
bus services; electricity supply to houses free of cost from the 
West Seti Hydropower Project; and provision of postal services, 
food stores, a health center, a police post, banking facilities, 
community forest, safe drinking water, and employment 
opportunities.
“Mis-Development” and Prolonged Planning
Although implementation of the project plans has not started, local government 
authorities act as if the project is being implemented and the project area will 
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soon be inundated by the proposed reservoir. As a result, the areas that fall 
under the project do not get priority in development planning or local welfare 
budget allocations. Private companies do not want to invest in the area for 
the same reason. The unusually prolonged planning phase of the project 
has exacerbated such “mis-development,” as the construction and repair of 
suspension bridges, refurbishment of roads, and expansion of school buildings 
were put on hold because of the imminent inundation of the area.
Effective administration is a key aspect of local development. But delays in project 
implementation have stalled local development initiatives, such as training and 
extension for crop diversification and multicropping, for several decades in 
the reservoir and downstream areas. Maintenance of social services, such as 
clinics, health centers, primary schools has also been affected because of the 
lack of government support. After decades of neglect, these facilities barely 
exist in the project area. General maintenance by local communities using VDC 
funds, such as for road maintenance, is also neglected because of the pending 
evacuation of populations. 
The residents in the proposed project areas also take “mis-development” in 
their communities for granted. They concentrate more on their new relocation 
sites and the advantages they will bring than on their own land in their villages. 
During consultations with such people, this issue came up clearly and in strong 
terms. In Talara Village, a group of Dalits pointed out that at their new relocation 
site they should get minimum common facilities and special programs targeted 
at vulnerable groups. This would enable them to find decent employment and 
move away from bonded labor, thus helping their children at least to improve 
their socioeconomic status. At their present location, they continue to be 
oppressed, vulnerable, and poor. 
Many households do not trust outsiders, especially project authorities, 
surveyors, and data collectors, because of uncertainties and confusions 
regarding the time of displacement and locations of resettlement. They do not 
know who to believe regarding the compensation packages offered at various 
times. They now suffer from “consultation fatigue.” As more consultations are 
held to explain the project, its benefits, their entitlements, and opportunities 
for development, expectations rise and project-affected persons increase their 
demands. 
Because of stress, anxiety, and trauma, project-affected persons react 
unenthusiastically to their own self-improvement. They no longer invest in 
house improvement, vehicles, or furniture, or in improving basic facilities such 
as toilets. They are essentially a population waiting to be moved and resettled 
elsewhere. Several generations’ experience of a “suspended community” 
acutely demoralizes them.
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Some villagers in the project area suspect that their local governments are 
colluding with West Seti Hydropower Project officials in physically displacing 
them without appropriate compensation and resettlement assistance. The 
formation of Concerned Committees by the villagers shows their concerns 
about their future and their lack of trust in local and national governing bodies. 
At least one-fifth of the potential resettlers thought as recently as 2009 that that 
they had received false information concocted by local governments to pacify 
them and to grab their land. Suspicion and exasperation with the inordinate 
delay have made them resentful of outsiders. They do not want to meet any 
researchers, social survey groups, or project personnel any more. 
The behavior of villagers of Gopghat, a key village in the project area, reflects 
the general attitude and mood among potential project-affected persons in 
the project areas. While extending their support cautiously to the proposed 
project, they demand strong commitment from the project authorities regarding 
employment, land size and productivity, off-farm employment, infrastructure, 
and environmental issues at resettlement sites. The villagers prepared a list of 
26 demands, which reflect the absence of community facilities in their village 
and their desire to have them provided at the resettlement site. Among the 
demands are upgraded health post at the resettlement site and a 100-bed 
hospital in the area; drinking water facilities and a drainage network at the 
resettlement site; a model school and free education, especially for the children 
of Dalit, Janajati, and other vulnerable groups; postal and television services; a 
community forestry program; specious houses built according to international 
standards; priority in employment at the project sites; and at least one project 
job for each resettled household. 
Conclusion
Project planning delays over several years or decades induce impoverishment, 
hopelessness, anxiety, and fear among potential project-affected persons. 
These adverse impacts of resettlement planning are aggravated when several 
development agencies are engaged in project planning. In such a context, 
the impoverishment risks become actual experience for those who live in 
proposed project areas. This is the case in the West Seti Hydropower Project. 
In the project areas, the potential project-affected households have already 
entered the stream of impoverishment, with concomitant marginalization and 
hopelessness. The social disarticulation and anxiety thus created at proposed 
project areas spread to the host communities where the project authorities plan 
to resettle the physically displaced households. 
In resettlement literature, host communities are generally considered as 
homogenous communities which resettlers could easily join, if both groups 
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could share the project benefits. However, the host communities of the West 
Seti Hydropower Project have their own worries, fears, and political agendas 
that encourage them to oppose the establishment of resettlement sites in the 
Terai region. Superficially, the landholders appear willing to sell large parts 
of their estates to the project to establish resettlements. But behind such 
willingness, there is an urgency to dispose of such land as quickly as possible 
and collect some money before they lose it altogether to their sharecroppers 
who claim the land as their ancestral domain under a resuscitated indigenous 
identity. The sharecroppers oppose the arrival of resettlers in the Terai region 
because they fear that such an influx of high-caste resettlers would upset 
their numerical dominance in the area and effectively destroy their chances of 
becoming landholders of their tenanted land. 
The current resettlement models—the four-stage framework, and the 
impoverishment risks and reconstruction model—are not comprehensive 
enough to capture the “upstream” process of impoverishment in the project 
cycle. This is a major deficiency that requires the attention of resettlement model 
builders, policy makers, and practitioners. If it is ignored, impoverishment risks 
could become a reality before a project plan is implemented. A key requirement 
is to expand the scope of resettlement and its management to include pre-
displacement planning risks. This expansion in scope is being delayed mainly 
because of the reluctance among resettlement policy makers, planners, and 
practitioners to deal with the physical displacement of large numbers of persons 
that would trigger human rights issues and call into question the legitimacy of 
development interventions. Another reason is the lingering similarities between 
environmental assessment and planning, and socioeconomic assessment and 
resettlement planning. Soon after the introduction of environmental management 
policies and frameworks in the 1980s, social scientists too presented 
resettlement management models that use the same language, issues, and 
targets. Environmental management policies focus on how to avoid adverse 
impacts of development activities, based on the primary policy of “do no harm.” 
Resettlement policies and frameworks also focus on how to avoid or minimize 
impoverishment during resettlement. But there is a big difference between 
environment and resettlement programs. First, it is possible to benchmark the 
time of adverse environmental impacts of a development intervention. This is 
invariably during the intervention, and not during its planning. In resettlement, 
the impacts of a project or development intervention affect people from the 
time the intervention is planned, as demonstrated in this chapter. Second, 
environmental policies exclusively focus on adverse impacts of an intervention 
and how to avoid or minimize such impacts. Resettlement impacts include 
both positive and adverse impacts. Thus, resettlement policies, models, and 
practices present a dilemma in which resettlement impacts are both adverse 
and beneficial: adverse because of impoverishment risks; beneficial because of 
the development opportunities they provide. The unavoidability of resettlement 
in the context of national development, together with the possibility of providing 
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a development opportunity for those who are affected, provide a formidable 
rationale for physical displacement of large number of persons. But global 
physical displacement and resettlement experiences clearly indicate that 
impoverishment risks associated with displacement far exceed the possibility 
of converting displacement and resettlement into a development opportunity 
even for a fraction of displaced population.
References
Cernea, M. 1997. The Risk and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced 
Populations. World Development. 25 (10). pp. 1569–1587.
Dwivedi, R. 2002. Models and Methods in Development-Induced Displacement. 
Development and Change. 33 (4). pp. 709–732.
Scudder, T. 2005. The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, 
Institutional and Political Costs. London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan.
 105
6.  Why Compensation 
Is Not Enough to 
Make Resettlement a 
Development Opportunity?
by Chiara Mariotti 
T he forced movement of people to make way for projects intended to trigger growth and development is not new in South Asia. Fernandes estimated that about 60 million people have been displaced since India 
gained independence from the British rule in 1947 (2011, 303). Moreover, forced 
movement of large populations in the name of development and growth is often 
combined with the acceleration of their impoverishment and the worsening of 
their living conditions (Dreze et al. 2000; Parasuraman 1999; Jain and Bala 
2006; Somayaji and Talwar 2011). 
The recognition of this worldwide phenomenon has triggered a reflection 
by many international institutions and development banks on the factors 
affecting displacement and resettlement. This reflection has now been 
incorporated into the dominant discourse on displacement and resettlement. 
This discourse articulates resettlement essentially as a problem of policy and 
management. Its main theoretical justification rests on the Impoverishment 
Risks and Reconstruction Model (Cernea 1997), which links displacement 
to impoverishment through the concept of risks: displacement triggers 
mechanisms that create or exacerbate the risk of impoverishment in its multiple 
dimensions. Resettlement is then understood as the device devoted to the 
management of risks (Mathur 2006). 
This chapter argues that the performance of a resettlement program does not 
depend only on its management, but also on structural factors such as the 
social composition of the affected population, the structure of landownership 
and the history of agrarian relations, the characteristics of the labor market, and 
the ability of the local development growth path to create nonfarm employment. 
Such factors act independently from the implementation and management 
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of the resettlement programs, and accounting for their role can contribute to 
understanding what mechanisms prevent different forms of restitution and 
rehabilitation from improving the lives of people affected by development 
interventions.
Taking the case of the Polavaram Dam in Andhra Pradesh, India, this 
chapter analyzes two fundamental forms of restitution included in any good 
resettlement and rehabilitation program: cash-for-land and land-for-land 
compensation for assets acquired for a project. The findings of the author’s 
extensive fieldwork, conducted in the affected areas of the Polavaram Dam in 
2009, suggest that these two compensation typologies are unlikely to prevent 
the impoverishment of the population affected by the Polavaram Project. 
This is because of shortcomings in the design of the Polavaram resettlement 
and rehabilitation (R&R) package, and the interaction of these shortcomings 
with the socioeconomic characteristics of the affected population and the 
history of agrarian relations. The most important of these shortcomings are 
the payment of insufficient compensation for the land lost to the project, 
the provision of land-for-land compensation only to tribal peoples, and the 
neglect of alternative resettlement interventions such as income restoration 
and employment creation programs.
The Polavaram Dam
The Polavaram Dam is a large multipurpose dam, located next to Polavaram 
Town on the Godavari River in West Godavari District of the State of Andhra 
Pradesh. The dam project was first conceived in 1947, but its construction 
was postponed many times and only started in 2004. Construction works were 
stopped again in 2010 and resumed in 2012. The main reason of these delays 
is the opposition of Orissa and Chhattisgarh states, which will be adversely 
affected by the project (Gujja et al. 2006).
The original cost estimate of the project was $2.04 billion and it was later 
increased to $2.28 billion. By July 2010, about $725 million had been spent 
on the project (Government of Andhra Pradesh, Irrigation Department). The 
length of the dam is about 2.32 kilometers (km) and, once completed, it will 
inundate about 35,000 hectares (ha) of land. It will divert 5,325 million cubic 
meters of water to the Krishna Delta in Krishna District through the 174-km- 
long Right Main Canal and to Visakhapatnam District through the 208-km-long 
Left Main Canal. 
The expected benefits of the dam are manifold. It will generate power and 
augment irrigation supplies for agriculture. In particular, it will provide water 
for irrigation to 54 Mandals (sub districts) in four districts (East Godavari, 
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West Godavari, Krishna, and Visakhapatnam) and for industrial uses in 
Visakhapatnam City. Power generation is particularly important because the 
state has a severe energy shortage. The supporters of the project stress that 
improved availability of electricity and irrigation water will benefit sectors vital 
for economic development and will increase the growth potential of the region. 
After the completion of the dam, about 60,000 ha of land in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh, 2,400 ha in Chhattisgarh State, and 1,230 ha in Orissa State will be 
submerged. In Andhra Pradesh, 277 villages will be submerged; 43 of them 
are in the East Godavari District, 29 in the West Godavari District, and 47 in 
Khammam District. This will affect about 42,700 households. Of these, 40,100 
(94%) are below the state’s poverty line (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Project-Affected Villages and Households, 2010
District
Number of 
Affected 
Villages
Project-
Displaced 
Households
Households 
below Poverty 
Line
% of Displaced 
Households 
below Poverty 
line
East Godavari 43 4,630 4,409 95
West Godavari 29 4,363 4,139 95
Khammam 205 33,708 31,552 94
Total 277 42,701 40,100 94
Source: Government of Andhra Pradesh, Commissioner of Resettlement and Rehabilitation. 
As the construction of the dam is lagging, so are the resettlement operations. In 
2009, only one resettlement colony had been completed and households had 
not yet been relocated. Compensation for the expropriated land is being paid in 
accordance with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Relocation and the provision 
of other benefits are granted according to the Andhra Pradesh Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation Policy of 2005. These benefits form an R&R package that 
grants different amounts of money to different social groups according to the 
extent to which their livelihoods are disrupted by displacement. Appendix I lists 
the main financial benefits granted under the R&R package in the Polavaram 
Mandal in West Godavari District. 
The Affected Population: Social Composition 
and Sources of Livelihood
The structural factors that affect and complicate relocation of the people 
affected by the Polavaram Dam include the diverse social composition of the 
population, its low income level, and the nature of the livelihood sources and of 
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the agrarian relations. Poor scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are among 
the majority of project-affected households. The project’s environmental impact 
assessment of 2005 states that 53% of the total affected population belongs 
to scheduled tribes and 13% belongs to scheduled castes. Scheduled castes 
and scheduled tribes also constitute the most vulnerable groups in the state 
and in India (Mehta and Shah 2001). They show backwardness in every aspect 
of human development, from income level to health and education, as well 
as in access to basic infrastructure and amenities (Centre for Economic and 
Social Studies 2008). A key reason for the persistence of their disadvantage is 
their dependence on agriculture as their main source of income, either as small 
or marginal farmers, or as agricultural wage laborers. 
Physical displacement of farmers and agricultural wage workers is an assault 
on their primary source of livelihood. This assault is further aggravated by the 
fact that displaced people are also deprived of another key source of livelihood: 
access to forests. Scheduled tribes of Andhra Pradesh State supplement their 
meager income from farming, grazing, hunting, and by collecting minor forest 
produce such as firewood, honey, tamarind, soapnuts, and bamboo. These 
items are often sold to raise cash (Reddy et al. 2010). Indeed, the majority of 
the displaced population of the Polavaram Dam lives in forest areas and is 
engaged in collecting forest produce. However, as they are being relocated in 
plain areas, they will lose their access to this key source of livelihood.
Tribal Land Issues and Forest Conflicts 
in Andhra Pradesh 
The submersion areas of the Polavaram Dam are recognized by the fifth 
schedule of the Indian Constitution and by the Integrated Tribal Development 
Agency as scheduled tribal and scheduled caste areas. This important factor 
not only signals that the areas have a unique system of agrarian relations, which 
is characterized by conflicts and disputes over land, but it also has significant 
implications for the modalities of compensation and resettlement granted to 
the affected people. 
Historically, agrarian relations in areas affected by the Polavaram Dam have 
been characterized by alienation of tribal land to people from the plains and 
the eviction of tribal peoples from forest areas. Land alienation has occurred as 
an outcome of the penetration of the market economy into the hills region, and 
of the creation of relationships of interdependence between tribal peoples and 
the plains people operating as traders, intermediaries, and moneylenders (Rao 
2006). In Andhra Pradesh “[t]he process of land alienation has manifested itself 
mainly in large-scale migration of tribal communities from fertile plain areas to 
the neighboring forests. The structural changes occurring in the plain areas 
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have been responsible for this shift […]. These changes introduced rapid 
capital penetration, irrigation facilities, railway and communication facilities, 
sale and purchase of lands and creation of certain land systems like Zamindari, 
Ryotwari systems, etc.” (Rupavath 2009, 4). 
Processes of land alienation have progressively forced tribal peoples deeper 
into forest areas. Furthermore, tribal peoples’ customary rights to forestland 
have been put at stake by the state through the reservation of large forest tracts 
as state property, with the restriction of access to forests and forest produce 
collection, and the allocation of such land for logging and commercialization of 
forest produce (Saravanan 2009). 
Nowadays, podu (shifting cultivation) in Andhra Pradesh State is declared 
illegal and considered a form of forest encroachment by the Forest Department 
(Reddy et al. 2004). The takeover of control and management of forest and 
forest resources was initiated by the British administration and followed up by 
the Government of India, mainly through environmental legislation and forest 
conservation policies (Gadgil and Guha 1992). From the 19th century, forestry 
has been considered a distinct land use system. Blaming sifting cultivation 
for degradation of soils, and tribal populations for the retreat of the forest 
cover, further restrictions have been imposed on forest use in the name of 
environmental protection.
The post-independence policies on forest use have maintained the colonial 
focus on the productive and profit-making aspects of forest management, 
mainly to subsidize industry. For instance, the Forest Policy of 1952 aimed 
primarily at increasing state revenues, earmarking the production of timber for 
the use in industries, railways, markets, exports, and defense needs. These 
uses superseded the domestic and agricultural needs of local people (Reddy 
et al. 2004). Only at the end of the 1980s, with the National Forest Policy of 
1988, was tribal peoples’ dependence on forests legally recognized. Since 
then, the government has designed policies to safeguard customary rights 
and well-being of tribal people (Rao 2006; Saravan 2009). Tribal peoples have 
been allowed through joint forest management programs to use forestland in a 
limited way. These exceptions were codified in the Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006.
As a measure to make up for the injustice suffered by tribals over the centuries 
through land alienation and forest eviction, the Government of Andhra Pradesh 
enacted stringent laws prohibiting the alienation of tribal land to nontribals. 
The Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation of 1959 (as 
amended in 1970) prohibits nontribals from purchasing land from tribals in 
areas declared under the fifth schedule of the Constitution. The presumption 
is that all land in scheduled areas originally belonged to scheduled tribes. 
This legislative measure has important consequences for land compensation 
in the Polavaram Dam areas. The Polavaram R&R package includes land-for-
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land compensation only for displaced tribal households, whereas nontribals 
(scheduled castes and other castes) are offered cash for land lost to the 
project. The rationale for the policy is derived from the assumption that only 
tribal peoples are entitled to own land, and therefore only they are entitled 
to land-for-land compensation at resettlement sites. It is also implied that all 
other households own land “illegally,” and therefore are entitled only to cash 
compensation. This preferential treatment is aimed at reestablishing social 
justice for tribal peoples who suffered discrimination over many centuries. 
However, this measure will have the undesirable effect increasing landlessness 
among nontribal households, particularly among scheduled caste households.. 
Methods of Data Collection 
This chapter is based on the findings of my fieldwork conducted in the 
Polavaram Dam affected area in 2009. One of the main aims of the fieldwork 
was to identify the sources of livelihood of the affected communities and to elicit 
their preferred forms of compensation and relocation. The data were collected 
using a household survey, a choice experiment, and focus group discussions. 
1. Household Survey
The household survey included 167 households belonging to 15 villages that will 
be submerged by the Polavaram Dam. The sample was constructed to replicate 
as closely as possible the social composition of the affected population. Thus, 
56% of sample households belonged to scheduled tribes, 25% to scheduled 
caste, 9% to backward castes, and 10% to other castes (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Key Characteristics of the Sample Population
Social Composition (%)
Share of Landless 
Families (%)
Share of Families 
Collecting Forest 
Produce (%)
Literacy 
Rate
(%)
56 scheduled tribes
25 scheduled castes
9 backward castes
10 other castes
46 79 75
Households Engaged in 
Agricultural Wage Labor 
(%)
Small and Marginal 
Farmers (%)
Households with 
Agriculture as Main 
Source of Income (%)
61 74 14
Source: Sample survey, 2009.
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The survey found that the majority of the households were engaged in agriculture. 
Only 14% of them had employment other than farming or agricultural wage labor. 
Landlessness was also very high, with 46% of the sample households owning no 
land. The two supplementary livelihood strategies that most sample households 
adopted were agricultural wage labor (61%) and collection of forest produce (79%). 
2. The Choice Experiment
Choice experiment is a methodology developed in experimental and behavioral 
economics to elicit people’s preferences for nonmarket goods and estimate 
the value of such goods. In a choice experiment, a participant is asked to 
choose their favorite from different varieties of the same good to ascertain 
the participant’s preferences for the attributes of the good (rather than for the 
good itself). If one of the goods offered includes among its attributes monetary 
compensation for the different level of the other attribute(s) that characterizes 
that version of the good, the researcher is able to estimate the marginal rate 
of substitution between attributes, and to attach a value to each of them. A 
consultation exercise based on the choice experiment methodology was used 
to investigate the attitudes of the affected people of the Polavaram Dam toward 
different types of compensation and resettlement. The rationale for using a choice 
experiment was that if the resettlement package is the good to be investigated, 
and the different benefits granted by it are the attributes to be evaluated, a 
choice experiment can help identifying the affected people’s favorite forms of 
compensation and modalities of relocation, thereby contributing to the design 
of more efficient resettlement programs.
Choice experiments are typically grounded in a consumer utility model and rest 
on the assumption that preferences behave as postulated by rational choice 
theory. By contrast, the choice experiment of this case study does not assume 
rational preferences and does not attribute to them a normative status. The 
preferences expressed by the respondents are not grounded in a utility model 
and are simply taken to indicate what aspects of their lives people value and 
for which they should be compensated. In this sense, the choice experiment is 
employed as a method for systematic and direct consultation with the affected 
people (Mariotti 2012). The advantage of using the blueprint offered by choice 
experiments for systematic consultation with displaced people is twofold. First, 
it can reveal what are the attributes of a resettlement program that are more 
likely to be acceptable to the displaced households. Second, it can also bring 
to the surface resettlement-related issues that might otherwise remain hidden.
The choice experiment in Polavaram was applied to the same 167 respondents 
who participated in the household survey. Each respondent was asked to make a 
sequence of choices among different kinds of hypothetical resettlement packages. 
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Each package was represented by a set of attributes (different types of compensation 
and relocation), so that by choosing a particular package, the respondent was 
expressing his or her preference for one or more attribute. The exercises were 
conducted with the help of visual tools: each package was represented by a card 
and each card contained images portraying an attribute of the package (e.g., a house 
to represent housing facilities provided by the government). This made it easier to 
explain the characteristics of and the differences among different R&R packages.
The Polavaram R&R package that was offered by the state government to the 
displaced people was taken as a benchmark to design six different hypothetical 
R&R packages used in the choice experiment (described below). It is marked 
as Package I. The other five packages are:
Package II—Access to Forest: It offered no cash compensation, but provided 
relocation in a place similar to the original village, and in particular close to the 
forest and a river. This package aimed to replicate the conditions in which the 
affected people are living at the moment. 
Package III—Cash Compensation: A household is offered only cash as 
compensation for the loss of land, housing, access to forest and river, and loss 
of livelihood. It was assumed that the government would provide a relocation 
site and supply it with basic facilities, but without housing assistance. 
Package IV—Land-for-Land: The package resembles the one offered by the 
government. It included housing at a relocation site, cash compensation for 
the loss of access to forest and river, and land-for-land compensation. It differs 
from the government’s package as it provides land-for-land compensation 
to each affected landowning household, irrespective of its social status, i.e., 
membership of a scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other castes.
Package V—Self-Employment: It offered each affected household cash 
compensation for lost land; housing; cash compensation for the loss of access 
to forest and river; and training and technical and financial assistance to start 
self-employment, such as a petty business, carpentry, or a tailor shop. The 
rationale of this package was to offer the possibility of abandoning farming and 
to move to nonfarm self-employment. 
Package VI—Compensation in Installments: It offered the same compensation 
as Package III, but with higher cash compensation. However, the payment of 
cash compensation was divided into 10 installments and paid over a period of 
5 years. The rational for offering this package was to check whether households, 
when given an opportunity, would opt for a (larger) flow of income that lasts for 
a longer period, rather than for a bulk payment that is likely to be exhausted by 
the time resettlement takes place.
One of main objectives of the choice experiment was to observe the trade-offs 
in the preferences for a resettlement package consisting of the maintenance 
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of the status quo (Package II—Access to Forest) compared with resettlement 
packages that led to significant changes in at least one aspect of people’s lives. 
For this purpose, the experiment consisted of three exercises. In the first exercise, 
respondents were asked to make a sequence of binary choices, where the choice 
was between Package II and each of the other packages. Table 6.3 shows the 
results of the first exercise. It is evident that Package II was the preferred option in 
the majority of cases, regardless of the alternatives offered—cash compensation, 
housing and land compensation, or self-employment.
Table 6.3 Results of the Choice Experiment, Exercise 1
Item
Choice Presented to the Respondent
Package II—
Access to Forest, 
or Package 
III—Cash 
Compensation
Package II—
Access to Forest, 
or Package IV—
Land-for-Land
Package II—
Access to Forest, 
or Package V— 
Self-Employment
Number and share of 
respondents who preferred 
Package II—Access to Forest 
143 (86%) 136 (81%) 126 (75%)
Number and share of 
respondents who preferred 
the alternative package 
27 (14%) 31 (19%) 41 (25%)
Source: Fieldwork notes, 2009.
In the second exercise, respondents were asked to rank four packages (II, 
III, IV, and V) in order of preference. The aim of this exercise was to double-
check the preferences expressed in the first exercise, making the respondents 
reflect more deeply on the options. The results confirmed the findings of the 
first exercise (Table 6.4). From a total of 166 answers, Package II appears 133 
times in first place (the most preferred option), 9 times in second place, 2 times 
in third place, and 22 times as the least preferred option.
Table 6.4 Summary of Ranking Results, Exercise 2
Rank
Package II 
—Access to 
Forest
Package III 
—Cash 
Compensation
Package IV— 
Land-for-Land
Package V 
—Self-
Employment Total
First 133 20 4 9 166
Second 9 4 126 27 166
Third 2 32 28 104 166
Fourth 22 110 8 26 166
Total 166 166 166 166
Source: Fieldwork notes, 2009.
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A third exercise was also implemented in which respondents were asked to 
choose between Package IV (Land-for-Land) and Package VI (Compensation 
in Installments). A significant number of respondents preferred Package IV, 
indicating their dislike of receiving compensation in installments.
3. Focus Group Discussions
The choice experiment was complemented with focus group discussions 
conducted in eight project-affected village communities. The discussion took 
place at the village’s collective space where village meetings are normally 
held, typically under a tree or at the village temple or shrine. Participation in the 
discussion was voluntary and no limit was set to the number of people who could 
join in. The conversation was held by one of the research assistants in Telugu.
Four focus group discussions were conducted before the choice experiment 
was started with the purpose of obtaining information useful to the design of 
the resettlement packages to be included in the choice experiment. The other 
four focus groups were held in four of the villages where the choice experiment 
and the household survey had already been conducted. These ex post focus 
group discussions had two objectives: first, to investigate thoroughly how the 
issues of displacement, resettlement, and compensation are perceived by the 
affected people; and second, to recheck the information collected through 
the household survey and also to test whether collective preferences differed 
from individual preferences for resettlement packages. Two types of questions 
were discussed with the participants of focused groups: the first type focused 
on what they wanted and what deemed to be fair compensation for being 
displaced; and the second focused on participants’ subjective evaluation of 
costs and benefits of displacement and relocation. 
The choice experiment, complemented by the household survey and the focus 
group discussions, helped to collect information on the characteristics of 
the resettlement package preferred by the affected people. It also helped to 
understand how the processes of displacement and resettlement are perceived 
by those affected by them. 
Limits of Cash Compensation: 
Money Does Not Buy New Livelihoods
The aim of the Polavaram R&R package is to restore the losses borne by 
the affected people as a consequence of displacement. In this regard, the 
designers of the package adopted cash compensation as the most important 
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device to achieve this objective. Cash compensation for lost land and property 
provides the freedom for affected people to use cash according to their 
own preferences, without any influence from outside, especially from project 
authorities. With money, they are free to replace what has been lost or to use 
it for different purposes. However, constraints exist that limit this freedom. 
These constraints operate at three levels: access to markets, land prices, and 
consumption and saving. 
1. Access to Market
Affected households might not have access to markets to buy assets to replace 
what they lost. Sometimes, markets do not exist. This is particularly true of land. 
If land is scarce in the resettlement area or the land market is interlocked with 
the credit market and both are shaped by power and exploitative relationships, 
it is difficult for a displaced household to buy land of equal size and quality at 
or near a resettlement site. 
2. Land Prices 
Accessibility to land market becomes irrelevant if the compensation received 
for lost land is below the market price. This happens when land compensation 
is estimated at the price of land in the displacement area instead of the 
resettlement area. Often, the market in the resettlement area is more developed 
than that in the displacement area, and prices are higher. This limits the 
resettlers’ ability to repurchase land after relocation. 
Indeed, this was the experience of the displaced people of the Polavaram 
Dam Project. The estimated price of a hectare of land calculated in the 
Polavaram R&R package was four to five times less than the market price of 
land in the resettlement area. This means that many nontribal small farmers 
who owned a few hectares of land became landless when resettled, as their 
land compensation was insufficient to repurchase even the minimum amount 
of land a household needed to earn a living in the resettlement area. For 
example, a displaced household received Rs201,250 as compensation for 
1.75 acres of land at the compensation rate of Rs115,000 per acre. However, 
in the resettlement area the land value was Rs500,000 per acre; so with the 
compensation, the displaced household could buy only 0.4 acres of land. 
Another displaced household received Rs618,000 for 6.0 acres of land. With 
this compensation, it could buy only 1.2 acres in the resettlement area. This 
means that the small farmer household (owning 6 acres of land) in the pre-
displacement phase of the project has become a marginal farmer household 
(i.e., owing less than 5 acres of land). At the same time, nontribal big farmers, 
although disappointed over the unfair and inadequate prices received for their 
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land, gained by losing land to the project. This was because the package gave 
them an opportunity to get some compensation for the land for which they 
did not have titles. The loss of land therefore did not significantly affect their 
livelihood, as in most cases they own land in other locations as well.
3. Consumption and Savings
The use of cash compensation by the affected households is also influenced by 
the fact that often they have a limited engagement with the monetized economy, 
and do not have experience in transacting with outsiders using significant 
amounts of money. Poor displaced households holding large amounts of 
money for the first time usually use the money for daily household needs and 
the repayment of an outstanding debt, or to give a dowry to a daughter. Some 
particularly unlucky households may spend all of their compensation on the 
health expenses of a household member and eventually on his or her funeral. 
In Polavaram, of 167 households interviewed, 46 (32%) had already received 
some cash compensation either for the land parcel and the dwelling lost or as 
allowances for lost wages. Table 6.5 lists the ways in which the compensation 
money was used (or was going to be used) by the interviewed households. 
Only a very small number of households indicated that they were using 
compensation for productive purposes, such as the purchase of land or cattle. 
The majority used the money for consumption needs and social expenses.
Table 6.5 Use of Cash Compensation by Households Affected by the Polavaram Dam 
Use of Cash Compensation 
Number of 
Households
Use of Cash 
Compensation
Number of 
Households
Deposit in commercial bank 31 Children’s education 2
General everyday expenses 13 Health expenses 2
House purchase or construction 8 Purchase of land 2
Dowry or wedding ceremony 6 Purchase of cattle 2
Redistribution of money among 
household members 3 Investment in agriculture 1
Purchase of a motorbike 3 Loan repayment 1
Source: Fieldwork notes, 2009.
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Perceptions of Displaced Households 
on Cash Compensation 
A key finding of the household survey is that cash compensation for the land 
lost to the project is not sufficient to buy sufficient land in the resettlement 
area. There is also significant evidence that most of the households used the 
compensation for household consumption and social expenses, and very little 
on productive investments (Table 6.5). 
These findings are consistent with the results of the focus group discussions on 
the fairness of land compensation and what kind and amount of compensation 
the participants considered satisfactory. In all the focus group discussions, 
some dissatisfaction was expressed by participants toward the amount 
of compensation that they had received. They thought that the government 
had not valued the acquired property correctly and as a result, they had not 
received what they should have as compensation. Land-for-land compensation, 
housing, relocation close to forests, and secure employment were considered 
to be integral elements of a fair compensation and R&R package.
The results of the focus group discussions also reaffirmed the findings of the 
choice experiment. When the participants of the choice experiment were asked 
to choose between the “status quo” package (Package II) and an “only cash 
compensation” package (Package III), only 14% of the 167 households preferred 
Package III (Table 6.3). In the ranking of preferences, Package III appears more 
often as the least preferred option (110 times out of 160) (Table 6.4).
The findings seem to point toward a generalized dislike and distrust of cash 
compensation among displaced households, and a clear preference among 
them for other forms of resettlement. In other words, cash compensation is 
welcomed as a transfer that increases consumption, but it is not perceived as 
a substitute for the lost sources of livelihood. 
Participants in the choice experiment also showed a strong preference for 
up-front and bulk payments. In the third exercise, only 9 of the 167 respondents 
(5%) chose Package VI—Compensation in Installments (which offered a higher 
amount of cash compensation paid in installments). This was motivated by 
the fact that many displaced households did not believe that the government 
would keep the promise of paying all five installments, or they feared that the 
government might “change its mind,” especially after the elections. 
It was stated earlier that the history of land alienation and forest eviction of tribal 
populations from forest areas has had some impact on the choice of land for 
acquisition and significant consequences for the modalities of compensation 
and outcomes of resettlement. This argument is supported by the findings of 
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this case study. As a result of centuries of abuse and neglect by the state, 
tribal peoples have developed a sense of distrust toward the state and its 
functionaries. In the eyes of the affected people, the state has no reputation 
of delivering benefits in due time to the poor and vulnerable and, on the 
contrary, it is the instigator of disruption of lives and livelihoods. As a result, 
they do not take the government’s promises of fair compensation and other 
rewards seriously. This diffidence toward the state also has the undesirable 
consequence of affecting the preferences of the displaced people for a given 
form of compensation. It might well be that cash compensation is disliked, 
and land-for-land compensation is preferred not because land-for-land 
compensation is indeed deemed more useful and fair than cash, but because 
it is perceived as more reliable and secure.
This discussion clearly shows that modalities of compensation and resettlement 
cannot be determined in a vacuum, as the effectiveness of each modality is the 
result of the interplay of the agents involved. If the affected households are 
inclined not to believe the state’s promises, they are less likely to cooperate 
with the project personnel in implementing the resettlement process by readily 
handing over their land and other assets to the project. Instead, they resist 
any such demobilization of existing assets and try to hold on to them until 
compensation is paid for the lost assets.  
Methodological Issues of Cash Compensation 
To complete the discussion on the limitations of cash compensation, the 
methodological implications of its extensive use need also to be considered. 
Cash compensation entails estimating the value of the affected household’s 
losses. Such valuation is done by the state and project personnel at their own 
discretion. They decide what kind of losses can be compensated and at what 
rate. As a result, the risk of subjectivity and variability of rates is likely to be 
high. The affected households are excluded from the process and are aware of 
the unpredictability of its results. National safeguard policies and international 
guidelines on good practices attempt to minimize such risks. But even if project 
authorities adhere to them, a significant level of variability and randomness is 
left in the estimation of the value of the losses incurred by affected households.
Estimation of the value of lost properties can be problematic. This is especially 
true when there are no land markets to obtain base prices of such properties to 
determine compensation. The Polavaram Dam Project will uproot the affected 
tribal households from forest areas, which is their traditional environment and 
the catalyst of their spiritual, cultural, and social life. Attributing a monetary 
value to this loss is not feasible, and probably not even desirable. 
Even if the compensation is fair and sufficient to buy land and other productive 
assets elsewhere, the reconstruction of a new livelihood at a new location will 
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need resources other than money. Personal skills and institutional support are 
needed to invest in income-generating activities. If training and institutions 
are not provided, cash compensation, even if fair and sufficient, runs the 
risk of being used to meet consumption expenditure, without contributing to 
the restoration of lost livelihoods. In the long term, this implies increase in 
vulnerability, joblessness, landlessness, and poverty.
Land-for-Land Compensation:  
A Better Alternative to Cash for Land?
Agriculture is the main source of livelihood of the affected population of the 
Polavaram Dam Project. Physical displacement arising from land acquisition 
will directly impact their main livelihood: land cultivation. This applies to 
affected landless households, too, as they work as wage laborers on their 
neighbors’ land.
The purpose of land-for-land compensation is to restore the disrupted 
livelihoods. However, in Polavaram, land compensation neither provides a 
fair restitution of what has been lost nor helps regenerating lost livelihoods. 
Three sets of factors influence the capacity of land-for-land compensation to 
restore the disrupted livelihoods. The first relates to the entrenchment of land 
compensation with preexisting land conflicts and the insufficiency of the price 
paid for the expropriated land. The second depends on whether the modality 
of land-for-land compensation reflects the preference of the affected people. A 
third set of factors is related to the quality of the land provided as compensation. 
1. Entrenchment with Issues of Agrarian Relations 
Land compensation in Polavaram is made particularly problematic by the 
processes of tribal land alienation to outsiders and eviction of tribal peoples from 
forest areas, which historically have vexed the affected area and population. 
As discussed earlier, in conformity with the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area 
Land Transfer Regulations, the Polavaram R&R package grants land-for-land 
compensation to scheduled tribes and cash-for-land compensation to all other 
groups. Land-for-land compensation is not given to nontribal households on 
the assumption that they illegally occupy tribal land recognized by the fifth 
schedule of the Indian Constitution. Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that 
nontribal landowners who lost land to the project would buy land outside the 
scheduled areas using the cash received as compensation for land losses. 
However, two major constraints limit the success of this policy. First, most 
villages will be resettled in colonies in Fifth Schedule Areas. This is to avoid 
tribal peoples losing the special rights and safeguards that they enjoy in Fifth 
Schedule Areas as a consequence of displacement. The implication, however, 
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is that households from scheduled castes and other castes living in the same 
village will be relocated in an area where they are not supposed to own land. 
Of course, they are free to leave the community and move out of the Fifth 
Schedule Area, but this option is not even contemplated as such a movement 
is often too risky and costly. 
The second constraint is that even if nontribal households were willing to 
purchase land outside Fifth Schedule Areas, they could not do so because the 
cash compensation received is not sufficient to buy land in the resettlement area. 
As a result of displacement and the provision of land-for-land compensation 
only to tribal households, landlessness will continue to increase among the 
non-tribal displaced households. If alternative employment opportunities are 
lacking, most of them will join the cadres of casual wage laborers and become 
even more vulnerable and marginalized.
2. Displaced Households and Preference 
  for Land-for-Land Compensation
The choice experiment used a hypothetical R&R package (Package IV—Land-
for-Land) resembling the package effectively offered by the government, 
including a relocation site, housing, some cash compensation for the loss of 
access to forest and river, and land compensation. However, it differed from 
the government package as it offered land-for-land compensation to every 
family irrespective of their social group—i.e., to both tribal and nontribal 
households. In the ranking exercise, the land-for-land package was chosen as 
the second-most-favored option (after Access to Forest) by 126 (76%) of the 
166 households surveyed. Similarly, when asked to indicate the elements of 
a fair compensation package, all the focus groups consultations pointed out 
that land-for-land compensation was a key element of any fair R&R package. 
This strongly suggests that, in Polavaram, land is still considered as the main 
productive asset by most households and that the expropriation of this asset 
is perceived as an injustice that can only be alleviated by providing alternative 
land of similar quality and size.
3. Quality of Land
The quality of the land distributed under the land-for-land compensation 
modality and the distance between resettlement colonies and farming sites 
directly affect people’s livelihoods and therefore also influence the land 
recipients’ views about the resettlement process. In Polavaram, some displaced 
households who had already received land or had been shown their allotments 
at the resettlement sites reported that the allocated land is of low quality or 
far away from the resettlement colony. During the focus group discussions, 
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affected households of Sirvaca village reported that the authorities had shown 
them their new land, and they had found it to be unsuitable for farming because 
it is sandy. 
Low-quality land cannot be cultivated immediately upon arrival at resettlement 
areas. Time and inputs are required to prepare such land for cultivation. 
This delays the restoration of the disrupted livelihood thereby increasing the 
household’s vulnerability. The resettler households of the village of Devaragundi 
will have to walk 5 kilometers to reach the allocated agricultural land. The 
households pointed out that walking this distance will be a waste of their time 
and money, and that before displacement they owned fertile land with irrigation 
water. Their farms were only a few meters away from their dwelling and, as a 
result, they did not spend time on walking or money on hiring transport to go 
to work.
Conclusion
The chapter has examined the structural factors that make the resettlement 
process problematic in the Polavaram Dam Project in Andhra Pradesh, using 
the results of a household survey, a choice experiment, and focus group 
discussions conducted with the affected population. The discussion has 
focused on the social composition of the affected population, their sources of 
livelihood, and the historical context of agrarian relations. It also examined the 
main shortcomings of the two forms of compensation adopted in the Polavaram 
R&R package: cash-for-land and land-for-land. 
The main finding was that the cash-for-land and land-for-land compensation 
modalities used in the Polavaram Dam Project are unlikely to meet the R&R 
objectives of preventing further impoverishment and enabling the restoration of 
livelihoods disrupted by displacement and relocation processes.
It also found that cash compensation can be arbitrary, as the estimation of 
the value of land and other properties is made by government officials without 
consultation with the affected persons and without paying sufficient attention 
to the replacement cost of land and other physical assets. In Polavaram, the 
compensation rates for land were below the price of land at the resettlement 
sites, making it impossible for the displaced households to purchase land 
of equal quality and size after relocation. Moreover, many households are 
compelled by their poverty to use the cash compensation to satisfy daily 
household needs, compromising their ability to make productive investments 
after relocation. It was also found that many affected people do not believe that 
the government will pay all the compensation due to them. This distrust toward 
the government leads them to prefer smaller amounts of compensation paid 
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in bulk to higher amounts paid in installments. It also prevents the creation of a 
climate of cooperation in resettlement operations.
The study found that the modalities and outcomes of land compensation 
are affected by preexisting agrarian relations and conflicts over land. The 
Polavaram R&R package attempts to correct the injustice historically endured 
by tribal communities by granting land-for-land compensation only to displaced 
tribal households. However, in so doing it harms small and marginal farmers 
belonging to scheduled, backward, or other castes, increasing their risk of 
landlessness after relocation.
Overall, the Polavaram Dam Project demonstrates that compensation in cash 
or land alone does not guarantee an efficient and fair form of restoration and 
rehabilitation of income sources and livelihoods of displaced households. On the 
basis of these findings, some recommendations for improving compensation 
and resettlement programs are listed below: 
First, cash compensation must be paid at replacement cost for all acquired 
land and other properties. The calculation of replacement cost should be fair 
and transparent, and the money should be paid promptly and predictably 
so that resettlers can plan their investments at resettlement sites, particularly 
in productive sources such as land, business, and education. This would 
help stabilize affected households’ income flow, allowing them to plan 
consumption and investments, and it would increase their trust in the 
government. 
Second, land-for-land compensation should be pursued as much as possible 
in resettlement planning and implementation. Such planning should be based 
on a thorough understanding of the socioeconomic conditions of the affected 
households, and the nature of their interaction and sources of conflict and 
cooperation among the communities. Resettlement planning should not 
aggravate existing inequalities but should attenuate such inequalities to guard 
against further impoverishment of resettlers. 
Third, when land-for-land compensation is not feasible, the replacement cost 
of all acquired property should be calculated by following good governance 
practices such as including all affected households regardless of ownership of 
land in the category of eligible displaced households. 
Finally, any resettlement program should be combined with comprehensive 
income restoration and improvement interventions to tackle the risks of 
landlessness and unemployment. This could be done by establishing a 
connection between the resettlement program and programs for current 
employment generation in the resettlement area. Indeed, linking resettlement 
to employment creation would truly contribute to making resettlement a 
progressive process that opens up development opportunities to all project-
affected households.
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APPENDIX
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION PACKAGE FOR AGRICULTURAL LABORER/
FARMER IN POLAVARAM MANDAL IN WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT (Rs)
Item
Tribal Nontribal
Agricultural 
laborers Farmers
Agricultural 
laborers Farmers
Free house site, all categories 
of PAF
202 m2 202 m2 202 m2 202 m2
Grant for house construction 
(BPL families only)
50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Grant for construction of sanitary 
toilets (BPL families only)
3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Grant of cattle shed (all PAFs) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Grant of transporting material 
(all PAFs)
5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Minimum agricultural wages of 
625 days @ Rs80 per day (all PAFs)
50,000 0 50,000 0
Subsistence allowance of  
240 days @ Rs80 per day  
(all project-displaced families)
19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200
Additional allowance of 500 days @ 
Rs80 per day as compensation for 
loss of customary rights and usage 
of forest produce 
40,000 40,000 0 0
Financial assistance equivalent to 
750 days of minimum agricultural 
wage @ Rs80 per day 
0 0 0 60,000
Total 170,200 120,200 130,200 140,200
BPL = below poverty line, m2 = square meter, PAF = project-affected family. 
Source: Resettlement and rehabilitation details of Indira Sagar (Polavaram) Project as at 5 June 2009.
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Improving Livelihoods 
among the Urban 
Displaced: Lessons from 
Mumbai, India
by Dolores Koenig
M any cities in developing countries are facing dramatic growth, estimated at 2.20% per year in Asia during 2000–2030 (UN-HABITAT 2007, 337). This is partly because of natural population increase, but cities also 
attract migrants because they are “engines of national economic growth” (ADB 
2006, 3). Some city governments have tried to plan for rapid urban growth, but 
most do not have sufficient infrastructure to become the modern “global” cities 
they desire to be. Nor do they have enough regularized residential areas for 
new immigrants; thus, new residents typically move to neighborhoods that lack 
basic services and adequate housing, commonly known as slums. In 2001, 
approximately 38% of the residents of the entire Mumbai metropolitan area 
lived in areas considered slums.1 Within Greater Mumbai (the original island 
city and its suburbs), there is an even greater concentration of slums, with an 
estimated 54% of its inhabitants living in such neighborhoods (Mahendra et al., 
unpublished, p. 9).
To address problems of inadequate infrastructure and slums, urban 
administrations have planned and undertaken programs of urban development 
and neighborhood rehabilitation. These include transport such as roads, rail, 
and rapid transit; sanitary infrastructure such as water and sewerage; and 
electricity. Health and education services, both basic and high-end, have also 
been targeted to attract major economic investments. To create a positive 
1 Slums are areas “with one or more of the following conditions: inadequate drinking water; 
inadequate sanitation; poor structural quality/durability of housing; overcrowding; and insecurity 
of tenure” (UN-HABITAT 2007, 334). 
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urban image while reducing poverty and improving the lives of poorer residents, 
governments have also implemented programs to regularize and bring services 
to slum areas.
These efforts improve city infrastructure and services, but they also displace 
many urban residents. Those who live in the path of new transport initiatives 
and other infrastructure must move. Although slum rehabilitation projects target 
the existing residents, many are displaced, either because they can no longer 
afford to live in improved areas or because the regularized neighborhoods 
house fewer residents.
This chapter focuses on the outcomes for residents displaced by these urban 
development initiatives. It asks whether they been able to reconstruct and improve 
their livelihoods—a major objective of involuntary resettlement safeguards. In 
Mumbai, for example, the evidence suggests that those displaced by urban 
development projects often become impoverished because the projects do not 
pay sufficient attention to livelihoods.
This chapter first presents an overview of growth and development in Mumbai 
and discusses the kinds of displacement that have occurred. Second, it looks 
at the safeguard policies that have been instrumental in framing interventions to 
assist the displaced and resettled. Then, it considers the outcomes of projects 
in Mumbai in terms of the policy goals of the right to resettlement, reconstruction 
of housing and neighborhoods, and livelihood restoration and improvement. 
Because many resettled households face impoverishment, the next section 
focuses on issues important to livelihood improvement, including social class 
differentiation, the constraints of informal sector occupations, and the challenge 
of reconstructing livelihoods for providers of goods. The conclusion discusses 
ways that urban projects could better restore and improve urban livelihoods 
through a more direct focus on livelihood reconstruction.
Development and Growth in Mumbai
The Mumbai Metropolitan Region is one of the largest and most densely 
populated urban areas in the world (Table 7.1). Its population is still growing, 
although the growth rate has slowed since the 1970s when it was estimated at 
3.6% per year (Mahendra et al., unpublished, p. 16). The region includes Greater 
Mumbai, the new city of Navi Mumbai, and neighboring districts in Thane and 
Raigad (also known as Raigarh). Recent growth has been particularly marked 
in the outer districts of Thane and Raigad. Nevertheless, Greater Mumbai 
retains the vast majority of the population.
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Table 7.1 Population of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region
Population, 2011 18.4 milliona Greater Mumbai 63% in 2001b
Outer regions 37% in 2001b
Area 4,355 km2 b Greater Mumbai 777 km2 c
Outer regions 3,578 km2 b
Annual Population 
Growth, 1991–2001
2.7%b
Residents in Substandard 
Housing, 2003
8.5 milliond Slums 5.5 million– 
6.0 milliond
Pavement dwellers 1 milliond
Old, dilapidated rental units 2 milliond
km2 = square kilometer.
Sources: (a) Government of India. 2011. Provisional Population Totals, Census of India 2011: Cities Having 
Population 1 lakh and above; (b) Mahendra et al. Economic Growth of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (Draft). 
2006. The Urban Institute, Washington, DC. pp. 7–8; (c) Demographia. 2011. Demographica World Urban Areas 
(World Agglomerations). Seventh annual edition. Belleville; (d) P. Das. 2003. Slums: The Continuing Struggle 
for Housing. In S. Patel and J. Masselos, eds. Bombay and Mumbai: The City in Transition. p. 210. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press.
In this context of high density and rapid growth, life is difficult for all Mumbai 
residents. Interviewees said that almost no one had water 24 hours a day, 
and the situation is substantially more difficult in slums created after January 
1995 (Dimri 2010; Nair 2007).2 Traffic is congested and public transport, which 
carries more than 80% of commuters, is crowded. Trains designed for 2,000 
passengers carry 4,000–5,000, and buses and private cars move at an average 
speed of less than 10 kilometers (km) per hour during peak hours (Nallathiga 
2010). Almost everyone lives in tight living quarters, with most regularized 
housing in apartments in multistory buildings. As shown in Table 7.1, the 
situation is particularly acute for many poor of the city. The densely populated 
slums house more than half the population of Greater Mumbai on an estimated 
6% of its land. About half the slums are located on private land, a quarter on 
state government land, and another quarter on land owned by the municipal 
corporation (Das 2003, 210).
2 Slums created and residents who migrated to Mumbai after an official cut-off date have not 
been legally eligible for benefits or regularization. The most recent cut-off date was January 
1995, which replaced earlier dates, first 1976, then 1985 (Das 2003, 214). However, there has 
been ongoing discussion of extending the date, given the number of new immigrants since 
1995, and some large projects, such as Dharavi redevelopment, have used later dates, such 
as 2000. The state government, often as an elections approach, has attempted to change the 
cut-off date, although earlier efforts were overturned by the Supreme Court. In January 2012, 
the government announced that all who had lived in a structure for a year would be eligible for 
free housing in the case of redevelopment (Nair 2012).
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People tolerate the living conditions because of Mumbai’s booming economy 
and abundant jobs. The economy has grown substantially since 1991, when 
India adopted a policy of liberalization, which loosened the strict control of the 
government over development and economic growth. The private sector has 
taken a greater role in economic investment and has become a partner in social 
welfare initiatives, leading to substantial growth in private sector economic 
activity, both domestic and international. Directly after liberalization, the real 
earnings of workers grew, and the incomes of casual workers and those at the 
lower end of the hierarchy increased proportionately more (Deshpande and 
Deshpande 2003, 77). During 1998–2008, India as a whole saw annual average 
gross domestic product grow by 7.2% and average annual per capita by 5.6% 
(World Bank 2009). 
With liberalization, the economic structure of Mumbai’s economy has also 
changed. The importance of manufacturing has declined, and production 
facilities have moved from the city center to the periphery. Services have 
increased in importance, from 52.5% of gross domestic product during 1994–
1995 to 63.5% during 2003–2004 (Mahendra et al., unpublished, p. 2; see also 
Deshpande and Deshpande 2003). However, Mumbai’s economic growth 
has lagged that of smaller cities, such as Hyderabad and Bangalore, which 
have carved out new niches in the expanding global economy (Mahendra et 
al., unpublished). Thus, there are plans to increase the growth of the Mumbai 
region substantially and make it a world-class city attractive to international 
investment. The focus is on growth in finance, internet services, healthcare, 
media and entertainment as well as improvement in the quality of life of its 
citizens (Bombay First–McKinsey 2003; Mahendra et al., unpublished, p. 16).
The issue of who will benefit from the urban development needed for economic 
growth has been hotly debated. Even planning documents reflect the issue. 
Although Mahendra et al. (unpublished, p. 16) stressed the importance of 
“equitable participation in economic growth by all segments of society” and 
considered workforce development to be a necessary part of any development 
initiative, other planning documents emphasized the importance of creating 
upscale housing and retail that will attract “high-quality” talent (Bombay First-
McKinsey 2003, 15). For slum residents, the question is whether they are 
accepted as legitimate urban residents who contribute to the economic life of 
the city.
Growth and Displacement in Mumbai
Since 2001, multiple efforts have been taken to improve the city’s infrastructure 
through improved transport; the creation of growth centers such as the 
Bandra Kurla Complex; environment improvements; and initiatives to meet 
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the Millennium Development Goals of poverty alleviation and access to water, 
sanitation, and housing for all Mumbai residents (Mumbai Metropolitan Regional 
Development Authority 2011; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 2011). 
Both public and private sector actors have undertaken initiatives to increase 
economic growth and quality of life in the city. This process renders some areas 
more attractive, as they receive more services and better transport, facilities, 
and markets. Although the initiatives include efforts to improve and regularize 
slum areas so that people will have access to secure tenure and a full range 
of city services, the infrastructure and improvement projects also have the 
potential to displace people, by formally moving or informally coercing poorer 
residents to move to less attractive areas. Because of the high population 
density, any initiative that relocates people, even from a very small area, is likely 
to displace large numbers.
1. Formal Development and Resettlement Projects
Formal projects to relocate people consist of formal development projects and 
slum renovation initiatives. Formal development projects, which generally create 
new infrastructure, are usually well funded and large-scale, and are undertaken 
with state sponsorship. Recent projects include the Mumbai Urban Transport 
Project (MUTP) and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project (to improve road, 
rail, and traffic), the Mumbai Metro Rail, the Bandra–Worli Sea Link, and airport 
improvements.
These projects have and will displace large numbers of people. The official 
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority estimate is 35,000 
households, but this does not take into account future plans through 2020. 
Because these projects are often at least partly funded by international 
development agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the 
World Bank, they are subject to safeguard policies that frame planning, 
resettlement, and the allocation of benefits. Those resettled should have the 
best outcomes as the projects require benefits for all displaced households, 
including residents without formal tenure who are considered squatters or 
encroachers. 
Slum renovation projects aim to improve areas that do not meet urban standards 
for plot layout, road access, or service provision. Their focus is on improving 
the lives of the existing residents.3 In the past, international development 
organizations funded substantial slum renovation projects, but this is no longer 
the case. Thus, the State of Maharashtra has turned to the private sector as a 
major partner in slum renovation. Private developers rebuild slums in exchange 
for opportunities to build houses usually for the upper and upper-middle classes, 
3 See Das (2003, 211) for some of the initiatives undertaken in Mumbai.
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either on part of the redeveloped parcel or elsewhere in the city. Because slum 
renovation is rarely funded or guaranteed by international organizations, it is 
not subject to international policies, and instead falls under the policies and 
laws of India, Maharashtra State, and the municipality of Mumbai.
2. Other Resettlement and Development Efforts
Other efforts also relocate people, sometimes directly obligating them to 
move. For example, special economic zones (SEZs) for targeted economic 
development can acquire land for factories, offices, and worker housing. In rural 
areas, people often lose agricultural land (Sharma 2009). However, SEZs are 
also built on urban peripheries, such as the outer Mumbai metropolitan region, 
which includes some of the estimated 139 SEZs in Maharashtra State in 2008 
(Marpakwar 2008, 1). Moreover, planned future economic development, such 
as information technology parks in Navi Mumbai or Thane, or a biotechnology 
corridor between Mumbai and Pune, is likely to occur on the urban periphery 
(Kingsley et al. 2007, 33, 55).4 There is as yet little systematic study of the 
effects of urban-periphery SEZs on displacement of existing residential areas 
or businesses.
Other relocation occurs as a secondary consequence of economic development. 
Gentrification (refurbishment), usually of poor or working-class neighborhoods, 
with private capital is a primary example (Smith 1996, 32). City neighborhoods 
with new infrastructure or economic activity become more attractive, and those 
with the capacity to invest may develop these areas for new residences or 
commercial purposes, such as shopping malls. Formal development efforts, 
such as new roads, new residential neighborhoods in former slums, and new 
businesses and industries, may also make localities more attractive. These 
changes disproportionately benefit the more affluent. For example, in Bandra 
West, older building societies that own cooperative apartments have been 
solicited to sell by developers who want to build luxury apartments. Although 
gentrification may be considered a part of the natural process of urban growth, 
it incrementally forces poorer residents to move to less attractive areas.
Although much of the development that leads informally and secondarily 
to displacement of poorer residents depends on private investment, it is 
not independent of government action, since rezoning and new municipal 
infrastructure create opportunities for investment. These can lead to large-
scale gentrification. The reclassification of old textile factory areas, such as 
4 Despite the decline in the proportion of Mumbai’s gross domestic product generated by 
manufacturing, secondary sector activity is important and is expected to remain so. Much 
large-scale production is now on the urban periphery; in 2006, 69% of the value added in this 
sector came from enterprises in Thane, while 23% came from Greater Mumbai (Mahendra 
et al., unpublished, p. 50). 
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Lower Parel or Worli, from industrial to commercial and residential use allowed 
developers to build luxury housing and upscale retail establishments in the 
area. Former textile workers who still lived in substandard housing in the vicinity 
are now the target of redevelopment (Kamath 2010). There have been few 
studies of these processes in Mumbai, so little is known about the effects on 
the poor in terms of access to housing or employment, beyond the fact that 
they often move to less expensive areas on the urban periphery, where they 
face longer and more expensive commutes to existing jobs.5 A more in-depth 
understanding of urban displacement requires analysts to take into account 
displacement that occurs outside formal initiatives.
The safeguard policies of international organizations apply only when those 
organizations fund a formal project that involves relocation. They do not apply 
when funding is strictly from national government sources or the private sector, 
nor do they apply without a formal project or in cases of secondary relocation. 
In these instances, national laws on land acquisition, resettlement, zoning 
regulations, and social welfare policies affect how relocation and resettlement 
are carried out. Nevertheless, international organizations that set standards for 
resettlement and rehabilitation may have a positive effect on national thinking 
about the problems involved in forced resettlement and how to solve them 
(Cernea 2005).
Safeguard Policies and Standards of Living
Because displaced “people face impoverishment when their productive assets 
or income sources are lost” through development-caused forced resettlement 
(World Bank 2001, para 1), international development agencies have developed 
safeguard strategies to mitigate or avoid these losses. This section looks at the 
policies of ADB, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the World 
Bank (ADB 2009; IFC 2012; World Bank 2001).6 The main points of these 
policies are quite similar. They all intend to counteract the well-documented 
impoverishment brought about by forced resettlement that does not attend to 
the development of the displaced (Table 7.2).
5 But see the work done by PUKAR Editors’ Collective (2008) on the textile neighborhood of 
Girangaon. See also http://pukar.org.in/
6 The IFC policy discussed here is the new policy that came into force on 1 January 2012.
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Table 7.2 Summary of Basic Safeguards in Projects Requiring Resettlement
Basic Safeguards Sources
Minimize or avoid displacement ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 2[a]); 
IFC (2012, 1)
Improve or restore livelihoods of the 
displaced
ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 2[c]); 
IFC (2012, 2)
Attend to economic (loss of assets, 
income) and physical displacement 
(loss of homes, land)
ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 3[a]); 
IFC (2012, 1)
Create formal resettlement plan ADB (2009, 48); World Bank (2001, para 6);  
IFC (2012, 4)
Encourage negotiated settlements ADB (2009, 48); IFC (2012, 1)
Accent participation, consultation, 
communication with affected communities
ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 6[a]); 
IFC (2012, 3)
Include those without formal land tenure; 
distinction between recognized and 
nonrecognized rights to possession
ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 15); 
IFC (2012, 5)
Include vulnerable groups: landless, 
elderly, women and children, indigenous 
peoples, ethnic minorities
ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 8); 
IFC (2012, 3, 5)
Provide compensation at full 
replacement cost
ADB (2009, 45); World Bank (2001, para 6[a]); 
IFC (2012, 3)
Provide livelihood improvement strategies: 
locational advantage, productive 
potential, security of tenure, sustainable 
development programs
ADB (2009, 17, 46); World Bank (2001, paras 
2[b], 6[c]); IFC (2012, 6)
Include land-based asset replacement ADB (2009, 45); World Bank (2001, para 11); 
IFC (2012, 2)
Provide housing and community services ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, paras 6[b], 
13[b]); IFC (2012, 2, 5)
Establish cut-off date for eligibility ADB (2009, 45); World Bank (2001, para 16); 
IFC (2012, 4)
Form formal grievance mechanisms ADB (2009, 49); World Bank (2001, para 13[a]); 
IFC (2012, 4)
Share in benefits of project ADB (2009, 17); World Bank (2001, para 2[b]); 
IFC (2012, 3)
ADB = Asian Development Bank, IFC = International Finance Corporation.
Sources: ADB (2009); IFC (2012); World Bank (2001).
The explicit focus of all three policies is to avoid or minimize displacement if 
possible. If displacement is unavoidable, there should be a formal resettlement 
plan to restore or improve the livelihoods of the displaced, whether this 
displacement is physical or economic (loss of income, assets, or means of 
livelihoods without physical movement). All three policies (i) include households 
without formal land tenure, (ii) recommend compensation at replacement cost 
rather than market value, (iii) recognize the precarious position of the most 
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vulnerable, (iv) require formal grievance mechanisms to address problems 
of the displaced, and (v) encourage consultation and participation and the 
sharing of benefits generated by the larger development project that caused 
displacement. This section will discuss a few of the issues that are particularly 
problematic in urban resettlement projects.
Policies to mitigate the effects of involuntary resettlement were largely put 
into place to address the effects of dam construction projects, where large 
numbers of people were displaced from reservoir areas and suffered economic 
displacement in the affected watersheds. In this case, the affected households 
were usually rural residents and displacement left them without land or other 
natural resources to ensure their survival. These three international policies all 
show a strong rural bias, focusing on land as the primary productive resource. 
The resettlement plan should involve direct provision of replacement farmland, 
or, if that is impossible, compensation at full replacement cost.
The safeguard policies address the livelihoods of those who live from other than 
physical or natural resources—the situation of most urban residents—much 
less directly. The language of the IFC policy suggests that they may be ignored: 
“This Performance Standard…does not apply to impacts on livelihoods where 
the project is not changing the land use of the affected groups” (2012, 2). In 
cities, many residents earn their living from skills and social networks; physical 
displacement may disrupt these, but land use does not change.
Both the ADB and IFC policies address directly the situation of business 
owners with physical premises. They should receive replacement property of 
equal or higher value, with equivalent or better characteristics and advantages 
of location; they should get indemnities for net income lost during transition 
and the costs of transferring and reinstalling their plant, machinery, or other 
equipment (ADB 2009, 46; IFC 2012, 5). For nonbusiness owners, the ADB 
safeguard policy places more stress on income than the other two policies, 
requiring resettlement plans to include detailed measures for income 
restoration and livelihood improvement (2009, 48). Resettlement sites should 
have comparable access to employment opportunities, and transitional support 
could include employment (ADB 2009, 46). The World Bank policy discusses 
non-land-based options the least (2001, para 6[c]). It stresses the importance 
of executing resettlement as a development program that may include credit, 
training, or job opportunities. The lack of attention to the ways in which the 
urban displaced earn their living and the potential impact of resettlement on 
income-earning strategies has made it difficult for those resettled to reconstruct 
or improve their livelihoods. Thus, although the policies explicitly focus on 
livelihood improvement, the lack of discussion of strategies to reconstitute 
urban livelihoods makes it difficult to achieve this objective.
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All the policies include benefits for displaced residents without formal legal 
tenure. They require that those with recognized status, either through customary 
tenure or adverse possession, should receive compensation for the land they 
lose. In contrast, those with no recognizable legal right to the land they occupy 
should receive resettlement assistance, but do not have rights to land. Non-
land assets should be compensated, and the IFC notes explicitly that lost 
livelihoods should be restored and people should be resettled in sites with the 
possibility for security of tenure (2012, 2). Projects also should offer community 
services, better infrastructure, and improved housing. However, the status of 
urban residents is not always clear. National governments consider many of 
them to be squatters with few rights to benefits, although residents themselves 
often argue that they purchased or rented rights to occupy their land. Thus, the 
right to resettlement itself is often a point of contention.
These policies have improved the outcomes for the urban displaced, especially 
in regard to housing and community infrastructure. However, they still face a 
basic problem: lack of recognition that many urban livelihoods are based on 
access to skills and social networks rather than tangible assets, such as land, 
physical premises, or natural resources. Although these policies all prioritize the 
improvement or reconstruction of livelihoods, they discuss the reconstruction 
and restoration of tangible assets (land, infrastructure, and housing) to a 
greater extent. Projects themselves often have the same focus, as it is much 
easier to implement, monitor, and evaluate the restoration of tangible assets. 
Many urban resettlement projects therefore become housing projects, and 
livelihoods are forgotten.
The Outcomes for the Urban Displaced  
and Resettled
Throughout the world, the outcomes for the urban displaced and resettled are 
not good. Many become impoverished, because they cannot restore, much less 
improve, their livelihoods. This section looks at displacement and resettlement 
in Mumbai in terms of (i) the right to formal resettlement, (ii) the reconstruction 
of housing and neighborhood infrastructure, and (iii) livelihood reconstruction.
1. The Right to Resettlement with Development
The right to resettlement following displacement has not been systematically 
recognized in Mumbai. When a project is externally funded, the funder 
requires the organization receiving the funds to follow its safeguard policies, 
which, as noted, emphasize improvement or restoration of livelihoods and the 
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reestablishment of housing and neighborhood infrastructure in projects that 
include those without formal tenure. Although urban development initiatives 
that are not funded by international development agencies are not subject to 
the same policies, there have been some efforts to provide benefits, particularly 
housing, when large numbers are displaced. For example, the World Bank 
strategy in the MUTP has been used by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region 
Development Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai as a 
model to resettle those displaced by other projects. 
In contrast, when a project is smaller and funded internally by either the public 
or private sector, there are fewer benefits for the displaced. In these projects, 
displacement and resettlement are governed by national, state, and local laws, 
which are quite complex and sometimes contradictory. Many slum residents 
are technically squatters or encroachers without rights to live on their parcels. 
In theory, they simply can be evicted without benefits, yet because many slum 
dwellers are voters, they have political power and the politicians for whom they 
have voted may act in their interests. 
In general, older slums, where residents have often lived for several generations 
and invested in housing and businesses, are more likely to become recognized 
slums. At the same time, larger slums have more political power because of 
the number of their inhabitants. For example, the renovation of Dharavi, with 
its many occupants, contrasts with the experiences of smaller slums. Dharavi, 
originally on the northern margin of the city, but, with urban growth, now in 
central Mumbai, has become the target of a highly publicized slum renovation 
project. A large section was divided into five different redevelopment zones, 
each working with a different developer. Stakes are high because of the 
significant investment planned, but whether all the redevelopment laws will be 
respected and whether the new area will benefit existing residents has been 
debated (Patel and Arputham 2008; Arputham and Patel 2010). The experiences 
of smaller slums are less well documented, but they tend to face more difficulty 
getting redevelopment that benefits existing residents. Several interviewees 
talked about the problems of getting approvals for smaller projects done by 
NGOs or community groups, rather than with private for-profit developers 
(see also Das 2003, 217). In general, the larger the slum, the greater is its 
ability to negotiate for resettlement and rehabilitation benefits. However, these 
projects can become highly politicized and subject to corruption; developers 
may collude with influential residents to spur action or even use coercion to 
persuade people to move (Das 2003; Sharma 2009).
People in unregularized, unrecognized slums are more vulnerable to 
displacement, because they are often considered squatters or encroachers. 
In 2008, this viewpoint was reinforced by a judgment by the Supreme Court 
of India. Existing law had allowed adverse possession, which could include 
squatting, as a way to take over a property; the owner was given a stipulated 
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period of time to take back the house or land. The judgment noted that although 
the right to property is not a fundamental right, it is an important human right 
and the ousting of real property owners is a human rights violation (Mahapatra 
2008, 1). Although the relevance of this decision was not immediately clear for 
those who occupy public lands, it did potentially affect the many slums located 
on private land.
In Mumbai, this perspective also validates actions taken to demolish slums on 
public and private land and evict residents in recent years. Since 1997, at least 
50,000 families have been evicted from the Sanjay Gandhi National Park on 
the northern edge of Mumbai (Sachar and Daud 2000). Some 300,000 people 
were evicted from approximately 80,000 demolished houses in Mumbai during 
2004–2005 (UN-HABITAT 2007, 158 and 124). The outcomes for these people 
are unclear; some may be rehoused, but others simply go on to rebuild in other 
slums. In Mumbai, an estimated one-third of slum dwellers have been evicted 
from other areas (UN-HABITAT 2007, 158).
Those with the fewest rights are pavement dwellers, who build along the edges 
of roads, pavements, or railroads. The city center once had large numbers of 
pavement dwellers, but many have been relocated as part of urban improvement 
efforts. Peripheral areas of the city still have pavement dwellers. Usually, they 
receive few, if any, benefits when they are displaced, although those resettled 
as part of the MUTP were rehoused along with slums residents.
Overall, many people in Mumbai are displaced by development initiatives that 
do not take into account their right to resettlement with development, although 
some local laws and policies do require benefits for some residents, even those 
without legal tenure. Nevertheless, the resettlers that are most likely to receive 
benefits are those displaced by externally funded projects with safeguard 
policies. The following two subsections concentrate on these projects.
2. Reconstruction of Housing and Neighborhoods
The strongest aspect of current resettlement programs is the provision of 
housing and associated neighborhood infrastructure. This section discusses 
the relatively well studied MUTP, which was financed by the World Bank and 
subject to its 1990 involuntary resettlement policy. Because this project was 
based on known best practices, it should be expected to show the best 
outcomes. Indeed, an evaluation by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) 
recognized that this project, which adhered to international guidelines, showed 
better outcomes than many others projects involving displacements.
The MUTP required approximately 20,000 households in various areas of the 
city to relocate. Displaced residents were given new apartments in resettlement 
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areas at no cost. Even though the apartments were tiny (a standard 225 square 
feet), over 95% of households had more space than before (TISS 2008, 9). 
They also received other benefits, including assistance in creating cooperative 
housing societies and a fund whose interest was used to pay some required 
fees.
Because of the large number of displaced people, the MUTP had multiple 
resettlement areas. Some were in small, neighboring areas, where resettlers 
tended to be satisfied because they remained near to their existing jobs. Most, 
however, were moved to buildings with five to six stories in large tracts of land 
at a significant distance from their previous homes. Some moved to Vashi 
Nakka, a neighborhood with 33 buildings. Another site, Lallubhai Compound, 
had a similar number of buildings. These were both dense developments with 
numerous poor households. In any given neighborhood, residents came as a 
result of multiple projects; for example, residents at Mankhurd had been moved 
not only by the MUTP, but also by the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project and 
smaller municipal projects.
Finding sites with sufficient space to house large numbers of people within 
Greater Mumbai meant building in areas that were considered unattractive, 
and thus had smaller populations. Thus, Anik was located in a site that had 
previously been used for heavy industry and was reclassified from industrial use, 
raising the possibility of land contamination. Mankhurd was near the Deonar 
dump site for untreated municipal waste and some residents complained of air 
pollution (TISS 2008, 64).
The quality of the new buildings was poor. There were many cases of 
leaking pipes, caved-in ceilings, and walls with water damage (TISS 2008). 
The buildings were also very close together. The evaluation found distances 
between buildings “inadequate” at both Anik and Mankhurd (TISS 2008, 58, 
65). Although required by law to be sited at least 20 feet apart, the distance 
between the buildings was sometimes only 9–10 feet. People complained 
about darkness and lack of sunlight. Buildings with five stories did not have 
elevators, meaning a long walk up to the top floors. Buildings with seven 
stories had elevators, but these worked for only several hours in the morning 
and afternoon. The hallways were dark, with lights turned off during the day. 
Although the buildings had electricity, residents did not use it 24 hours a day, 
because the building society had to pay for the utilities.
Water provision has been a problem. At one site, water was not available during 
the first 2 years, and people received their water from trucks. By 2008, the water 
was connected, but people claimed they received water for less than 1 hour 
per day and sometimes went for several days without water. It was unclear 
what caused the problem; some said that it was because of reconstruction 
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of the water tanks, while others said that water bills were unpaid because of 
disagreement over rates.
Because the buildings were so close together, the open spaces surrounding 
them were generally inadequate for public events or children’s play (TISS 2008, 
58, 65). The few open areas were used heavily, turning to dirt in the dry season 
and mud when it rained. Given the environmental problems and the poor 
construction and upkeep, some residents considered these new communities 
to be vertical slums.
As noted, there have been some efforts to provide similar housing benefits to 
those displaced by other projects. Because these people are now often in the 
same neighborhoods, they suffer from the same deficiencies of neighborhood 
location, and since the buildings are similar, they may face some of the same 
construction problems. Nonetheless, compared to livelihood improvement and 
restoration, housing replacement and neighborhood infrastructure provision 
are a comparative success.
3. Livelihood Reconstruction and Improvement
Although livelihood improvement and restoration are the explicit objectives 
of international involuntary resettlement policies, they are seriously neglected 
by urban resettlement projects, which usually pay more attention to housing. 
The original MUTP design recognized explicitly the importance of restoring 
livelihoods (Government of Maharashtra 2000). The plan included transit 
passes for commuters for a period of time as well as livelihood compensation 
based on the previous year’s income if the resident lost a job (Government of 
Maharashtra 2000). However, at some point it was decided not to implement 
these two livelihood provisions. One interviewee claimed that there was 
also supposed to be a livelihood restoration fund with seed money for new 
businesses; this was implemented in the form of a women’s savings and 
income-generation program. However, the great majority of the displaced had 
to sustain their livelihoods without project assistance. 
In this context, many people complained about the difficulty of sustaining their 
standard of living, primarily because the distance to their old jobs increased 
the amount of time and money spent on travel. At worst, people lost jobs. 
Moreover, people faced increased expenses associated with their new 
residences. Nevertheless, the TISS found that the average household income 
increased after resettlement (2008). This was because of the booming Mumbai 
economy and because more family members were working (1.8 compared with 
1.3 before the resettlement) (TISS 2008).
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Women, business owners, and the unemployed were more seriously impacted. 
Many women lost their jobs. Before resettlement, many had worked as domestic 
servants and were able to earn adequate incomes by working for five or six 
different clients. This strategy was possible only when clients lived nearby; 
when they moved to resettlement areas with large settlements of former slum 
dwellers segregated from more affluent areas, there were fewer families to 
employ them. They could not continue with their earlier employers, because 
the distance between home and jobs compromised their ability to meet their 
domestic obligations. Business owners also found it difficult to continue their 
businesses, eventually bringing a grievance as a strategy to increase their 
compensation (World Bank Inspection Panel 2005).
The MUTP included people with few or no sources of regular income, such as 
abandoned widows, the handicapped, and the sick. Because these people 
often were unable to pay the new housing fees, they were the most likely to rent 
or sell their apartments. It is unclear to what extent the resettled were able to 
take advantage of existing federal or state government programs to assist the 
completely indigent.
Those affected by the MUTP also saw their social networks disrupted. Because 
people had to move some distance, they were cut off from networks with 
inhabitants in neighboring communities that did not move. Those whose 
work depended on these networks, such as domestic servants, had to find 
new income-earning strategies. Social networks inside the community, 
which can be used for solidarity and mutual assistance, were also disrupted. 
Although the MUTP tried to move neighborhoods together, and, indeed, many 
neighborhoods often relocated to a single site (TISS 2008), building residents 
usually came from different places. This led to obstacles in creating workable 
building societies. The new neighborhoods needed time to grow as social 
communities, and people had to learn to trust their neighbors.
Although people in the MUTP received better housing than before, they faced 
continuing livelihood problems, despite Mumbai’s growing economy. They 
also faced increased costs for the new housing, especially cooperative fees 
to maintain services such as electricity and water. Thus, they had to earn more 
than they had before simply to maintain living standards. Those who depended 
upon social networks found it more difficult to maintain income-earning 
strategies. Individual per capita incomes declined, although when multiple 
family members could work, this could fill the gap. This provided some short-
term benefit, but it risked compromising long-term economic growth if young 
people left school to go to work. Those who were able to keep their existing 
jobs generally faced more expensive and longer commutes. Both sites were 
served by some public transport—buses or trains, but queues were especially 
long at Anik, which relied on buses.
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In other projects, there is little to no information available about the restoration or 
improvement of livelihood. However, given the abundant literature on livelihood 
problems faced by the forcibly displaced, there is no reason to believe that their 
situation would have improved. As many have noted, livelihood restoration and 
improvement, so prominent in the policies, often disappear in urban projects 
that become housing projects (Koenig 2009). Even if the right to resettlement 
with development is recognized, housing is replaced, new neighborhood 
infrastructure is constructed and the ability of the displaced and resettled 
to maintain their standard of living is compromised because the need to 
reconstruct income and employment is rarely taken into account.
Improving Livelihood Outcomes  
for the Displaced and Resettled
Achieving better outcomes from urban forced resettlement projects requires 
more attention to livelihood reconstruction and improvement. However, 
“restoring the livelihoods of people displaced in urban areas is one of the 
most complex tasks in resettlement” (Agrawal 2003, 172). Urban livelihoods 
are diverse because urban populations themselves are very diverse. Residents 
use different kinds of resources and produce goods, services, and information. 
In contrast to a rural resettlement project, which might provide new land and 
agricultural extension, it is difficult if not impossible to offer a standardized 
income-earning package to the urban displaced. This section discusses 
the complexities of income improvement and restoration among the urban 
displaced and resettled through the lens of their diverse income-earning 
strategies. It pays particular attention to (i) social class and the assets available 
to a household, (ii) whether income-earning takes place in the formal or informal 
sector, and (iii) whether the occupation produces goods or provides services.
1.  Social Class, Access to Resources, and the Reconstruction  
of Livelihoods
Most of the displaced, whatever the project, have been residents of 
nonregularized areas. Outsiders may consider these areas to be homogeneously 
poor, but, because they house almost half the population of Mumbai, residents 
are quite diverse in terms of social class, occupation, education, economic 
resources, and status. Studies of slum settlements undertaken in the mid-1990s 
suggested little association between income and living standards among social 
classes (Swaminathan 2003). Many who lived in these neighborhoods were not 
poor, but upwardly mobile in terms of income and occupation (Swaminathan 
2003). Studies have consistently found that many who live in slums have 
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incomes above the poverty line—60%–70% in the 1980s and about 60% in 
the early 1990s. In a study of one slum settlement in 1993, per capita monthly 
incomes ranged widely, from 0 rupees to 3,000 rupees (Swaminathan 2003). 
While Swaminathan found the levels of income poverty in Mumbai “deeply 
disturbing” (2003, 85), resettlement planners need to recognize that many 
regularly employed working-class individuals live in slums because of the lack 
of decent and regularized housing.
Despite this diversity, many resettlement projects offer standard packages that 
poorly recognize the effects of these wealth differences on the reconstruction 
of livelihoods. Indeed, many resettlement projects appear to be planned with 
the average resident in mind—usually relatively poor, but working. Both the 
wealthier and the very poor are less well served by resettlement projects.
It is difficult to find systematic information on outcomes in Mumbai, but projects 
elsewhere have shown that many of the better off use compensation to move 
to neighborhoods other than the formal resettlement area (Koenig 2009). With 
greater social capital (networks and connections with the larger urban milieu), 
cultural capital (knowledge of their society and culture), and education to 
complement greater economic resources, they choose personalized solutions. 
From a policy point of view, this allows projects to concentrate on the needier 
members of the community, but resettlement communities may become poorer.
Some of those resettled by the MUTP were too poor to pay the cooperative 
housing fees required in their new apartments. These individuals might opt to 
rent or sell their units illegally (TISS 2008). In rural areas, the indigent may be 
cared for by kin and community; if resettlement conserves communities and 
their social capital, these people can make do. In urban communities, the links 
between kin and neighbors are usually less close, and some individuals have 
little, if any, social support. Many urban residents depend on institutional links 
to help them survive; in India these include state and federal social welfare 
programs and religious activities, such as feeding programs. It was not clear to 
what extent these institutional supports have been replaced in the resettlement 
sites. The truly poor should not be forgotten by resettlement programs; they 
are the vulnerable populations for which some safeguard policies, such as that 
of ADB, mandate improvement of livelihoods. For the elderly and chronically ill, 
projects may need to include social welfare benefits and facilitate the 
participation of resettled residents in existing schemes. Lacking these, projects 
may include their own social welfare benefits.
2. Informal Sector Occupations
Another major issue was the occupation of the displaced residents. One 
important difference was whether their occupation was in the formal or informal 
Reconstructing and Improving Livelihoods among the Urban Displaced: Lessons from Mumbai, India 143
sector and whether the individual was employee, employer, or individual 
entrepreneur. Formal employees who worked for individuals or enterprises 
outside the displacement zones were most likely to be able to conserve their 
occupations after resettlement. These individuals had primarily faced housing 
poverty rather than a lack of income or assets (Chaurasia 2007), a situation 
not uncommon in Mumbai, with its booming job market but notoriously bad 
housing market. For these people, a resettlement project that improves housing 
may indeed improve their standard of living. However, as noted, these people 
faced increased commuting costs and had new expenses to maintain housing. 
Thus, to maintain aspects of their livelihoods, such as the potential upward 
mobility of children through school achievement, they needed more income. 
For some MUTP resettlers, this necessitated sending more family members, 
usually youth, out to work.
Many people, however, worked in the informal sector rather than in formal 
occupations. The informal sector includes a great array of activities. People 
may be informal employees, subcontractors, or market vendors; or they may 
own small or medium-sized businesses. The owner of a medium-sized craft-
production business or a building-trades professional may have a relatively 
high and steady income, while other informal sector workers, such as small-
scale street vendors, may earn little and be quite vulnerable to competition. 
Despite these differences, there is one commonality: those who make a 
living in the informal sector often depend on social networks to sustain their 
income streams. Since displacement and resettlement disrupt both intra- and 
intercommunity social networks, people in the informal sector are at greater risk 
of losing income than those with formal sector jobs.
Many analysts have noted the “informalization” of the Mumbai economy in 
recent years, as large textile firms have closed and moved to subcontracting 
(Patel 2003, 19). Although some large industries, such as construction, are 
formally organized, the labor is often provided through subcontracting 
arrangements that are substantially more informal. Overall, the informal sector 
in Mumbai provides 55%–65% of employment (Kingsley et al. 2007). Although 
Kingsley et al. consider the informal sector problematic because of its lack of 
worker protection, tax payments, and effective economic growth, it is likely to 
continue to provide most of Mumbai’s employment in the future, even as the 
city economy develops.
Information suggests that informal sector livelihoods are especially difficult 
to reconstruct. As was noted, women who lived near affluent neighborhoods 
could work as domestic servants for multiple households, but when the MUTP 
relocated them, more affluent women lived farther away and resettled women 
lost their jobs. The most vulnerable people were those with supplementary 
informal jobs were close to their homes. Overall, 17.4% of people in the 
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evaluation sample had to change the location of their job when they moved to 
Anik. For those moving to Mankhurd, the figure was 6.8% (TISS 2008, 20, 21).
3. Providing Services versus Producing Goods
Another major difference that impacts livelihood reconstruction is whether 
an individual or business produces goods or provides services. Employees 
and those who provide services usually need only a residence when they are 
relocated. In contrast, people who sell goods need a place of business; and 
even though many stores were relatively small, this proved to be a problem 
in the MUTP. Shopkeepers lost significant numbers of clients. After the World 
Bank Inspection Panel investigation, there was agreement in principle that they 
would receive improved benefits; nevertheless, they continued negotiating for 
several years afterward.
Craftspeople and manufacturers of goods usually require space for supplies, 
areas to work, and storage for finished inventory. This category of occupations 
is rarely taken into account, partly because certain areas of Indian cities have 
often been categorized as residential. In Delhi’s 1962 master plan, some craft 
production was deemed inappropriate for the city, and people who pursued 
these activities were pushed to the periphery. Since then, hazardous industry 
has been relocated out of the city. This has affected many small industries, 
which are often more polluting than their larger counterparts (Sundaram 2010). 
Mumbai has not been as clearly demarcated as Delhi; however, zoning changes, 
environmental regulations, and the price of land have encouraged industry to 
move to Mumbai’s periphery. The main issues in resettling production facilities 
are the need for significant amounts of land and the maintenance of locational 
advantages such as access to supplies and clientele. As noted, both the ADB 
and IFC policies state that affected business owners are entitled to the costs of 
reestablishing commercial activities and net income lost during the transition. 
However, the World Bank policy does not address these issues.
The relocation of businesses was a matter of significant discussion in the plans 
for the redevelopment of Dharavi, with its extensive production facilities, mostly 
for crafts such as leather and pottery. Artisans were adamant that they needed 
areas to continue their businesses as well as housing for their families. Because 
many businesses, such as leather tanning, can be polluting, environmental 
issues had to be addressed. For these reasons, creating an adequate 
resettlement plan for the artisans was more difficult. Some potential developers 
had begun to work with those who needed housing only, encouraging them to 
opt for plans that would rehouse them quickly but would separate them from 
the artisans. 
Reconstructing and Improving Livelihoods among the Urban Displaced: Lessons from Mumbai, India 145
Arguably, the ability of Mumbai to provide a range of employment depends on 
a diverse economy that includes artisanal production as well as new services. 
The continuation of artisanal production can be directly linked to one of the 
targeted areas for growth: the creation of Maharashtra as a tourist destination 
(Mahendra et al., unpublished). 
Conclusion: Toward Livelihoods Improvement
Current approaches to resettlement of the urban displaced in contemporary 
Mumbai are insufficient to restore or improve livelihoods of affected persons. 
Although projects are generally successful at restoring housing and 
neighborhood infrastructure, they fail to recognize the right to resettlement for 
all displaced people and they do not sufficiently address livelihood restoration, 
much less improvement. Therefore, the standards of living of the resettled are 
often compromised, even if they have better housing. In Maharashtra State, 
the laws are very complex and sometimes contradictory (Rozario and Krishnan 
2005). As a result, the room for policy correction regarding livelihood restoration 
and improvement of project-affected persons is limited.
At the national level, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy of 2007 
is certainly a landmark in the process of recognizing project-affected persons’ 
right to resettlement. This process was culminated in 2013 when the Parliament 
passed the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill. The new law includes resettlement and 
rehabilitation as an integral part of land acquisition, and pays attention to 
livelihood reconstruction. 
Planning for livelihood improvement among the urban displaced is complex 
because of the diversity of their livelihood strategies and the varying amounts 
of resources available to them. Standard packages will not work. Pre-
resettlement studies will need to obtain significant information on people’s 
livelihood strategies and offer a portfolio of livelihood reconstruction options. 
This will not be easy. Although people may share the outlines of their livelihood 
strategies fairly readily, they are often unwilling to divulge the details necessary 
to accurately measure the available resources. Informal sector workers are 
often used to underestimating income and assets when talking to officials as 
a means to avoid taxation. However, if they perceive an opportunity for greater 
benefits, they may begin to overestimate these figures.
Planning for reconstruction is also difficult because of the varying needs of 
different groups of people. Some can maintain their income-earning strategies 
with assistance to cover increased commuting costs, such as subsidized 
commuter passes or scooter purchase. Others might need credit facilities to 
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rebuild or adapt existing businesses. Formal job training programs are usually 
needed to increase skills, particularly among resettled young men and women. 
Business owners need advice on re-siting their businesses. Finally, maintaining 
livelihoods may require the reinforcement of social safety nets for the completely 
indigent, especially those with minimal social support.
One way to address livelihood reconstruction is to partner with and build on 
existing efforts to provide employment and training as well as social safety nets. 
For example, Mumbai has government-supported technical and vocational 
training, nongovernment organization training programs in career development 
and skills, and employer-provided training (Kingsley et al. 2007). Although 
these are not sufficient to provide employment for all inadequately trained 
youth, projects involving involuntary resettlement could consider working in 
association with workforce development planners to improve the programs, and 
would assist both the resettled and the wider population (Kingsley et al. 2007). 
In the case of the MUTP, Mahila Milan, a women’s microcredit organization, 
expanded its programs to include women affected by the project. This kind of 
activity could be augmented as well.
Changing the focus to livelihood reconstruction to avoid impoverishment offers 
the possibility of refocusing some of the debates about involuntary resettlement 
in India. Concentrating on the livelihood provisions of involuntary resettlement 
safeguards deemphasizes landownership and land-based compensation and 
focuses on the livelihood needs of the displaced, whatever their tenure status. 
Whether they are squatters or encroachers becomes less important than the 
fact that they are urban residents threatened by impoverishment if relocated. 
This aligns with the ADB policy, which includes “those without legal title to land” 
in its list of vulnerable groups whose livelihoods should be improved (2009, 49).
Reframing urban resettlement projects to take livelihoods more directly into 
account is likely to increase the cost of resettlement projects, because it is 
easier to build housing than it is to restore livelihoods. International policies, 
especially that of the World Bank, will need to be enhanced to address 
urban livelihood restoration more directly. Emphasis on livelihoods promotes 
a strategy of inclusive growth for a more vibrant, economically robust city. A 
move toward a more productive and educated population will sustain and help 
create the global city envisioned by the elite of Mumbai.
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8.  Income Restoration and 
Livelihood Development: 
Impoverishment Risk or a 
Development Opportunity? 
by Amarasena Gamaathige
T he core component of a resettlement plan is its income restoration program, which enables project-affected persons to restore and improve their income and livelihood sources. A resettlement implementation 
plan (RIP)1 pays special attention to poor and vulnerable project-affected 
persons. The successful planning and implementation of an income restoration 
strategy help minimize the impoverishment risks associated with involuntary 
displacement and resettlement. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) observes 
that “the efficacy of resettlement plan lies in its effective implementation.” But 
often the problem lies with the quality of the plan itself, as the income restoration 
component is not given adequate attention either in terms of the baseline data 
collected or the interventions designed. As a result, income restoration remains 
a concern that is largely unaddressed in resettlement practice (ADB 2007, 39). 
The need for a conceptual framework and methodological tools to 
analyze impoverishment risks results from the widespread consensus that 
impoverishment is the key negative effect of the displacement, resettlement, 
and rehabilitation processes. The resettlement literature shows that a significant 
number of persons affected by projects, including those funded by international 
development agencies, have failed to restore their incomes after resettlement. 
Worldwide experience with resettlement has shown that physically displaced 
people do not easily recover. Resettlement studies have documented examples 
of new pockets of poverty in many resettlement projects (Downing 2002; 
Mathur 2008; and Scudder 2005). Such unsatisfactory resettlement outcomes 
are contrary to national involuntary resettlement policy objectives that view 
resettlement as a development opportunity. They also challenge the safeguard 
1 In Sri Lanka, a resettlement plan is known as a resettlement implementation plan.
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policies of development partners that consider resettlement as a vehicle to 
achieve poverty reduction. National involuntary resettlement policies in general, 
and safeguard policies of international development agencies in particular, 
provide a framework for preventing or minimizing risks and avoiding or mitigating 
them during the project cycle. However, the inclusion of involuntary resettlement 
practices within the framework of project preparation and implementation has 
produced mixed results and therefore the framework needs strengthening. In 
this context, the impoverishment risk and reconstruction model (IRR model) 
is a useful guide to lead project planners in appraisal and implementation of 
resettlement programs (Cernea 2000).
At the project planning stage, an income restoration plan is often included in 
the RIP, for the benefit of the project-affected households who will lose their 
income sources. The implementation of such income restoration programs 
usually becomes a difficult task because of the inherent problems of project 
administration, including (i) considerable delays in land acquisition and 
compensation payments, (ii) difficulties in obtaining sufficient funds for 
compensation, (iii) delays in identifying and developing resettlement sites, 
(iv) hurdles in employing poor affected persons at project construction sites 
because of their lack of skills, (v) financial constraints in the establishment of 
a revolving fund or providing credit facilities through financial institutions for 
resettlement programs, and (vi) the lack of knowledge and field experience 
among resettlement staff. Moreover, it is often difficult to recruit consultants 
or nongovernment organizations (NGOs) with appropriate skills and field 
experience to formulate and implement income restoration and improvement 
programs. However, a widespread view among project implementing agencies 
is that paying the replacement value of lost properties, providing displacement 
and resettlement support, undertaking regular consultations with affected 
persons, and a robust income restoration assistance programs will ultimately 
contribute to restoring and improving their income and livelihood. 
This chapter discusses experiences in income restoration and livelihood 
improvement of two development projects in Sri Lanka funded by ADB, the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Government of Sri 
Lanka. The Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) was implemented 
to construct a controlled-access expressway from Kottawa town in the Western 
Province to Matara town in the Southern Province covering a distance of 128 
kilometers (km). It physically displaced more than 1,300 households. About 
one-third of these households were resettled in project-assisted resettlement 
sites, while others self-relocated. The Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project 
(UKHP) is in Talawakale Division, in Nuwara Eliya District, Central Province. 
Its major components are the construction of a dam, reservoir, tunnels, 
powerhouse, and a transmission line. The project involved the resettlement of 
495 households and 88 commercial and industrial establishments. 
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The STDP applied both ADB’s involuntary resettlement policy and the National 
Involuntary Resettlement Policy (NIRP) of 2001, while the UKHP had the benefit 
of using both the NIRP and the experiences of the STDP in its resettlement 
planning. Both projects resettled the displaced households at resettlement 
sites near their original communities. They also paid them the replacement 
cost of lost assets, provided displacement and resettlement support, and 
implemented income restoration measures as stipulated by the policies. 
Because the project authorities realized that cash compensation alone would 
not be adequate to restore and improve incomes, efforts were made to offer 
a compensation package and income restoration program as a “development 
program” to create new income-generating opportunities for the displaced.
The chapter reviews the development of guidelines, conceptual approaches, 
and methodological tools used in impoverishment risk management in the two 
projects’ resettlement planning and implementation, and income restoration 
and livelihood rebuilding efforts. The chapter also discusses issues pertaining 
to the eligibility criteria for receiving income restoration assistance, as well 
as problems relating to the measurement of impoverishment risks, income 
changes, and livelihood improvements.
Resettlement Planning in Projects Funded  
by International Development Agencies
For projects funded by international development agencies, resettlement 
planning is an integral part of project design from the earliest phase in the 
project cycle. An initial poverty and social assessment is required for every 
development project. Undertaken at the inception of the project processing 
phase, this provides a preliminary assessment of the resettlement impacts 
envisaged, the resources required for resettlement planning, and the type 
of resettlement plan needed. For all public and private sector projects with 
potential involuntary resettlement impacts, executing agencies prepare 
and submit to their development partners before project appraisal a draft 
resettlement planning document with time-bound actions. The resettlement 
impacts are categorized as A, B, or C, according to their significance. A 
category A project is likely to physically displace or have a significant impact 
on the income and livelihoods of more than 200 persons (ADB 1998). In such 
a project, the project planners formulate a detailed resettlement plan based 
on a comprehensive social impact assessment. The assessment will include 
an inventory of properties and other losses, their replacement cost, impacts 
on livelihoods and income sources and on access to commons and natural 
resources, and a list of all affected persons and households. The resettlement 
impacts of category B projects are less significant than those of category A. 
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A category B project follows the same procedures in formulating a resettlement 
plan. A category C project foresees no involuntary resettlement impacts and 
therefore does not require a resettlement plan. The progress of resettlement 
planning and implementation is reviewed throughout the project cycle, and 
adjustments are made to solve implementation problems. Internal and external 
monitoring reports inform project managers of resettlement process and 
issues, if any.
The borrower—usually the government—is responsible for planning, 
implementing, and monitoring resettlement plans; while the development 
partners assist in preparing and implementing resettlement plans, and provide 
finance and technical assistance to strengthen the capacities of agencies 
responsible for managing the resettlement activities. Thus, the government and 
the development partners share responsibilities and are committed to the timely 
implementation of the resettlement plans. The key objective in this partnership 
is to ensure that persons whose land has been acquired and whose access 
to natural resources has been curtailed are assisted to improve or at least to 
restore their pre-project income and living standards. 
Design and Approval of Development Projects 
in Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, the National Environmental Act of 1980, amended in 1988 and 
1993, requires each project to prepare an interdisciplinary and publicly available 
assessment of its likely environmental and social impacts. This document is 
known as an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The EIA will be reviewed 
by the Central Environmental Authority for its adequacy of coverage of potential 
environmental and social impacts of the proposed project. A component of 
the EIA is the environmental management plan (EMP). It provides guidelines 
how to implement the recommendations of the EIA. Another component is a 
resettlement plan with implementation procedures. 
The National Involuntary Resettlement Policy of 2001 requires the conduct of a 
social impact assessment (SIA) for each project with significant social impacts. 
In formulating a resettlement plan, an SIA provides a framework to assess 
the likely social impacts of a proposed project. SIA methodology has three 
analytical components: (i) impact description to identify, measure, or estimate 
and describe the direct impact of the proposed intervention on persons and 
their communities; (ii) response determination to assess the relevance and 
comprehensiveness of suggestions, attitudes, and views of potential affected 
persons and their communities on the impacts, their magnitude, and how to 
avoid or at least minimize such impacts; and (iii) policy adjustment to implement 
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the proposed concrete actions to minimize impacts and maximize the benefits 
of the intervention. A resettlement plan addresses these issues highlighting the 
types of social impacts, how they will be addressed, budgetary allocations, and 
a time frame to implement it.
Project assisted by an international development agency is subject to partner 
agency’s safeguard policies, as well as domestic safeguard laws, regulations, 
and practices. The presence of parallel lines of guidance poses a difficulty to the 
proposers of development interventions on how to determine a proper mix of 
these competing demands, interests, and recommendations in a resettlement 
plan. This is specifically difficult when the laws, regulations, and practices of a 
borrower country sometimes do not match the involuntary resettlement policy 
requirements of the international development agency. As a result, resettlement 
plans often include aspirational programs that are included only to obtain the 
approval of all parties participating in the project. The borrower usually does 
not have sufficient resources, expertise, and commitment to implement such 
aspirational programs. Income restoration and improvement programs often 
fall into this category. In this context, a critical question is how to improve, or at 
least restore, the income and livelihoods of those affected by projects? 
Project Experiences in Planning and 
Implementing Income Restoration Programs
Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has caused large-scale involuntary 
resettlement impacts by constructing dams and reservoirs for irrigation and 
hydropower, and building roads and urban facilities. The restoration of major 
irrigation schemes in the country’s dry zone aimed to resettle people from 
densely populated districts in the wet zone, aided by a generous assistance 
package of services in their new relocation villages. The accelerated 
Mahaweli Development Program, implemented from 1978, necessitated the 
involuntary relocation of large numbers of people from their ancestral lands 
and communities in the wet zone to make way for large dams and reservoirs. 
The resettled households received alternative lands as part of a land-for-land 
resettlement program, and their relocation was completed in about 3–4 years.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, development projects with involuntary 
resettlement impacts were approved after preparing an EIA and conducting a 
series of public hearings. Starting in 1995, ADB expected the government to 
follow its safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement in assisted development 
interventions. For a project involving resettlement, the borrower was required 
to formulate a resettlement plan, but project documents prepared during 
1995–2000 contained neither income restoration measures nor a budget for 
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the purpose. In contrast to earlier projects, the STDP in 2002 and the UKHP 
in 2005 both incorporated income restoration programs with budgets in their 
resettlement implementation plans.
Southern Transport Development Project 
Income Restoration Program
The STDP was designed to construct the first access-controlled highway—a 
128 km road from Colombo to Matara town. The project was approved by ADB 
in November 1999, and the loan agreement was signed on 16 December 1999. 
The loan became effective on 30 October 2002 with the approval by ADB of the 
resettlement implementation plan (RIP). ADB financed the 60.0 km road section 
from Kurundugahahatakme town to Godagama town, and the 5.6 km access 
road to Galle City in Southern Province. JBIC financed about 60 km of the 
highway from Kottawa town in Colombo District to Kurundugahahatakme town 
in Galle District. The RIP, which covered both sections of the highway, estimated 
that 5,683 households (20,340 persons) would be affected, and 1,315 houses 
and 151 commercial structures would be physically displaced. The extent of 
the land area to be acquired for the right-of-way of the highway was estimated 
at about 951 hectares (ha), comprising about 300 ha of rice lands and 651 ha 
of agricultural land and home gardens. The land acquisition process started in 
2002 and was completed in 2006.
The STDP acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act of 1950 and paid 
statutory compensation for acquired land under section 17 of the act. In 2001, 
Cabinet approved the establishment of land acquisition and resettlement 
committees (LARCs) at the divisional secretariat level to pay additional 
allowances to bring statutory compensation rates up to the level of replacement 
cost of land and structures acquired. In addition, the RIP included a package 
of other payments, such as a payment of 25% of the statutory compensation 
amount for a house, SLRs100,000 per household for self-relocation, and other 
resettlement allowances.
Chapter 6 of the RIP included an income restoration program (IRP) for affected 
persons with a budget of SLRs60 million to be implemented by the project 
resettlement staff. It identified 1,430 project-affected households (25% of 
the total number) as poor households earning less than SLRs3000 per 
month. Among them, 214 households were considered “vulnerable affected 
households.” The resettlement staff paid little attention to the income restoration 
program because of their engagement in a large-scale project management, 
court cases regarding compensation and land acquisition, and delays in paying 
compensation and providing relocation facilities. However, a community welfare 
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program was implemented during 2003–2005, which included the formation of 
housing societies in 32 resettlement sites, the development of home gardens, 
and skills training.
In 2005, IRP preparation and implementation was outsourced to an NGO, 
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development Services (SEEDS). It took 
about 2 years to develop the program, complete social mobilization, and 
inform the affected people about the IRP. Of the 5,683 households affected, 
only 1,557, including 1,315 displaced households and 151 commercial 
establishments affected were eligible to benefit from the IRP. But only 1,050 
households (332 households at resettlement sites and 728 households who 
self-relocated) showed interest in participating in the IRP. There were three 
categories of recipients: vulnerable (20%), economically poor (39%), and 
middle-income group (41%). The key objectives of the RIP were to (i) promote 
self-employment and business opportunities for about 800 project-affected 
persons through entrepreneurial skills development training, preparation 
of business development plans, and access to credit; (ii) encourage home 
garden improvements; (iii) develop microfinance programs through savings 
and establish revolving funds in Housing Societies formed at each resettlement 
site; (iv) conduct vocational training; and (v) establish housing societies at 
resettlement sites. 
The first IRP training program was on entrepreneurial training for about 800 
project-affected persons who had basic skills and a desire to develop business 
plans with the seed money to start new self-employment and small business 
enterprises. The project resettlement staff and the NGO were responsible for 
contacting lending agencies to obtain credit for the project-affected persons. 
The starting of new self-employment and small business enterprises was the 
most difficult task. The majority of those who participated in the program could 
not proceed beyond the formulation of business plans. It was not possible to 
obtain credit from lending institutions for such small-scale income-generating 
activities without appropriate and sufficient collateral. At the end of the first 
year of the program, only 30 participants had applied for loans, and just 16 
were approved. 
The skills training and vocational training programs were unsuccessful because 
the majority of affected persons who were enrolled in the training courses 
dropped out as they found the training programs were not suitable for them. 
As SEEDS had failed to meet the program targets, the project management 
unit of the STDP terminated its contract in February 2008 and took over the 
responsibility for redesigning the RIP. In March 2008, the project management 
unit appointed a consultant to conduct a household survey of the 960 affected 
households listed in the database. The survey found that only 22 households 
in the JBIC section were eligible for income restoration assistance. The IRP 
was implemented for these households during 2008–2010. In 2010, the 
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implementation performance of the IRP was examined by a committee appointed 
by the project director. Based on its assessment of the need for further support 
for income restoration of project-affected persons, the committee found that 
the project had achieved its objective of income restoration and improvement 
of the living conditions of project-affected households. Although the IRP was 
beset with several managerial and financial difficulties, the project-affected 
poor and vulnerable households have managed to improve their household 
incomes over a period of 5–8 years. This is mainly because of rapid regional 
development in the project area which created employment, enhanced mobility, 
and improved communication. The role of the IRP in this process is marginal. 
Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project  
Income Restoration Program
The UKHP was designed to generate 150 megawatts of electricity at an 
estimated cost of $334 million. It is located in Nuwara Eliya District in the upper 
reaches of the Kotmale Oya—a tributary of the Mahaweli River. The project was 
first identified in 1968 as a component of the Mahaweli Development Program. 
Its first feasibility study was completed in 1987. The study was subsequently 
updated by examining several project alternatives in order to minimize its 
potential social and environmental impacts, particularly damages to waterfalls 
in the area. The Central Environmental Authority provisionally approved the 
project in July 1998. However, as a result of legal proceedings initiated by an 
environmental NGO at the Court of Appeal, the final approval was delayed until 
March 2000. The project loan agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka 
and JBIC was signed in March 2002. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) was 
the executing agency of the project. 
In the formulation of the resettlement plan of the project, the resettlement 
planner applied the resettlement principles of the National Involuntary 
Resettlement Policy of 2001. The planner benefited from the resettlement 
experiences in other infrastructure development projects, including the STDP 
in formulating the resettlement plan. The project-affected area mainly consists 
of tea plantations. The majority of the 495 households that were displaced lived 
in line-room houses belonging to their employers. The floor area of a house 
was less than 300 square feet, and 44% of households lacked basic facilities 
such as running water and electricity. About 75% of the affected households 
were Tamils, 22% were Sinhalese, and the remaining 3% were Muslims. The 
11 village communities affected were to be relocated in 10 resettlement sites 
within nearby Talawakelle town. Of 88 affected structures, 33 were commercial 
structures, 26 were cattle sheds, and the rest were common facilities such as 
schools, temples, libraries, workshops, and garages.
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By November 2012, the project had built 460 houses and had resettled 435 
displaced households at 9 resettlement sites. A further 60 houses were under 
construction. Six types of houses were constructed at the resettlement sites, 
and each displaced household was given a new house that is bigger than 
their original house and has additional amenities such as water, electricity, 
and access roads. The houses were allocated to the resettlers after checking 
the floor area of the house they occupied in the pre-displacement phase. 
A type A house with two bedrooms was given to a settler who occupied a 
house with a floor area of less than 400 square feet. A type F house with five 
bedrooms was allocated to a resettler who lived in a house with a floor area 
of 1,200–1,500 square feet. Each house has a piece of land of 10 perches 
(0.025 ha) in size. All houses at the resettlement sites have access to common 
facilities such as cooperative shops and worship centers for all represented 
religious denominations.
The income restoration program was implemented by the CEB in consultation 
with the displaced households. A total of 130 persons requested income 
restoration assistance to set up income-generating activities such as poultry 
rearing, dairy farming, horticulture, and mushroom farming. Some 134 project-
affected persons requested occupational skills-development training to allow 
them to start self-employment enterprises. The CEB financed the skills-training 
programs on heavy machinery equipment operation, electrical wiring, dress 
making, plumbing, mushroom cultivation, and computer programming. A 
significant number of trainees later found jobs in project-related construction 
activities. Although the home garden size is only about 2.5 perches (0.006 ha), 
a package of services, including agricultural equipment, seeds, and fertilizer, 
was also provided to each household for home garden cultivation. This enabled 
some affected households to begin cultivating vegetables. Those who bred and 
raised cattle as a secondary occupation were assisted in building cattle sheds. 
It proved difficult to provide credit through commercial banks or other sources; 
however, the payment of a disturbance allowance of SLRs15,000 and a shifting 
allowance helped supplement income restoration assistance. Vulnerable 
households were given additional voluntary payment of SLRs15,000. The 
project planned to establish a revolving fund to provide micro-credit facilities 
to project-affected persons as part of the self-employment initiatives. But the 
project could not obtain sufficient funds to operate it. 
Key Issues in Income Restoration 
in Resettlement Programs: 
In both projects, there was broad agreement among stakeholders, including 
development partners and government agencies, that income restoration 
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assistance should be provided in addition to compensation payments at 
replacement cost, and the living standards of the displaced households should 
be restored or improved. The need to plan such new economic opportunities 
was recognized by both projects (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Income Restoration Planning in the Southern Transport Development 
Project and Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project
Component
Southern Transport  
Development Project
Upper Kotmale 
Hydropower Project
Baseline data and 
inventory of losses 
survey
Inventory losses survey was conducted 
and income restoration program 
was included in the resettlement 
implementation plan. However, 
information on household incomes, 
income sources, occupations, skills 
possessed, and extent of land left after 
acquisition was limited and not updated.
Consultation with affected 
persons was done, but 
there is no primary or 
secondary data available 
for analysis of incomes and 
living conditions before 
resettlement of project-
affected persons.
Eligibility criteria and 
vulnerability analysis
The resettlement implementation plan 
listed the selection criteria of vulnerable 
households. Resettlement staff, and land 
acquisition and resettlement committees 
identified vulnerable households for 
income restoration assistance, and 
such selection was not based on a 
scientifically conducted census of 
affected population. 
Some vulnerable 
households were identified 
for additional financial 
assistance at the final stage 
of the project.
Identification 
of appropriate 
income restoration 
measures for eligible 
persons
The section on “income restoration 
programs” of the resettlement plan 
identified several income restoration 
strategies. However, measures proposed 
by the agency appointed to implement 
the income strategies were difficult to 
implement.
A list of suggestions from 
affected persons was 
prepared, and this became 
the income restoration 
assistance program.
Determination of 
poverty levels and 
identification of poor 
households
There was lack of information to 
determine poverty levels and identify 
poor households.
Information on poverty 
levels was not available. 
Income restoration 
assistance for 
nontitled persons 
The project provided financial assistance 
and house plots to squatters and adult 
children of affected households. 
The project built houses for 
all displaced households, 
including nontitled affected 
persons.
Source: Review of Southern Transport Development Project documents and secondary information from the 
website of the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project.
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1.  Identifying Eligible Affected People for Income Restoration 
and Improvement 
It is important to state explicitly in the resettlement plan the eligibility criteria 
for income restoration assistance, the components of the income restoration 
program and the budget. Such information would help reduce confusion in 
selecting eligible persons and groups for income restoration and improvement 
assistance programs and facilitating delivery mechanisms of financial support 
and other services. The following example from the STDP shows that the 
identification of eligible affected persons for the IRP was a major problem from 
the early phases of planning of the IRP.
In its third annual monitoring report on STDP in 2010, the ADB Compliance 
Review Panel (CRP) questioned the validity of reducing the original scope of 
the IRP from 1,050 affected households to 22 affected households under the 
revised IRP (ADB 2010). The CRP pointed out that compliance with the IRP 
in principle is achieved only when the IRP has been instrumental in raising 
the poor identified in the original IRP to non-poor status. This also applies to 
those who entered the category of poor after the launching of the IRP in 2005. 
A safeguard consultant was recruited to review the revised IRP, especially its 
process of selecting households to be included in the IRP. The consultant 
reported that the methodology used by the IRP to define eligibility for income 
restoration assistance was not sound. He also pointed out that the absence of a 
comprehensive database of household income levels at the pre-displacement 
phase contributed to the failure of several subsequent attempts to identify the 
poor and vulnerable among the project-affected households. 
The CRP report also referred to the report prepared by an independent external 
monitoring team (the Center for Poverty Analysis) of the project, which analyzed 
the economic status of a sample of 17 of the 62 households identified by the 
March 2008 survey as poor households who needed income restoration 
assistance in the ADB section of the highway. They owned commercial 
properties in the pre-project phase and self-relocated instead of moving to a 
resettlement site as resettlers. Of this group, 60% managed to reestablish their 
businesses. The other 40% either abandoned their commercial enterprises 
for other sources of income and livelihoods, or still are trying to restart their 
commercial enterprises (Center for Poverty Analysis unpublished; Jayawardene 
2011). The CRP report further indicated that several affected households, 
especially those headed by women, continued to be poverty stricken, and their 
socioeconomic status continued to deteriorate. The CRP concluded that some 
affected households were highly successful in setting up new businesses, 
while others are still struggling to regain their livelihoods. 
The CRP suggested that ADB should support the Road Development 
Authority, the project executing agency, in identifying vulnerable and poor 
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project-affected households and should continue its IRP for their benefit. 
It instructed that necessary data for this purpose could be found in the 
report prepared by the external monitoring team, management information 
system, and information contained in resettler files at regional STDP offices. 
The critical problems that the CRP review brought to light is the absence of 
a database enumerating the precise number of affected persons who are 
severely affected by income losses, and the lack of a comprehensive profile 
of the 1,050 affected persons identified in 2005 for IRP assistance and their 
standard of living before relocation and 5 years after relocation. The 2002 
inventory-of-losses survey data are outdated, while the 2005 survey data are 
inadequate for estimating the correct number of affected persons who have 
recovered from poverty and those who still require assistance. 
2. Income Restoration and Impoverishment Risks
The process of income restoration is defined in the STDP as the reestablishment 
of the livelihood, income, income-earning capacity, and production levels of 
people directly affected by the project (Government of Sri Lanka 2002). In the 
STDP, the pre-project socioeconomic survey of 2002 calculated the monthly 
income levels of 5,683 project-affected households. It estimated that 23% of 
them (1,430) were below the poverty line, i.e., less than SLRs3,000 per month. 
However, the estimate did not include the losses incurred by households from 
(i) the value of standing seasonal crops, (ii) income from rent and sharecropping, 
(iii) income from wage earnings, (iv) income from affected businesses, and 
(v) income from perennial crops and other produce. Project authorities argued 
that land acquisition has had a marginal impact on about 70% of total affected 
households because each of them lost less than 5 perches of their paddy 
land or high land to the project. As there was no comprehensive definition 
of poverty, it was difficult to categorize persons as poor or non-poor, and 
hence to determine their eligibility. This was discussed and debated at length 
during project progress review meetings. The discussions revealed that some 
ineligible persons received income restoration assistance while some bona 
fide affected persons were deprived of such assistance. 
Neither the IRP nor the management information system of the STDP provided 
comparable income data on affected households. As a result, it is difficult to 
determine the difference between pre-project (before land acquisition in 2002) 
poverty levels and post-project poverty level at different milestones—2005 and 
2010. The IRP did not consider the full resource base (land, savings, skills, 
and social support) of each affected household in the analysis of household 
income levels. Generally, the project authorities did not adopt a clear 
conceptual framework and methodologies to collect, analyze, and evaluate 
data to understand the poverty levels of project-affected persons and their 
livelihood options in the post-displacement phase. These shortcomings were 
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incorporated into the management information system making it an inadequate 
planning tool for IRP.
A lesson learned was that it is important to understand resettlement risks for 
different persons, households, and communities before preparing an income 
restoration assistance program. Impoverishment risks can be understood not 
only through the analysis of poverty data, but also from examining a combination 
of economic and social conditions and psychological perspectives. The 
mapping of variables of impoverishment and understanding the ways in which 
these variables are interlinked and influence one another need more statistical 
analysis. Given the speed with which the project moved on to acquiring land 
under the section 38 A “urgency clause” of the Land Acquisition Act, it is 
difficult to see how such a detailed analysis of the socioeconomic conditions 
and psychological perspectives of project-affected persons could have been 
accomplished under the STDP. Another lesson is that it is necessary to define 
key concepts and describe methodological tools that will be used to estimate 
total household income, income sources, lost income from the acquired 
properties, and pre- and post-project living standards of affected households.
In the case of the UKHP, the resettlement of 495 households was the major 
issue and the only option available was to relocate all of them at a resettlement 
site identified by the project. As the affected households were resettled close 
to their original communities, there was no direct impact on the sources of their 
incomes. Most of them were estate workers and they continue to be employed 
on the estate. However, relocation has had some adverse impacts on those 
who cultivated vegetables in home gardens as supplementary income before 
displacement. The identification of income restoration strategies for the affected 
commercial and industrial activities was done on a case-by-case basis. The 
UKHP was less complicated than the STDP in terms of income restoration 
programs. However, in both projects, some income restoration measures were 
taken for the benefit of nontitled holders, poor households, and vulnerable 
groups. Table 8.2 shows the severity of different impoverishment risks of the 
households displaced by the two projects.
164 Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
Table 8.2 Impoverishment Risks Assessment in the Southern Transport  
Development Project and Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project
Impoverishment 
Risks
STDP UKHP
RemarksH M L H M L
Landlessness X X Risk of landlessness was high in  
the STDP, because replacement  
of agricultural and paddy land  
was difficult.
Joblessness X X The laborers and self-employed in 
agricultural land, paddy cultivation, 
and home gardens, and employees in 
commercial establishments lost their 
income sources. Some have already 
recovered under the STDP. 
Homelessness X X In both projects, resettlement sites were 
developed and nontitled persons were 
given free house plots in addition to 
payment of the replacement cost of lost 
assets.
Marginalization X X The risk of marginalization is quite low 
because incomes and living conditions 
of many poor and medium-income 
groups have been improved in both the 
STDP and the UKHP.
Food security X X There was a risk of food insecurity in 
both projects due to the loss of home 
gardens and agricultural lands; but 
home gardens have been developed as 
a component of the income restoration 
program, which provides food security 
to some households.
Social 
disarticulation
X X In both projects, group resettlement 
and resettlement closer to original 
communities reduced the risk of social 
disarticulation.
Increased 
morbidity and 
mortality
No baseline information was available 
to make any comparison.
Loss of access to 
common property 
resources
X X In both projects, all common property 
resources affected were rebuilt. 
H = high, L = low, M = medium, STDP = Southern Transport Development Project, UKHP = Upper Kotmale 
Hydropower Project.
Source: Review of STDP documents and secondary information from the UKHP website.
Although project-affected persons of the STDP were exposed to several 
impoverishment risks, payment of replacement cost for land and structures 
acquired, provision of resettlement support, special assistance to those who self-
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relocated in finding and purchasing alternative land, and assistance provided 
to poor households through the IRP helped the majority of affected households 
in restoring their incomes and improving their living conditions, particularly in 
case of low-income households. However, remarkable increases in affected 
households’ incomes are usually attributed to factors such as favorable changes 
in the local economy, the large amount of cash compensation received, or the 
entrepreneurship of household members. Cash compensation at replacement 
cost for lost assets, income sources, and livelihoods played a critical role in 
preventing impoverishment among project-affected households. The UKHP 
also paid replacement costs for land and structures acquired; allocated lands 
in resettlement sites with houses and other amenities; provided assistance in 
finding employment and opportunities for self-employment and skills training; 
and, in case of self-relocating project-affected persons, helped find, purchase, 
and develop alternative lands. In both projects, such specific project actions 
certainly minimized impoverishment risks among project-affected persons and 
their households. 
3. Analysis of Vulnerability and Selection of Vulnerable Groups
SEEDS, the NGO, in formulating the IRP for the STDP used outdated 
socioeconomic information at the project offices to identify households eligible 
for income restoration assistance. Most of the project-affected persons, 
especially in rural areas, suffered from a lack of skills, capital, and support 
systems to restart their livelihoods. This knowledge is useful to identify the 
kinds of financial support to be provided to each selected household. However, 
without a vulnerability analysis, it is difficult to develop sustainable livelihood 
development plans. 
The RIP of the STDP defined a vulnerable household as one with elderly; 
invalids; households headed by women; estate workers; households without 
legal title to land (informal dwellers); and the poor households identified in 
inventory-of-losses surveys as those who would suffer disproportionately 
from displacement and resettlement impacts. The surveys identified 214 such 
project-affected households in the project area.
The identification of 214 households as vulnerable households in the RIP in 2002 
was not done systematically using a set of eligibility criteria. The determination 
of vulnerability of a project-affected person or household in the STDP was done 
during RIP implementation after reviewing the field observations of resettlement 
staff and the records of the meetings the Land Acquisition and Resettlement 
Committee (LARC) conducted with each affected household. The LARC used 
not only the amount of compensation an affected household received, but 
also the age of adults and their health conditions in determining whether the 
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household is vulnerable or not. As a result, the vulnerable households identified 
by the LARC were not identical to the list of vulnerable households found in 
the RIP. According to the LARC records, such detailed analysis of vulnerability 
of an affected household was not done at each LARC meeting. This led to a 
discrepancy in the payment of special allowances to vulnerable households 
and including them in the IRP. The definitions of “employee” in formal and 
informal businesses, and “casual” and “permanent” agricultural workers were 
not clear in the RIP. As a result, appropriate compensation rates could not be 
determined for these categories of project-affected persons. For example, 
some casual agricultural workers received income restoration assistance while 
others did not, although they qualified as vulnerable. There was inadequate 
information for identifying vulnerable households in the UKHP. The RIP did not 
include a complete list of affected vulnerable households. As a result, only a 
few vulnerable households received vulnerable assistance from the project. 
4. Methodological Tools and Databases
The first step in planning income restoration programs is to develop indicators 
with benchmarks against which a project-affected person’s recovery from 
poverty could be measured. The benchmarks could be derived from the 
census of affected persons, the inventory of losses, and other socioeconomic 
databases. In both the STDP and the UKHP, such surveys and censuses were 
conducted to develop baseline data, but such data were not used to develop 
comprehensive development indicators. The project authorities also failed to 
update the databases, and, as a result, they could not monitor the progress of 
land acquisition, payment of compensation, and resettlement. 
In the STDP, the key unit of data was a land lot which reflected the narrow 
legal focus on the acquisition of land. Such data were not adequate for long-
term income restoration planning as such planning focus on project-affected 
individuals and households and not on land plots or parcels. The data on 
persons’ occupations and skills were patchy and inadequate for formulating 
comprehensive income restoration strategies for different occupational groups 
affected by the project. The quality of data collected through various surveys 
was poor, as evidenced by missing information on important variables such 
as total income, income sources, and total household wealth in the STDP 
databases. The computerized management information system maintains 
data on all land plots acquired for the project and socioeconomic profiles of all 
affected persons, but information regarding pre-project income levels is only 
available for few households in the system. The Road Development Authority 
has failed to remedy this key deficiency in the management information system. 
The author was informed in 2013 that project authorities in the UKHP have not 
yet done any studies on the effectiveness of the project’s income restoration 
program.
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Project monitoring reports for the two projects have highlighted the following key 
information needs for formulating and implementing comprehensive income 
restoration and improvement programs: (i) establishing clear definitions of 
key concepts such as income restoration, impoverishment, entitlement, and 
vulnerable groups; (ii) suitable income restoration options, such as livelihood 
development and skills training for eligible households in consultation with 
them; (iii) collecting baseline data to measure the income losses and lost 
assets; and (iv) establishing key monitoring indicators for scientific evaluation 
of project outcomes before commencing displacement. Most RIPs contain a 
section on income restoration; but it is often perfunctory and fails to identify 
adequate income restoration measures or monitoring and evaluation indicators 
based on livelihood impact analysis, vulnerability analysis, and impoverishment 
risk identification. As a result, income restoration activities in an IRP are often 
limited to rehabilitation assistance. Effective and sustainable income restoration 
interventions can only be designed and implemented within a carefully 
constructed conceptual framework, based on reliable databases. 
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to project monitoring and evaluation 
studies to find out whether the expected objectives of income restoration 
and living standards improvements have been achieved after relocation. The 
findings of such studies have become controversial because of the lack of 
clear definitions of key concepts, such as income restoration, livelihood 
improvements, living standards, impoverishment, and marginalization. The 
selection and measurement of key indicators to determine the success or 
failure of such programs also appear to be questionable. 
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the key aspects of planning and implementation 
of income restoration and improvement programs of two infrastructure 
development projects in Sri Lanka. It also discussed experiences of income 
restoration and livelihood improvement in the two projects. Both projects 
resettled displaced households at sites near their original communities, paid 
replacement cost for lost assets, and provided displacement support and 
income restoration measures according to the policies of development partners 
and the NIRP. Some efforts were made to offer an attractive compensation 
package and income restoration program as a development program to create 
new income-generating opportunities for project-affected persons, because 
cash compensation alone cannot restore income and livelihood losses. The 
key issues identified in planning and implementing the income restoration 
programs in the two case studies are (i) delays in IRP implementation and 
weak institutional arrangements; (ii) ambiguities throughout IRP planning and 
implementation with regard to definitions of eligibility criteria for receiving 
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income restoration assistance; (iii) difficulties in identifying appropriate income-
generating activities for diverse groups of affected persons; and (iv) problems 
of measuring impoverishment risks, income changes, income restoration, and 
livelihood improvements. 
Several lessons were learned from the two case studies. First, income 
restoration and livelihood programs should be carefully developed in 
consultation with project-affected persons before displacement starts, and 
they should be implemented soon after displacement. Second, the attitudes 
of project authorities toward identifying and managing impoverishment risk 
will affect both the planning and implementation of the income restoration 
program. They need to be educated and informed about the gravity of induced 
impoverishment among project-affected persons and households by projects. 
Third, an income restoration program should be supported by an adequate 
budget and an efficient management team. Fourth, the income restoration 
and improvement programs should tally with the level of education, skills, and 
income levels of the affected persons. The project-affected persons, especially 
in rural areas, lack skills, capital, and support systems to restart their livelihoods. 
Such information could be found through a vulnerability analysis. It is difficult to 
develop sustainable livelihood development plans unless they are based on a 
vulnerability analysis of all project-affected persons.
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9.  Compensation, 
Replacement Cost, 
and Post-Resettlement 
Impoverishment 
by Biswanath Debnath
T his chapter highlights the importance of having a social preparation phase early in the project cycle to allow both the affected persons and project authorities to discuss, negotiate, and agree on a fair and 
adequate compensation package for property acquired for a development 
project. It also argues that such a social preparation phase should lead to timely 
disbursement of cash compensation to the affected persons or households in 
full at replacement cost for the property acquired to avoid their impoverishment. 
By doing so, the chapter aims to contribute to the long-running debate on 
compensation and impoverishment.
Social preparation refers to a series of meaningful consultations that land-
acquiring authorities and project authorities conduct with landowners and land 
users before the acquisition of private land for a development intervention. 
It precedes the displacement and relocation phases of a development 
intervention. As a preinvestment process, social preparation can be used to
i. consult with project-affected persons and to provide them with project 
information; 
ii. help them to decide between self-relocation and project-assisted 
resettlement;
iii. motivate them to identify economic opportunities at resettlement sites, or 
where they opt to settle down as self-relocatees; 
iv. prepare them to develop such opportunities into development opportunities 
which, in turn, help them to restore income and livelihoods and improve 
their living standards; and 
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v. educate and guide them on how to negotiate adequate compensation 
for property lost and invest cash compensation in income-generating 
activities. 
Social Preparation
The safeguard policies of international development agencies provide a narrow 
scope for the social preparation phase in the project cycle by reserving its 
application only to development interventions that are likely to displace large 
populations or pose complex and sensitive involuntary resettlement impacts 
and risks. In such projects, they expect borrowers to consult all potential project-
affected persons at the initial phase of resettlement planning to ascertain their 
views, concerns, and suggestions. Based on this understanding, the borrower 
and the international development agency can determine whether project-
affected persons would support and participate in the resettlement planning 
or oppose the development intervention. If there is significant opposition to 
or agitation against the proposed development intervention, the international 
development agency would distance itself from the project planning process 
and leave the borrower and project-affected persons to resolve their grievances 
and to arrive at an understanding that would allow the development intervention 
to proceed. 
The affected people should be fully informed and closely 
consulted on resettlement and compensation options. 
Where adversely affected people are particularly vulnerable, 
resettlement and compensation decisions should be preceded 
by a social preparation phase to build up the capacity of the 
vulnerable people to deal with the issues. Social preparation 
would so be necessary to obtain cooperation for the project to 
proceed in cases where there is likely to be significant social 
resistance (ADB 1997).
Compensation
Compensation is a payment for a loss. In land law, compensation is defined 
as the amount of money required to make the owner no better or worse off 
than if no land had been acquired from him or her. In the context of involuntary 
displacement and resettlement, compensation takes two key forms: cash for 
land and land for land. In case of cash-for-land compensation, it is the amount 
of cash that the owner of lost asset needs to replace it. This is not the market 
value of the lost property; but the money the property owner needs to buy a 
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property of equal productivity or value. If compensation is given as land for 
land, the land received in lieu of the acquired land must be of equal value or 
productivity. A key difference between cash for land and land for land is that in 
land-for-land compensation, the loser is given replacement land by the project 
authorities, while in cash-for-land compensation, the loser has the option either 
to invest the money received in land or to use it as he or she wishes. The Land 
Acquisition Act of Sri Lanka defines compensation as payment in cash or kind 
to replace an asset, resource, or income source which has been acquired or 
affected by a project for which the person affected is entitled to, and the amount 
of money required to keep a person in the same socioeconomic position that 
he or she held before acquisition (Government of Sri Lanka 1950).
Replacement Cost
Replacement cost is used in the context of compensation for expropriated 
property as a matter of good governance. In general, it refers to the fair market 
value of a property. It is tomorrow’s anticipated price for today’s acquired 
land. It helps prevent the impoverishment of the land loser. Often, soon after 
compensation is paid, land prices shoot up in the formal land market, reacting to 
the perceived demand for land. This effectively blocks project-affected persons 
from purchasing land to replace their lost assets. Replacement cost, thus, 
indicates the level of valuation for expropriated property that will be sufficient 
for project-affected persons to replace their lost land with land of equal value 
or comparable productivity. Accordingly, compensation at replacement cost 
includes actual cost of asset replacement plus associated transaction costs 
and fees.
Replacement cost applies to tangible assets—primarily land, houses, 
commercial buildings, temporary structures, trees, and crops. Intangible 
losses, such as sentimental attachment to a house or a location, proximity to 
neighbors or relatives, accessibility to spiritual sites, or aesthetic qualities are 
rarely considered as eligible losses for compensation. But intangible factors, 
such as customer goodwill toward a commercial establishment, are usually 
taken into consideration in determining compensation for such property. For 
example, shopkeepers that are displaced from a popular market should be 
relocated at a place where there is the possibility of developing a similar level of 
goodwill. This would include easy access and the availability of parking facilities 
and security. An example is the Bangalore–Pune Highway, built by the National 
Highways Authority of India. The project’s resettlement planners recognized 
the need to relocate small vendors at a location along the highway where they 
could continue their small businesses. 
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Sometimes, instead of providing special facilities, a premium is paid as part of 
cash compensation to acknowledge the loss of goodwill that will result from the 
acquisition of property and the time the project-affected person would require 
to reconstruct goodwill and business. When the payment of compensation 
is only an element of the resettlement package, several other payments are 
applied by resettlement planners as part of the replacement cost. These include 
(i) relocation or resettlement assistance; (ii) subsistence and transition 
allowances for a specific period of time soon after displacement; (iii) interest 
paid for delays in paying compensation; and, in case of India, (iv) the solatium, 
which is 30% of the statutory value of the land acquired and is intended to 
compensate for the involuntary nature of the acquisition. However, potential 
project-related benefits, such as access to new irrigation facilities or employment-
training programs, are counted not as components of the replacement cost but 
as components of resettlement assistance. 
Resettlement literature on compensation in general and replacement cost in 
particular does not clearly distinguish between market value and replacement 
cost, or between replacement cost and resettlement assistance. Replacement 
cost, however, is a much wider concept than market value. Resettlement 
assistance is a bundle of assistance provided over a period of time to a resettler. 
It is therefore different from replacement cost, which takes the form of a lump 
sum payment to replace the lost property and thereby to arrest impoverishment. 
Compensation, resettlement assistance, income restoration, and improvement 
assistance, together with special arrangements to find employment, are all 
geared to prevent project-affected persons losing their incomes which would 
either impoverish them or, if they are already poor, make them more vulnerable 
and marginalized.
Replacement Cost versus Market Value: 
Valuation Methodologies 
Replacement cost and market value are not synonymous. Market value is the 
prevailing open market value of a property. Fair compensation according to 
market valuation is carried out in most South Asian countries in accordance with 
the standards of the International Valuation Standards Committee in London. 
The standards are sensitive to local laws, customs, practices, and market 
conditions, and are usually adapted to accommodate a specific economic 
and social environment. Market value is defined by the International Valuation 
Standards Committee and adopted by the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors as follows:
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The estimated rate for which a property should exchange on the 
date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in 
an arm’s-length transaction after proper marketing wherein the 
parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without 
compulsion. 
There are several methods to value a property. The key methods are the 
comparable method, the residual method, the replacement cost method (used 
for building valuation), the rent capitalization method, and the discounted cash 
flow method. The comparable and residual methods are most relevant to the 
calculation of replacement cost of acquired property in involuntary resettlement 
programs. 
The comparable method arrives at the value of a property by reviewing 
comparable recent property transactions in the vicinity. Recent transactions 
are examined to get a comparable understanding of property value. If recent 
transactions are not available in the micro-market (in the area), a valuation 
specialist will form an opinion based on the quoted prices in the market with 
adjustments for margin for negotiation. Based on this information, adjustments 
are made for the property attributes that affect its land value. These attributes 
may include the location, micro-market characteristics, size, shape, availability 
of infrastructural facilities, frontage along the access road, accessibility, and 
its development potential. Given the heterogeneous nature of real estate 
properties, appropriate adjustments usually allow for any qualitative and 
quantitative differences that may affect the property’s price. In land markets, 
especially in remote rural areas, transaction comparators are often difficult 
to find. In such instances, values are benchmarked with transactions in other 
locations with comparable neighborhood profiles. 
The residual method is an assessment of the capital value of a property on a 
completion basis, i.e., assuming it was completed on the date of valuation. 
An estimated total cost, including fees and an allowance for interest and 
other associated expenditures such as developer’s risks, is considered in this 
method. Generally, anticipated profits are deducted from the gross development 
value. The resultant figure is the residual value. This method is subject to some 
hypothetical assumptions and parameters. A slight change in one or more of 
the assumptions or parameters would have a significant impact on the residual 
value estimated.
Resettlement practitioners and professional valuers have generally employed 
the comparable and residual methods to provide fair compensation according 
to the current market value of assets. While the comparable method is suitable 
for valuing land, the residual method is useful in valuing structures and land 
with structures. 
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A brief discussion of the three other valuation methods is in order. The 
replacement cost method is based on the construction cost of assets. This 
method is appropriate for valuing buildings. The cost to be estimated is the 
cost of construction according to the construction status as of the valuation 
date. This is based on the inspection of the facility; however, no structural 
survey is conducted because valuation of the buildings is based on book 
value. The rent capitalization method is used to value a leased property. This 
method focuses on valuing the entire property (both buildings and land that 
have revenue-generating potential), not the land alone. This method involves 
deriving the rental income net of operating expenses for the current lease in the 
subject property that would be capitalized with an appropriate capitalization 
rate to arrive at the sale value for the leased space. The discounted cash flow 
method is based on the present value of the future receivable net income from 
the current operational leases. It is mostly speculative. This method focuses on 
valuing the entire property (not the land alone) based on its long-term revenue-
generation potential. 
Negotiated Settlement and Replacement Cost
Often, international development agencies hesitate to proceed with 
resettlement planning if there is a dispute between the borrower and potential 
project-affected persons regarding land acquisition, compensation rates, and 
relocation programs. In such situations, besides providing social preparation 
time to the borrower and project-affected persons, the agency may encourage 
the borrower and project-affected persons to negotiate, consult, and arrive 
at a mutually acceptable formula that is also acceptable to the agency. An 
example of this approach is the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-assisted 
Himachal Pradesh Clean Energy Development Investment Program in India. 
Compensation rates were negotiated between the project-affected persons and 
the executing agency, and the agreed-upon rates were included in the project’s 
resettlement framework to guide the formulation of appropriate resettlement 
plans (ADB 2008a).
Negotiated settlement is an alternative arrangement to land acquisition for a 
public purpose. Under this arrangement, the value of the land is negotiated by 
the land-acquiring party and the property owner. When a state acquires land 
for a public purpose, the negotiation framework becomes asymmetrical as the 
state has powers to acquire any private land for a public purpose regardless 
of its owner’s consent. This power emanates from the state’s inherent right 
of eminent domain. However, it does not mean that the state would acquire 
private land regardless of its owner’s opposition. There are several paths that 
the state could take in acquiring land through negotiated settlement. First, it 
could negotiate and pay the negotiated price to the landowner. This is equal 
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to the replacement cost of the land or more. Second, the government could 
decide not to proceed with acquisition. Several recent community development 
projects, such as rural roads projects in several states in India, use as a guiding 
principle the consent of the people to hand over some land through negotiation. 
If the community as a whole or a significant component of it opposes the 
project, the state government would not proceed with the project. Another 
example is the Building Climate Resilience of Watersheds in Mountain Eco-
Regions Project in Nepal, where the consensus of the community to provide 
land to the project is a requirement to proceed with the project (ADB 2013). In 
such situations, payment of replacement cost does not arise. Third, the state 
could acquire private land, regardless of landowners’ opposition or resistance, 
and pay compensation as prescribed under the land law. This option falls into 
the involuntary resettlement category of international development agencies’ 
social safeguard policies. This type of cash compensation is generally known 
in South Asia as statutory compensation. It is much lower than the prevailing 
market value and is below the replacement cost. However, many countries are 
moving toward fair market value. For example, in Sri Lanka, the National Involuntary 
Resettlement Policy (2001) provides for replacement cost for all acquired land:
•	 Replacement land should be an option for compensation in the case of 
loss of land, and in the absence of replacement land cash compensation 
should be an option for all affected persons.
•	 Compensation for loss of land, structures, other assets and income should 
be based on replacement cost and should be paid promptly. This should 
include transactions costs (Government of Sri Lanka 2001).
Several international development agencies and government departments 
in South Asia prefer negotiated settlement to land acquisition under land 
acquisition acts. For example, ADB specifically encourages negotiated 
settlement when acquiring land for development interventions (ADB 2009). 
Social safeguard policies of these agencies lay out procedural guidelines 
to protect landowners from risks associated with negotiated settlement 
transactions. These procedures pay special attention to transparency and 
consistency, and ensure that those who enter into a negotiated settlement can 
maintain the same or better income and livelihood status after the acquisition of 
land. In this process, the key words are “adequate” and “fair price” for land and 
other assets acquired. The safeguard policies want the borrower to ensure that 
the proposed land acquisition process corrects any asymmetries of information 
and bargaining power of the parties. The documents pertaining to negotiated 
settlements such as village maps, land registry entries, land sales records, 
and bylaws used during negotiations are to be disclosed. The borrower should 
also engage an independent external party to document the negotiations and 
settlement process, and verify their adequacy and transparency. The anticipated 
outcome of this elaborated process is that the property owner receives the 
replacement cost of the property.
Compensation, Replacement Cost, and Post-Resettlement Impoverishment 177
Payment of Replacement Cost 
in ADB Operations
The payment of replacement cost for acquired property is one of the key 
principles of the Involuntary Resettlement Policy of ADB (ADB 2009). During 
the past 18 years, this principle has been applied to hundreds of ADB-funded 
development interventions. It is pertinent to examine how well it has been 
applied in different countries. The following section discusses the progress in 
applying the principle of replacement cost in several countries. 
1. India
Under the Indian Constitution, the responsibility for acquiring private land and 
other property for a public purpose lies solely with state governments. The 
key legal instrument in this regard is the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (amended 
in 1984).1 According to the Land Acquisition Act, a cash compensation 
package includes the market price of land based on documented recent land 
transactions in the area, 12% annual interest from the day the intention of land 
acquisition was gazetted, and 30% of the compensation amount as a solatium 
(Government of India 1894). 
In a free market situation, the market price of a parcel of land is determined 
through a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller of the land 
parcel. But when a state government acquires land from a private individual 
for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, the landowner usually is 
not a willing seller. This is because the owner does not have the option not to 
sell the land parcel or not to accept the compensation package determined by 
the acquiring officer. The process of appeal and seeking justice through filing 
a case in a competent court are the options open for the affected person. But 
such remedies could take years to materialize. 
In the 1990s, the World Bank introduced the practice of paying the difference 
between statutory compensation and replacement cost as part of “resettlement 
assistance” to ensure that landowners would receive replacement cost of their 
property in projects that it assisted. In addition, it encouraged the borrower to 
top up the current land price index to bring it up to the prevailing open market 
prices to establish the replacement cost of acquired property. The baseline 
data on land prices are obtained from the government land registry, which is 
controlled by the states revenue departments, for the topping-up exercise. 
The baseline data on other tangible assets—known as Basic Schedule of 
1 The Land Acquisition Law of 1894 was replaced in 2013 by the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act.
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Rates (BSR)—are obtained from the State Public Works Department. The BSR 
are notoriously outdated and often lag by 4–5 years. This complicates the 
topping-up exercise and determining the replacement cost. 
In India, complex ground realities add to the difficulties of determining 
replacement cost on the basis of the fair market price of a land parcel. 
Landowners do not declare the real value of their property, especially land, to 
avoid paying taxes; land offices do not update land records on a systematic 
manner; and corruption is rampant in land transactions. As a result, it is difficult 
to apply any of the valuation methods outlined. When projects encounter such 
situations, project managers try to overcome them by adding an extra payment 
of up to 50% of the registered land price to the total cash compensation 
package. However, this arrangement does not guarantee that the total package 
of compensation will reach the replacement cost threshold. An ADB study found 
that in a highway project, the replacement cost of a lost property was 250% of 
the market value awarded according to the Land Acquisition Act (ADB 2007).
The government pays an index-based special allowance called a “dearness 
allowance” (cost of living adjustment allowance) to all salaried employees. 
The allowance is updated twice a year based on the prevailing price index 
of consumer goods. A similar practice of updating the land price index is 
required to help apply the principle of replacement cost in land transactions, 
especially when land is acquired for a public purpose. If state governments 
update and revise the land price index at least once a year, the persons 
affected by development interventions could expect to obtain a better cash 
compensation package. 
2. Afghanistan
Any action to acquire land in Afghanistan for a public purpose triggers the Law 
on Land Expropriation, enacted in October 2000 (Government of Afghanistan 
2000). The law allows the payment of adequate compensation, based on the 
market price of the land at the time the land is acquired. The compensation 
package includes the value of the land, and the structures and fruit trees on 
the land. The Council of Ministers decides land prices while the municipalities 
decide the value of the building structures in accordance with the rates given in 
the Unified Table for Valuation. Most land records in Afghanistan were destroyed 
during the prolonged wars. Therefore, actual land prices are to be calculated 
based on the principle of the willingness of the owner to sell the land (Debnath, 
unpublished). 
Project implementing agencies consult with the project-affected persons and 
the Ministry of Agriculture to determine compensation for other tangible losses, 
such as crops and fruit trees. Based on consultations and negotiations, all 
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parties arrive at the replacement cost of the assets. The author was a witness to 
such an exercise in early 2008 carried out by the Ministry of Energy and Water 
(Debnath, unpublished). It determined the replacement cost of assets such 
as grape vines, mulberry trees, walnut trees, and almond trees in consultation 
with project-affected persons’ representatives and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
They determined prices for each item under negotiation. The net present 
value methodology was used to establish a value for the average productive 
life of a fruit tree. While this methodology enabled project-affected persons to 
achieve a fair price for their fruit trees, it carries the risk that they may try to claim 
compensation for thousands of fruit tree seedlings planted to make a quick 
profit. Such cheating is rare, however, and can be contained through proper 
due diligence during project formulation.
3. The People’s Republic of China
There are three types of land in the People’s Republic of China (PRC): the 
land in urban areas is owned by the state; the land in rural areas is owned 
by village collectives; and reserved land is owned either by the state or the 
village collectives. Individuals cannot own land, but they do have user rights 
over land for varying periods of time as members of collectives. Individuals and 
communities are eligible to receive compensation when land for which they 
have user rights is acquired by the state. Generally, a compensation package 
includes cash compensation for land, dwelling units, and crops cultivated on 
the land; a resettlement subsidy for services such as telephone and television 
connections; and the right to collect the harvest of the crops cultivated on land 
that has just been acquired. The land compensation fees for the acquired 
farmland in rural areas belong to the village collective. However, a large portion 
of it is also paid to the farmers. The remaining portion is kept in the collective’s 
reserved fund. The resettlement subsidy and compensation for crops are paid 
to the farmers.
There is no land market in the PRC. However, prices of land and other assets 
are regularly updated both in rural and urban areas. In the urban areas, 
some form of market rates are emerging and these are applied to land sales. 
Compensation is a state-administered exercise, as only the state can acquire 
land from a collective. In this process, the consent of project-affected persons 
is to be obtained according to the Law of Land Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China, but the decision of the central or provincial government 
prevails over the affected persons’ consent (Government of the PRC 1998). 
However, the scope for consultation between project-affected persons and 
the state indicates that there is room for negotiations to determine mutually 
acceptable prices for land and other assets.
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Provincial and local governments use their own rates to determine the 
replacement cost of land acquired. A multiplier of the average annual gross 
output value (AAOV) of agricultural production over the preceding 3 years is 
applied in determining the replacement cost of crops and trees. Despite the 
presence of national laws and policies on land acquisition and compensation, 
compensation rates are influenced by local conditions and local government 
laws and regulations. This opens a window of opportunity for project-affected 
persons to negotiate a better price for their losses. Consultation and the 
willingness of local government officials to accommodate project-affected 
persons’ concerns and demands play a vital role in such negotiations. 
Community negotiations on behalf of individuals facilitate a quick, consensus-
seeking decision-making process, thereby ensuring a fair compensation 
package for individuals. Such negotiations prioritize individuals and households 
according to their degree of economic loss. An additional allowance is given to 
these project-affected persons as part of the compensation package.
During the past 20 years, compensation standards in the PRC have improved. 
The PRC has learned that compensation and resettlement systems can only 
work if they are fair to all. They cannot be adjusted arbitrarily or manipulated 
to favor one at the expense of another, otherwise they will break down. Thus, 
the adjustment made in 2008 to the Law of Land Administration has helped 
improve the compensation rates and standards.
Based on this law, provincial governments formulate uniform land compensation 
standards to be applied when the government acquires collectively owned 
agricultural land for construction projects. In 2008, provinces resurveyed 
farmlands to develop uniform zones of AAOV rates and location-based 
composite land prices for land acquisition. Since 2004, the minimum combined 
multiplier of the AAOV was set at 16 times, with the provision that it can be 
raised to 30 times at the discretion of the local government. Typically, the land 
compensation multiplier ranges from 8 to 10 times, but it is lower for non-irrigated 
land, grassland, or forestlands. The resettlement subsidy multiplier ranges from 
6 to 20 times for small landholdings and is only applied to cultivated lands. A 
landholding is considered smallholding based on rural population density and 
socioeconomic factors. Some local governments use a combined multiplier, 
which provides a better compensation package for project-affected persons. 
During land acquisition, multipliers can be adjusted in consultation with the 
affected communities, and a higher multiplier can be agreed upon. Thus, land 
valuation in the PRC is based on the income capitalization method, which gives 
compensation for the land that is generally considered adequate to replace the 
income losses. Since the net income from the land is often less than 50% of 
the AAOV, the compensation is equivalent to 30–70 years of farming income. 
The PRC’s land valuation method does not consider the “best” use of land as 
the basis for valuation, as all land use is strictly controlled, and it is owned by a 
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collective (as in the case of farming), state-owned (as in the case of construction 
sites), or reserved for a special purpose. 
Determining the total amount of compensation for a community is the first 
step in allocating compensation to project-affected persons. The allocation 
of compensation from the village level to individual project-affected persons 
or other villagers is decided at village meetings. The common approach to 
distributing compensation to individuals or households is direct payment to 
project-affected persons. In several areas, the old system of land adjustment 
to accommodate a community’s land lost is still practiced. In such instances, 
cash compensation is distributed equally among the members of the 
community, and a portion of cash compensation is retained by the community 
to pay for village infrastructure maintenance or to issue endowment insurance 
policies to needy community members. The road improvement component of 
the ADB-assisted Gansu Baiyin Urban Development Project in Baiyin District 
provides an example of the calculation of a compensation package to meet the 
replacement cost (ADB 2008d). The project followed the formula prescribed for 
calculating compensation at replacement cost:
•	 Compensation for acquired cultivated land at the rate of 6–10 times the 
AAOV of the acquired land for during the 3 preceding years. 
•	 Resettlement subsidy at the rate of 4–6 times the AAOV of the acquired 
cultivated land during the preceding 3 years.
•	 Compensation rates for structures and crops on the requisitioned land are to 
be prescribed by provincial authorities, autonomous region administrators, 
and municipalities. 
In case the cash compensation and resettlement subsidies are insufficient to 
economically rehabilitate project-affected persons at least to their pre-project 
living standards, provincial governments, municipalities, and administrators 
of autonomous regions can increase the resettlement subsidy to meet the 
requirement. However, the total land compensation and resettlement subsidy 
cannot exceed 30 times the AAOV of the requisitioned land.
As discussed earlier, some ADB-assisted projects considered an endowment 
insurance scheme as a sustainable income-generating instrument for use 
by project-affected persons in lieu of cash compensation (ADB 2008c). A 
disadvantage of the scheme is that project-affected persons cannot benefit 
from endowment insurance until they retire. This approach is similar to the 
rehabilitation measures adopted by a power-generation project in India that 
sought to pay compensation for the lost land in the form of an annuity for 33 years 
(ADB 2008b). In both cases, the purported objective is to ensure that project-
affected persons are better off after their losses to the project, or can at least 
restore their pre-project income and livelihoods with the assistance provided by 
the project. Thus, by losing their property to a development intervention, they 
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could achieve a net gain. If this occurs, the arrangement described would fulfill 
the requirements of applying the principle of replacement cost. In the PRC, 
many project-affected persons want to participate in the endowment insurance 
scheme as the government pays the major share of the premium. 
A Case Study of Replacement Cost:  
The Bangalore Metro Rail Project in India
The Bangalore Metro Rail Project in Karnataka State in India acquired about 
30 hectares of land affecting 9,190 persons in 1,838 households (ADB 2010). 
A post-acquisition due diligence exercise confirmed that compensation for 
land and other properties had been paid at open market prices following the 
principle of replacement cost. This section discusses how the Land Committee 
established by the project authorities determined the replacement cost of land 
and other properties. 
The Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation (BMRC) constituted a land committee 
comprising chartered valuers, planners, architects, real estate experts, and 
analysts to determine the replacement cost of the land that the BMRC proposed 
to acquire. The Land Committee adopted a value assessment methodology that 
combined the comparable approach with the residual approach to determine 
the market value of the acquired land. The final value was determined by 
taking the average value of the two methodologies. The combination of the two 
methodologies boosted the confidence of the Land Committee in valuing the 
affected properties.
The BMRC also adopted the resettlement principle of restoring and improving 
the income and livelihood of project-affected persons by adding a cash 
assistance component to the income and livelihood rehabilitation package. 
This principle was drawn from the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
Policy of India (Government of India 2007). The package includes a shifting 
allowance, an inconvenience allowance, the right to salvage material, a 
transitional allowance, a rental income loss allowance, a business premises 
reestablishment allowance, and a business loss allowance. Moreover, project-
affected slums were rehabilitated by providing a new housing scheme where 
each affected slum-dwelling household was allotted a duplex apartment 
together with rights to the land to improve their security of tenure. Further, the 
BMRC also provided utilities (water and electricity) free of charge for 5 years as 
part of the compensation package. 
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Compensation and Impoverishment
Impoverishment and increased vulnerability of project-affected persons are 
often caused by the poor management of compensation delivery, which leads 
to money being wasted on liquor, gambling, and on nonproductive assets 
such as television sets and motorcycles. The delivery of compensation is often 
delayed because of bureaucratic procedures and project managers’ poor 
attitude to development. The apathy of project managers has often been a 
cause of the failure of cash compensation to restore and improve the income 
and livelihood of project-affected persons. Cernea and Mathur hinted at 
this issue: “is it possible that there is something else which is not yet under 
analytical scrutiny as it should be, and which may explain the recurrence of the 
same problems in resettlement?” (2008, 5). Unfortunately, their book did not 
pursue this issue further.
Many projects have failed to deliver compensation on time and in full. For 
example, in an ADB-funded national highway project in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh in India, compensation to affected persons was paid in 2007 based 
on the cost estimates of 2005 (ADB 2003). Although the prices of construction 
material and the cost of labor increased substantially in the intervening period, 
the project managers did not revise the resettlement budget to reflect 2007 
prices. Many affected persons, especially wealthy individuals, refused to 
accept the compensation offered and filed lawsuits requesting to review the 
compensation package. Ironically, the project management filed a counter 
lawsuit arguing that the package was “more than required.” 
Cash compensation for acquired property is often welcomed by poor rural 
households. They usually spend the bulk of cash received as compensation 
to defray the cost of occasional household expenditures, the wedding 
of a daughter, a pilgrimage, or house repairs. By using compensation in 
such activities, the affected households lose the opportunity to invest the 
compensation in productive investment. This will further impoverish them 
unless they are assisted by the project to learn vocational skills or invest their 
compensation in productive assets such as land. 
Harassment, extortion, and vulnerability are hallmarks of rural society and 
economy, and in such an environment, the poor and vulnerable can become 
easy targets. As soon as illiterate and vulnerable affected persons receive large 
sums of money, dominant elements of the local economy, such as landholders, 
moneylenders, and the police, pounce on them and extract significant amounts 
of cash under various pretexts such as loans owed, protection, and favors in 
finding or registering new land bought with cash compensation. Therefore, it is 
necessary to control and manage the cash compensation received by affected 
persons to prevent their impoverishment. Such asset management should be a 
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component of income restoration and improvement programs of development 
interventions given the vulnerability, illiteracy, and indebtedness among poor 
project-affected households.
One critical issue regarding the adequacy of cash compensation at 
replacement cost is the perceptions of different actors in the resettlement 
process—the project owners, advocacy nongovernment organizations, and 
affected persons. What matters most is how affected persons perceive their 
compensation packages. If they find that the compensation package is equal 
to replacement cost, the whole transaction takes the form of an asset exchange 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller based on informed decision making, 
prudence, and transparency. Otherwise, it may become a bitter experience for 
affected persons who may not use the cash compensation prudently, thereby 
losing their once-in-a-lifetime chance to invest a large sum of money to improve 
their life chances.
Conclusion
Often, the payment of compensation at full replacement cost for acquired 
properties, especially land, does not prevent the impoverishment of the 
affected persons. As Koppel (unpublished) pointed out, cash compensation 
is inadequate to purchase new land of comparable quality and size. Often, 
affected persons do not receive compensation in full before displacement. 
Payment in installments exposes them to rapidly increasing prices for land 
and construction materials. In the absence of livelihood opportunities, 
compensation is quickly exhausted, leaving the affected persons destitute. 
Unless the payment of compensation at replacement cost is accompanied by 
an income and livelihood restoration program, it will not help affected persons 
to restore their pre-project income, livelihoods, and socioeconomic status. 
Social preparation phase should be a part of resettlement planning in each 
project. During this period, project-affected persons could learn how to use 
cash compensation to restore and improve lost income sources and livelihoods. 
Consultations, training, and advice on financial matters are the core pillars of 
social preparation in a sustainable resettlement program. 
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10.  Development-Induced 
Displacement and 
Resettlement: Experiences 
of the People’s Republic 
of China and India 
by Hari Mohan Mathur
Development projects in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India have physically displaced large numbers of people during the past 60 years. In India, it is estimated that development projects have displaced 
about 60 million people during this period (Mathur 2013), while in the PRC about 
70 million have been displaced (Shi and Yu 2012). The resettlement programs 
of large infrastructure development projects, such as the Three Gorges Dam 
Project in the PRC and the Narmada River projects in India, have impoverished 
and marginalized large populations, triggering strong grassroots protests. 
Despite the protests and known risks of impoverishment that such programs 
entail, neither the PRC nor India has slowed the pace of development, which 
inevitably causes displacement. They both see development projects as the 
basis for enhancing the living standards of their large populations. 
This chapter examines how the PRC and India deal with massive physical 
displacement arising from large-scale development interventions. The 
resettlement policies and the implementing strategies of both countries are 
reviewed, as well as their performance in preventing the impoverishment 
and marginalization of resettlers. The chapter is based mostly on published 
documents. In India, there is no dearth of resettlement literature, and research 
publications—especially on the disruptive and impoverishing aspects 
of development—keep emerging. Since the controversy over the Sardar 
Sarovar Narmada Dam Project erupted in the mid-1980s, dozens of books 
and papers have been published on these projects alone, and, even today, 
the Narmada projects enjoy great popularity as a research topic. In contrast, 
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there is a noticeable lack of resettlement literature in English on the PRC. The 
Three Gorges Dam is the biggest dam in the world and yet little is known 
about its resettlement impacts. A number of studies conducted mainly by 
provincial and county officials and institutions responsible for resettlement 
exist, but these are largely inaccessible unpublished government reports 
meant for internal use (Tan 2008). McDonald-Wilmsen reported the problems 
she encountered while carrying out resettlement research in the PRC: 
“the fieldwork undertaken … was constrained by its political context—by 
municipal government restrictions that limited the study to the resettlement 
region in Hubei Province” (2000, 297). As a result, World Bank reports on the 
resettlement experience of various infrastructure projects continue to be the 
main source of information on resettlement programs in the PRC. 
Involuntary Resettlement Policies and Laws
A major World Bank review holds that the lack of a resettlement policy is the 
reason for most impoverishment associated with development interventions: 
“An extensive review of the anthropological and sociological research literature 
on resettlement, carried out by the task force to assess displacement impacts 
worldwide, found that the most frequent and severe cases of impoverishment 
have occurred in programs unguided by domestic or international policy 
norms” (1994a, ix). The World Bank sees resettlement policy as an important 
tool in controlling impoverishment risks and also in improving resettlement 
outcomes. It attributes the improved performance of resettlement planning and 
implementation in the PRC to major changes that have been introduced to its 
national policies and legal environment surrounding resettlement. 
During the 1960s and the early 1970s, dam projects in the PRC caused 
impoverishment and social and political discontent. In response to such 
agitation, the government reformed its resettlement policy, and major steps 
have been taken to formulate a new comprehensive resettlement policy (Nian 
1995, Shaohua 1995). In the new policy, “Compensation and assistance before 
resettlement, and support for production after resettlement are provided as per- 
the displaced persons’ needs and to the extent that national resources permit 
to enable the displaced persons’ livelihood to reach or exceed the former level” 
(Nian 1995, 59).
Since 1978, a series of laws and regulations have been adopted and fine-tuned, 
either for national-level application or for specific investment sectors such as 
water, transport, industry, and urban. These laws and regulations apply to all 
types of resettlement programs. The benefits of enacting a comprehensive 
resettlement policy and a legal framework can be seen in the impressive 
improvement in resettlement program implementation (World Bank 1994b). 
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The 1986 Land Administration Law and its 1988 amendments clarify the land 
rights of individuals and communes and the land registration processes. They 
also guide provinces, cities, prefectures, counties, districts, and collectives 
on how to acquire land for projects and implement resettlement programs 
associated with such projects. In the late 1980s, special measures were also 
introduced to compensate for lost assets at their replacement value, restore 
pre-relocation incomes, and attend to the specific needs of ethnic minority 
groups. The Land Administration Law formalizes procedures of consultation 
and grievance resolution for those who are affected by development projects. 
Provinces, cities, and counties are encouraged to draw up their own guidelines 
for consultation and grievance redress in conformity with the national law.
Resettlement planning and implementation are the responsibility of the 
government (Tan 2008).The government encourages self-reliance among 
resettlers and helps them restore their pre-project living standards and 
livelihoods. The Land Administration Law established general resettlement 
principles, leaving the development of detailed regulations to individual sectors, 
and made provincial and local administrations accountable for the application 
of the law and its regulations. The PRC is committed to ensuring that projects 
are undertaken to further the development process. In this process, it will take 
action to prevent impoverishment among its citizens. 
In the 1990s, the government formally promoted its Developmental Resettlement 
Policy (Yuefang and McDonald 2004, 9). The aim of the policy is to support the 
development of local economies so that resettlers can improve their livelihoods 
in the post-relocation phase of resettlement programs. The policy is an 
improvement on previous resettlement policies, which largely failed to resolve 
several resettlement problems, particularly impoverishment (Jing 2000). This 
policy led to better resettlement packages. 
Although the World Bank found the resettlement policies of the PRC to be 
forward-looking and development-oriented, several scholars have argued that 
they are still weak. Jing concludes his study of the resettlement experience in 
the PRC as follows: 
It is not only too early but also fallacious to declare [the PRC] as 
a model for the world in handling population resettlement in the 
construction of large-scale dams and reservoirs. Even [PRC] 
officials have repeatedly stated in writing that resettlement for 
new projects remains a daunting task for them to accomplish 
while there are a great many unsolved problems from the past 
for them to tackle (2000, 30–31). 
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In India, resettlement policies and laws have not evolved at the same speed as 
has been witnessed in the PRC. Development projects acquire private land 
through the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, as amended in 1984. The act prescribes 
cash compensation at market value for such land acquisition. As a result, India’s 
approach to displacement and resettlement arising from land acquisition is 
closely tied up with cash compensation principles based on the market value of 
property acquired. Moreover, the law only recognizes titleholders and excludes 
squatters and other informal dwellers from compensation programs, triggering 
impoverishment and further marginalization of such vulnerable groups. Cash 
compensation paid for acquired property is usually inadequate to replace it.  
The Government of India began to formulate a national resettlement and 
rehabilitation policy in the 1980s; but the policy took more than 2 decades to get 
adopted, despite pressure from the World Bank, nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs), and others. The government adopted the policy in 2007. Based on 
the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, the Government of India 
presented a new bill to repeal the Land Acquisition Act to the Parliament. In 
2013, the Parliament passed the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act.
During the past 30 years, the states of Gujarat, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh 
have adopted their own state-level resettlement policies, mainly to satisfy 
international development agencies. Such policies were haphazardly prepared 
copying the involuntary resettlement policies of the agencies. In addition, 
several large-scale domestic corporations have also formulated their own 
involuntary resettlement policies. Coal India, for example, operates about 500 
mines in India and its resettlement policy was formulated as a requirement 
of a World Bank loan. The policy applies only to the 25 mines that received 
financial assistance from the World Bank-sponsored Coal Sector Environment 
and Social Mitigation Project. Some states and public sector undertakings are 
steering away from the World Bank to other funding sources to escape its strict 
policy compliance stipulations (Mathur 2006). 
Country Commitment 
Next to the presence of a comprehensive resettlement policy is the government’s 
commitment that makes a difference to resettlement projects’ performance. 
The World Bank pointed out that “resettlement works when governments 
want it to work” (1994a, iv). According to an evaluation study, the restoration 
of resettlers’ incomes to their pre-project levels is a legal requirement in the 
PRC, and the state and resettlement authorities have displayed their strong 
commitment to realize it. As a result, resettlement programs succeed even in 
remote areas such as Yantan Province (World Bank 1998a). As a rule, all local 
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governments are committed to the implementation of resettlement programs. 
In areas that are significantly affected by irrigation and hydropower projects, the 
income and livelihood recovery of all affected persons is considered the most 
important objective of the local administration. In this regard, the performance 
of the Shuikou Project and the Yantan Hydroelectric Project, both of which were 
assisted by the World Bank, exceeded the World Bank’s resettlement safeguard 
policy standards. The projects set new standards regarding the formulation of 
income restoration programs for resettlers, and much of the credit for income 
recovery should go to the local governments. The projects demonstrate what 
can be done to make a resettlement program work when the executing agencies 
are committed to the program’s success (Picciotto et al. 2001).
A World Bank evaluation study rated resettlement programs of irrigation projects 
in Karnataka and Maharashtra in India that it had sponsored as “poor.” It found 
that the main cause of the poor performance of the projects in rehabilitating 
incomes and livelihoods of affected farmers was the failure of commitment at 
the highest level of government (World Bank 1998b). The evaluation also noted 
that “the strongest pressure the Bank could bring to bear did not influence 
resettlement success in the face of the absence of government commitment” 
(Picciotto et al. 2001, 132).
Compensation: For Individual or Community?
Land belongs to the community, not to individuals in the PRC. This makes 
the task of land acquisition easy for project authorities. They negotiate land 
requirements and applicable compensation rates with leaders who are 
influential representatives of the affected communities. There is little complaint 
about the manner in which compensation is determined or how it is paid. The 
determination and payment of compensation for land acquired in the PRC is 
therefore not a major problem (Picciotto et al. 2001). During the past 20 years, 
however, compensation rates for land acquired have gone up considerably. 
Village collectives continue to negotiate higher rates for farmland especially in 
peri-urban areas. 
In India, compensation calculation and payment are major stumbling blocks, as 
they involve the project-affected persons rather than their community leaders. 
The key problem regarding compensation is definitional. In India, “project-
affected person” is used in a restricted sense to refer only to owners who lose 
immovable property. Others who are not owners of land, such as agricultural 
workers, are excluded from the definition of a project-affected person and 
denied compensation and resettlement assistance. 
192 Lose to Gain: Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
In India, those who are entitled to receive cash compensation for their lost 
land receive only its market value, not its replacement value. The market value 
calculated by local administration is never sufficient to buy land of similar 
productivity or size, especially when physically displaced persons enter the 
land market in large numbers. Unable to find replacement land, farmers who 
once were landowners often end up as unskilled workers in nearby towns eking 
a living at a level much lower than what they had enjoyed before their land was 
acquired. 
Physically displaced people, especially tribal people and villagers in remote 
communities, seldom know what to do with the cash compensation they receive. 
Often, it is the largest amount of money that they handle in their lifetime. Some 
spend their compensation on drinking, gambling, ostentatious marriages, 
religious ceremonies, and purchasing of TVs and scooters. Compensation is 
thus frittered away in ways least likely to support the rehabilitation of their income 
and livelihood (Mathur 1999). Often, cash compensation is the surest and most 
direct route to impoverishment for many physically displaced persons in India. 
Despite the shortcomings of cash compensation, development projects 
frequently use the policy of cash for land. Perera (2000) found a strong 
compensation bias in the resettlement programs of thermal power projects in 
the Singrauli region of Uttar Pradesh State. Oleschak, reporting on the Sardar 
Sarovar project, states that “although the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal 
awards and the Supreme Court explicitly calls for providing compensation on 
the ‘land-for-land’ basis, the State of Madhya Pradesh is forcing displaced 
persons to accept cash compensation—which, as studies have shown, 
generally leads to impoverishment” (2006, 68).
Relocation
Relocation requires careful advance planning. The World Bank (1994a) outlined 
two approaches to relocation planning—one from the PRC and the other from 
India. To relocate 40,000 persons, the Yantan Hydroelectric Project in the PRC 
formulated a timetable that spread the relocation process of displaced persons 
over the entire duration of the project, keeping in mind the project’s capacity 
to handle the task optimally. Budgetary allocations were specified year by year. 
On average, 5,000 persons were relocated annually for 8 years (1986–1993) in 
accordance with the plan. Relocation at this pace did not strain the project’s 
organizational capacity or financial resources, nor did it necessitate any hurried 
or last-minute emergency resettlement. As a result, the whole operation moved 
smoothly without shock or trauma to the large number of displaced persons, 
and avoided impoverishing them by providing opportunities to reestablish their 
livelihoods at the resettlement sites. 
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The Yantan example shows that resettlement with development is possible 
even if a large number of persons are affected, provided that resettlement 
planning is conducted in a comprehensive and a meaningful way. However, 
in the Three Gorges Project, Steil and Yuefang (2002) found that the ideal of 
resettlement with development was an ambiguous concept that poses serious 
challenges for resettlement officials. Yuefang and McDonald (2004) argued that 
resettlement with development is only an ideal, and very few projects have 
attempted to apply it in the PRC. They pointed out, based on 40 years of field 
experience, that the approach has been applied inadequately in the PRC, 
except in the case of hydropower-related resettlement programs. 
One notable feature of the Three Gorges Project’s resettlement programs 
is that it ran parallel to the construction of the dam. This required thorough 
planning so that the relocation process could be completed before the 
commissioning of the dam. But not all aspects of resettlement appear to have 
received careful attention from the project authorities, and this jeopardized 
the chances of completing the resettlement process before impounding the 
reservoir. Tan observed that “resettlement components [of the Three Gorges 
Project] are often underdesigned, underfunded, and understaffed” (2008, 5). 
In large infrastructure projects, a decisive factor in resettlement planning is 
the number of project-affected persons who need to be relocated. However, 
accurate estimates are always difficult, and numbers tend to increase when the 
technical designs of the project are completed. As a result, in the Three Gorges 
Project, estimates of the number of project-affected persons varied from 
1.1 million to 1.9 million. 
In the PRC, an important good relocation practice is “near resettlement,” 
involving the relocation of displaced rural farming people on the hilly land of 
local communities. This was considered a great success in the Three Gorges 
Project. But Tan (2008) found that the measures taken to reclaim uphill land 
were inadequate, jeopardizing the success of the near-resettlement programs. 
Uphill land resettlement programs encountered several difficulties. First, 
all uphill land parcels were not available for near-resettlement purposes, as 
some hilly areas were already demarcated for national reforestation programs. 
As a result, sufficient suitable replacement land could not be found in hilly 
areas close to the displaced persons’ original settlements. Second, inadequate 
capital for land improvement, deteriorating water supply situation, and soil 
erosion arising from runoff on steep slopes further compounded the problem. 
Third, the capacity of near-resettlement programs to overcome the shortage 
of farmland in nearby areas for those physically displaced was overestimated. 
The other modality of relocation, distant resettlement, also had problems 
(Padovani 2006a and 2007). Padovani (2007) provides a vivid account of 
the problems involved in moving displaced persons from the reservoir area 
to a distant resettlement location. Shanghai Municipality, where some of the 
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physically displaced had moved, used a strict resettler selection process. Only 
after successful screening was a displaced person or household allowed to 
resettle on the outskirts of the municipality. Persons with a peasant registration 
certificate had to satisfy the following criteria:
•	 A household has fewer than three children.
•	 There is no report against the household members at a police station.
•	 Both cultivated fields and the dwelling place were flooded and lost.
•	 A physically and mentally challenged resettler was to be accompanied by 
three young adults who possess agricultural residence licenses and are 
capable of supporting the patient. 
Life was not easy for those who succeeded in obtaining permits to resettle 
on the outskirts of Shanghai. The policy adopted by the local cadres was to 
disperse physically displaced households as widely as possible within the 
municipality, rather than to resettle them as a group in one district. This policy 
aimed to prevent them from becoming a homogenous small community that 
was sufficiently united to put forth their demands to the municipal resettlement 
authorities. Moreover, the cadres wanted the resettlers to share their resources 
with their host population, which they believed would help resettlers integrate 
with their host communities.
Many resettlers complained about living in a peri-urban environment. Shanghai 
was too expensive for them, and for the first time in their lives they had to pay 
for everything, including water and firewood. Taking peasants from rural areas 
and giving them land on the outskirts of the city overlooked one key issue in 
resettlement planning—the need to find resettlement areas where displaced 
persons could use their skills and other capital. Before displacement, the 
resettled households largely depended on an informal economy, where cash 
was not the primary vehicle for transactions. They cultivated their lands and 
collected timber, firewood, and fruits from nearby forests on the hilly slopes. 
After moving to the city fringe, each resettler had to find a job. This was a 
difficult task, especially when the unemployment rate is rising, old state-owned 
enterprises were closing, and their level of literacy did not match the job 
requirements in the new economy. Their resident permits did not help them 
either, as the job market in Shanghai is highly competitive. To make matters 
worse, they had to compete with economic migrants arriving from all over the 
country as well as with the local people.
In India, generally there are no relocation timetables for resettlement. For 
example, the Narmada Sardar Sarovar Project did not have a relocation 
timetable. The Narmada Control Authority prepared a timetable to 
relocate 126,172 persons over a 5-year period toward the end of project 
implementation. The authority planned to relocate 86,000 persons, or 70% 
of the total number of physically displaced persons, during the final 12 
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months of the project (World Bank 1994a). During the first 7 years of the 
project (1985–1992), the project authorities resettled only 20,000 people 
(16% of the physically displaced persons). The “bunching” of resettlement 
in the project’s final year required a level of organizational capacity that the 
resettlement agency did not possess. As a result, the resettlement of a large 
number of physically displaced persons within a very short period of time 
became an emergency under the pressure of rising water levels. The basic 
principle of synchronizing of the relocation of physically displaced persons 
with the gradual progress of dam construction was ignored by the authority.
Relocation planning in the PRC is done with care, allowing sufficient time for 
resources and infrastructure to be ready before the resettlers arrive at their 
relocation sites, thus minimizing the transition period between resettlement 
and restoration of resettlers’ livelihoods (Meikle and Walker 2000). A good 
example is the Shuikou Hydropower Dam Project, where the relocation site was 
developed well in advance of the resettlers’ arrival. “The project terraced land 
and removed stones on formerly uncultivated steep hills. On the new terraces, 
fruits were planted at project expense 4–5 years in advance of resettlers’ arrival. 
By the time displaced families moved in, the new orchards were close to fruition 
and produced cash crops” (World Bank 1998a, 80). 
In India, feasibility studies at the relocation sites are not generally undertaken 
before the displaced persons move in. Instead of feasibility studies, the 
project authorities merely check that land is available for the relocation of 
displaced persons. Displaced persons are rarely consulted to learn their views, 
recommendations, and worries. For example, when relocating persons under 
the Pong Dam Project in the Province of Himachal Pradesh in the Thar Desert 
areas of the State of Rajasthan, the only factor that was considered was land 
availability at potential resettlement sites. Once the land area was identified, the 
displaced were asked to travel a great distance to an area that was physically, 
climatically, socially, and culturally completely different from their own. Unable 
to make a living in the harsh conditions that deterred even Rajasthan’s landless 
poor from settling in that region, the Pong people gave up their efforts to be 
resettlers and returned home empty-handed (Mathur 1995b).
Due to the lack of resettlement planning, displaced persons are sometimes 
forced to relocate more than once. For example, the displaced persons of 
several thermal power projects in the Singrauli region of Uttar Pradesh were 
subjected to multiple relocation programs because of development interventions 
introduced at different times in the region in the 1960s (Thukral and Singh 1995, 
110). The first group of people was displaced by the Rihand Dam Project in the 
1960s. Subsequent projects in the form of mines, railway lines, thermal power 
plants, and industries, as well as the efforts of the Special Area Development 
Authority—all of which occurred within a 20-kilometer radius of the Rihand 
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reservoir—forced the resettlers to undergo repeated displacement, sometimes 
as many as five times. 
In dam projects, such as irrigation and hydropower projects, relocation of 
displaced persons is to be conducted ahead of the impounding of water. Such 
programming is often missing, as in case of the Almatti Dam Project in Karnataka 
State (World Bank 1998b). In 1996 and 1997, the reservoir waters inundated 
communities before resettlement sites were ready to receive the resettlers. As 
a result, large numbers of people had to be evacuated from the reservoir area 
using boats and helicopters. This shows that the dam construction schedule 
was not synchronized with the relocation schedule. Instead, the construction of 
the dam took priority without paying attention to both intended and unintended 
consequences of major decisions regarding time targets of project completion. 
As the World Bank (1998b) stated, it is an example of how not to do a relocation.
Income and Livelihood Restoration
Income restoration is the most elusive element in any resettlement policy. 
In a critical response to the World Bank’s much-publicized 1994 review of 
resettlement, Oxfam (1995) pointed out that the World Bank review could 
not document a single project where a displaced population had restored 
its standard of living at least to the pre-project level. Scudder made a similar 
observation: “within the major dam-building countries, including the [United 
States], the PRC, and India, I am aware of none that can document that they 
have been able to restore the incomes of the majority of resettlers” (2005, 20). 
A policy of employing all employable individuals is rooted in the history of the 
PRC’s economic policy. This helps explain the restatement of this standard 
in resettlement experience (World Bank 1998c). The resettlement experiences 
in the Shuikou and Yantan projects demonstrate how sound resettlement 
practices led to rapid household income restoration in large-scale relocation 
sites before relocation. The two projects tried first to exploit niche activities on 
the land that remained underdeveloped. These included orchards on terraced 
slopes; bamboo and tea on the steeper slopes; forestry on the steepest slopes; 
goats in the drier hills; integrated fish, duck, and hog farms near reservoirs; 
oyster beds and fish cages in the reservoirs; and pigs and mushrooms in 
confined spaces next to dwellings. The resettlement authorities of the Shuikou 
Project wisely anticipated that the regional economy would grow fast, providing 
jobs for those who were relocated in the area. The success of the project in 
providing adequate income sources to all resettled households within a short 
period of time was boosted by rapid economic growth in the region. Rapid 
economic growth and the strong commitment of project resettlement officials 
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to implement the resettlement program saved the large number of relocated 
persons from impoverishment and marginalization. 
In India, as many as 75% of 60 million persons displaced by development 
projects during the past 6 decades have been physically relocated without any 
support for rehabilitating their income and livelihood sources. The World Bank 
(1994a) concluded that in India until 1992 most affected families failed to regain 
their previous standard of living. 
The track record of income restoration in India remains unsatisfactory. Evidence 
of how development projects frequently leave behind a trail of impoverishment 
is overwhelming (Mathur and Marsden 1998). This is true of projects that had 
special provisions to restore the incomes and livelihoods of project-affected 
persons. A good example is the World Bank-funded Coal India Project (Mathur 
2008). The project failed to restore affected persons’ income and livelihood 
sources through its self-employment assistance program (Resettlement News 
2003).
Institutional Capacity
The planning culture in the PRC that deals with large-scale resettlement 
programs is well organized and developed. Large-scale infrastructure 
development projects usually manage construction contracts with local 
authorities, thereby sharing the responsibility and ownership of such projects 
with local people who will be directly impacted by them. In such projects, 
resettlement programs are sometimes implemented as separate projects 
with their own budgets, personnel, implementation schedules, and evaluation 
programs. This separation of resettlement from project construction helps plan 
and design the resettlement program tailored to various income categories, 
thereby increasing resettlers’ chances of escaping impoverishment (World 
Bank 1994a).
In the PRC, resettlement programs in most sectors are implemented mainly by 
local governments with funds provided by project agencies. In some projects, 
the entire resettlement planning and implementation process is devolved to 
local governments. Usually, such devolution happens in projects such as rural 
development projects where resettlement processes take place within one 
administrative jurisdiction (World Bank 1994b). The transfer of responsibility for 
most aspects of resettlement to local or city governments has the advantage 
that (i) resettlement solutions are developed locally, and resettlers and their 
hosts can hold local authorities accountable; and (ii) resettlement programs 
can draw upon diverse technical skills and experience of other development 
projects.
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In India, there is no central agency to coordinate resettlement programs either 
at the central government or state levels. As a result, resettlement planning 
and implementation are left to the project authorities. Although resettlement 
implementation units have been established in the recent past as part of the 
project management structure, their staffing has been inadequate to manage 
complicated resettlement issues. 
In 2001, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) established an 
environmental and social development unit at its headquarters in Delhi. However, 
it did not have sufficient resettlement specialists to deal with the compensation, 
relocation, and income restoration aspects of project management. As a result, 
NHAI engineers are designated as resettlement officers in many projects, where 
they are expected to manage both technical operations and resettlement tasks. 
Most of these engineers are unhappy with this arrangement and do not want to 
engage in resettlement programs, which in their view requires different expertise. 
They feel that taking over the additional tasks of resettlement management 
prevents them from performing their technical duties fully (Mathur 2006).
In the mid-1990s, several large-scale infrastructure projects attempted to 
strengthen their resettlement units by recruiting social scientists on an ad hoc 
basis. A few projects created a separate cadre of officers for resettlement. The 
National Thermal Power Corporation was the first organization to recognize 
the importance of social science inputs in resettlement programs and their 
implementation, and recruited social scientists especially for field positions. 
Coal India created a separate cadre of community development, resettlement, 
and rehabilitation officers to deal exclusively with resettlement programs. Similar 
specialized resettlement personnel are now found in private infrastructure 
development agencies such as the Tata and Adani groups. 
Despite the recognition of the role of resettlement specialists in development 
projects, the conditions under which resettlement personnel work are not 
congenial. They see no future in their careers and feel frustrated. For example, 
among the Coal India resettlement officers, there is a feeling that they have 
been given these positions only to meet the World Bank requirements. Once 
the project is completed, they will either revert to their previous units or lose 
their jobs (Mathur 2008). In the private sector, in recent years, the recognition 
of the value of safeguard policy compliance has been noted. The India 
Infrastructure Financing Company, for example, incorporated a safeguard 
policy component into its corporate policy and established an environmental 
and social safeguard unit at its headquarters in Delhi with several permanent 
social and environmental professionals to attend to safeguard requirements of 
projects that it support (IIFCL 2013).
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Consultation and Participation 
The resettlement literature shows that when project-affected persons are 
consulted regarding their physical displacement, relocation, and associated 
risks and benefits, they come forward with their own plans or even help project 
authorities formulate and implement resettlement plans. This phase is known as 
the “social preparation phase.” Conversely, when project information remains 
inaccessible to project-affected persons, rumors, gossip, and misinformation 
replace it, triggering local agitation against projects and providing opportunities 
for corrupt practices. If they learn about losses and potential risks just before 
they are relocated, the affected persons will not be able to organize themselves 
to deal with their new physical, social, and cultural environment. Compensation 
negotiations and planning for income and livelihood restoration are virtually 
absent in such situations. 
In India, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy (R&RP) of 2007 
provides a framework for consultation and participation. The recommendation 
in the R&RP that a socioeconomic impact assessment is required for some 
projects indicates that room is being created for consultation with displaced 
persons. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 further expanded the room for 
consultation and participation in resettlement planning and implementation.
In the PRC, displaced persons’ participation in and consultation on resettlement 
planning and implementation are key areas of resettlement programs. For 
example, in the Shuikou Hydropower Dam Project, displaced persons were 
consulted on many resettlement matters from the initial phases of the project, 
and this participatory process continued throughout the life of the project 
(World Bank 1998a). During the early phases of the project, consultation was 
limited. Only town and village leaders participated when resettlement maps 
were drawn up indicating preferred sites for new towns and villages and the 
availability of unused land for development. In the next phase of the project, 
however, the affected households were brought into the resettlement planning 
process. Local government officials engaged in detailed discussions with each 
affected household to determine a resettlement plan that was specific to each 
village and to ensure a sufficient allocation of village development funds. These 
households were allowed to choose their own post-relocation occupations 
within the limits set by the availability of funds and natural resources in the 
area. Resettler participation extended to some macro-level decisions about 
relocation as well. Households and local officials discussed information about 
the proposed relocation sites at new villages and the merits of connecting them 
with other villages and towns. 
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Several other resettlement programs displayed a similar commitment to resettler 
participation in resettlement planning and implementation. In the Shanghai 
Sewerage Project, for example, strenuous efforts were made to disseminate 
project and resettlement information among project-affected persons. Project 
offices and local governments used pamphlets, booklets, posters, films, and 
neighborhood and individual meetings to disseminate project and resettlement 
information. Such media were used to inform people of a wide range of issues 
such as compensation policy and rates, other entitlements, relocation schemes, 
and their availability. Project-sponsored neighborhood meetings helped people 
to air views and raise issues with project authorities. These meetings were 
followed up with individual visits, as required. The project team members 
shared their telephone numbers and office addresses as well as the addresses 
of the grievance-redress committees, thereby giving project-affected persons 
good access to project authorities and information (World Bank 2004). 
Until the 1990s, India did not engage displaced persons in resettlement 
planning and implementation. Usually, they came to know about a project and 
how it would affect them when they were given legal notice informing them that 
their land would be taken over for a project. By that time, the project would 
be almost ready to implement, leaving no room for any design change or 
consultation. Even preliminary project information often remains inaccessible 
to most project-affected persons. Project and district officials view project 
information as sensitive and prefer not to part with it. For example, displaced 
persons facing submergence after the construction of the Rihand Dam received 
no prior information about the project. “When the waters were released, they 
had literally to run” (Thukral 1992, 15). The situation has since changed with 
the promulgation of a law that gives affected persons the right to information 
(Government of India 2005). 
While development NGOs tend to support consultations with project-affected 
persons and encourage their participation in project activities, they sometimes 
do not favor participatory development. Commenting on the anti-dam movement 
launched by the NGO Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), Singh said, 
It has been less successful in developing a truly democratic 
representation of the people’s interests, and of the diversity of 
these interests…The oustees (physically displaced persons) 
have never really been their own spokespersons, nor have they 
been incorporated in the top leadership of the NBA. In fact, 
as the momentum of the movement grew, the functioning of 
the NBA became somewhat less democratic and participatory 
(1997, 13–14). 
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Recently, several project authorities have adopted participatory approaches 
to resettlement planning and implementation. They have understood the 
advantages of participatory approaches and have increasingly sought NGO 
assistance to reach out to project-affected persons and their communities. For 
example, the ADB-funded National Highways Authority of India Project applied 
a participatory approach to resettlement on the Tumkur–Haveri section of 
National Highway Number 4 in Karnataka State, and was successful in getting 
resettlers’ cooperation and support.  
The Role of Nongovernment Organizations 
in Resettlement
NGOs remain by far the most important advocates for the rights of people 
displaced by development programs. The presence of NGOs in a project 
area makes displaced persons more vocal in demanding their entitlements. 
NGO-supported protests and agitations are becoming more aggressive 
and widespread, sometimes proving to be a major hurdle in implementing 
development projects. Projects have even been rolled back because of their 
persistent campaigns. Marsden pointed out that “the emergence of large 
number of organizations of civil society has meant that poor performance is 
increasingly visible, and more easily translates into pressures for action and 
change. It is no longer easy for powerful organizations to ride roughshod 
over the interests of the weak and marginalized, or to impose solutions which 
have not been publicly debated and agreed to by all the major stakeholders” 
(1998, 24).
NGOs did not play a role in resettlement planning in the PRC until the 21st 
century. During the past 10 years, a small number of rural and urban physically 
displaced persons, supported by NGOs, have agitated and opposed 
development interventions which seriously affected their livelihoods, residence, 
and culture. Protest in any form that is seen as obstructing a construction 
project is summarily dismissed by the government as subversion. Speaking 
about repression in the Three Gorges Project, Sullivan noted: “sufficient police 
and legal forces have been deployed to make sure that local agitators cannot 
gain an upper hand and that demonstrations, such as those that have slowed 
the Narmada River project in India, do not occur in the Three Gorges area” 
(2006, 311).
In India, some NGOs are supportive of resettlement programs and are willing to 
help such projects, while others are confrontational and attempt to obstruct them. 
Morse and Berger (1992) noted that NGOs greatly assisted the resettlement 
process of the Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat. The identification, selection, 
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and purchase of resettlement sites, and many other aspects of the relocation 
process were assisted by NGOs in close collaboration with project officials. 
The NGOs that operated in the Narmada Valley (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh 
and Maharashtra States) illustrate the differences in NGO approaches toward 
resettlement programs. While the NBA has opposed the dam construction 
and three resettlement programs associated with it, the NGO ARCH-Vahini 
fully supported the dam construction and assisted its resettlement program 
(Dhagamwar 1997). 
Summary 
Since the 1980s, the PRC has formulated comprehensive resettlement policies 
and laws that conform to international standards. They are applicable to all 
resettlement projects regardless of funding sources. They treat resettlement as 
a development opportunity and ensure that resettlers at least regain their pre-
project level income levels. The resettlement policies and laws have created 
room for local leaders at the village, township, county, and provincial levels to 
work closely with resettlement officers.  
As Meikle and Zhu point out, the strength of PRC’s resettlement practice, 
whether rural or urban, “has traditionally derived from the nature of the 
operational environment in which it has been undertaken.” Specifically, it stems 
from “the persistence of planning elements in the [the PRC] economy, coupled 
with collective ownership…and the importance of local government in shaping 
investment. When combined, these factors allow accurate identification of 
affected people, protect rights to employment, and foster the ability to create 
that employment” (2000, 130). 
The resettlement program of the Three Gorges Project continues to receive 
strong criticism from human rights activists. This indicates the difficulties that 
the PRC continues to encounter in resettlement planning and implementation. 
As Meikle and Zhu (2000) noted, economic reforms have eroded the right to 
employment of displaced farmers, shopkeepers, enterprise employees, and 
illegal migrants, and their right to generate self-employment. Another criticism 
is that compensation payments serve as a lure, but promises are frequently not 
kept. The most serious criticism of the PRC resettlement policy is that almost 
all legal channels for appeal are cut off in state-mandated projects such as 
dam projects. Stein states that “while appeals and protests appear appropriate 
over the Three Gorges and other displacement operations, the government 
effectively suppresses the rights of displaced communities” (1998, 9).
Studies on resettlement programs in India indicate that they do not work 
well. Much that has been written on resettlement underperformance—a litany 
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of hardships inflicted by forced evictions—is an accurate reflection of the 
situation. Resettlement continues to be a dreadful experience for millions of 
people in India. As a result, the dominant topic in the resettlement debate in 
India is induced impoverishment.
Until recently, the lack of a national resettlement policy in India was the subject 
of serious discussion and criticism. Although a formal policy officially became 
effective only in 2004 (and was replaced in 2007), its absence was not such 
an obstacle to planning and implementation of resettlement programs as was 
commonly believed. In India, resettlement planning and implementation are 
conducted by the state governments. They have managed these operations 
with their own policies, government orders, and regulations sometimes 
designed either for specific projects or specific sectors’ projects (Mathur 1997). 
The Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal award, for example, issued in 1979 to 
the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, has been the basis 
for carrying out resettlement programs exclusively for the people affected by 
the Narmada projects. This was a major policy initiative, albeit meant only 
for one large project. Highlighting the significance of the tribunal directives, 
Bhattarai states: 
These were stipulated even before the much applauded World 
Bank guidelines were formulated…the award appears to endorse 
the overarching principle, later evolved by the World Bank, that 
the economic status of the [project-affected persons] should 
be restored at least to the pre-move level. Over and above, 
the very idea of setting up of resettlement and rehabilitation a 
precondition for displacement indicates the strong resolve of 
the Tribunal not to make it an issue to be forgotten later in the 
actual implementation of the project” (2001, 224).
Social impact assessment is a progressive element of India’s resettlement 
policy (Mathur 2011). The policy has clearly mandated that if involuntary 
resettlement is required for a new project or for the expansion of an existing 
one, the government must ensure that a social impact assessment study is 
carried out in the proposed affected areas. This helps planners to anticipate 
the likely adverse social impacts of the project and to initiate action to avert or 
at least to mitigate these impacts. 
The poor quality of resettlement planning and implementation in India is often 
viewed as intolerable, and outcomes of protests led by the affected groups and 
their NGO supporters are translating into improved resettlement packages. 
Human rights activists and NGOs are demanding better resettlement policy 
and laws to guarantee displaced persons’ human rights.  
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In India, it is no longer possible to ride roughshod over the rights of displaced 
people. “India cannot send storm troopers to evict peasants; governments lose 
elections if they do so…Its system of pluralistic political participation means 
that the opposition has a say: After sustained activism, policies are altered, 
roads change directions, and dams’ heights get reduced” (Tripathi 2007, 30). 
For example, Tata recently had to move their small car project out of West 
Bengal to Gujarat because of the persistent protest movement against the 
project (Mathur 2013).
Project-affected persons struggling for their rights are protected by a strong 
and independent judicial system in India. On this issue, the Supreme Court 
of India stated that “no development project, however laudable, can possibly 
justify impoverishment of large sections of people and their destitution” (1982). 
Over the years, the resettlement planning process has been improved 
significantly, and this is reflected in resettlement outcomes in both the PRC and 
India. Resettlement units are now in place in most projects, and resettlement 
management capacity is being built up through training programs. People are 
being brought into decision-making processes through consultation programs. 
Some successes have also been achieved, and more such stories are gradually 
coming to light in the PRC and India. 
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Is Involuntary Resettlement a Development Opportunity?
A crucial issue that confronts development in South Asia is how to build a 
better life for people displaced by infrastructure development projects. 
 This book comprises recent displacement and resettlement case 
studies conducted by eight anthropologists in South Asia. Each contributor 
wrote around the key theme of the book: Is involuntary resettlement 
a development opportunity for those displaced by development 
interventions? In this book, ”resettlement” carries a broader meaning 
to include physical and economic displacement, restricted access to 
public land such as forests and parks, relocation, income rehabilitation, 
and self-relocation.
 The book demonstrates that despite significant progress in national 
policies, laws, and regulations, their application still requires more 
commitment, adequate resources, and better supervision. 
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